Commercial High Technology Innovations Face Uncertain Future Amid Emerging  BRICS  Compulsory Licensing and IT Interoperability Frameworks by Kogan, Lawrence A.


















   
   
 
       
   
  
Commercial High Technology 
Innovations Face Uncertain Future 
Amid Emerging “BRICS” Compulsory 
Licensing and IT Interoperability 
Frameworks† 
LAWRENCE A. KOGAN*
† © 2011 Lawrence A. Kogan.
* Lawrence A. Kogan is founder and Managing Attorney of The Kogan Law 
Group, P.C., a New York City–based multidisciplinary professional services firm specialized
in identifying and addressing emerging regulatory, policy and trade risks posed to 
multinational company assets, operations and supply-chains.  He is President/Director of
the Institute for Trade, Standards and Sustainable Development (ITSSD), a Princeton,
NJ-based nonprofit legal research, analytics and educational organization admitted as an 
ad hoc observer to the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) Standing
Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP).  This Article was inspired by the side-bar event
the author convened in Geneva, Switzerland on October 12, 2010 during the 15th Session of
the WIPO SCP entitled, Can Government Intervention Sustain Economic Incentive, 
Technological Innovation, and Capital Flows?. The flyer, handout materials and Précis 
of the side-bar event are accessible online at the ITSSD at http://www.itssd.org/ITSSD
%20October%2012,%202010%20WIPO%20SCP%20side-bar%20event%20flyer.pdf;
http://www.itssd.org/ITSSD%20WIPO%20SCP%20Side-bar%20Geneva%2010-12-
10%20-%20Handout%20Materials.pdf; and http://www. itssd.org/ITSSD%20WIPO%20
SCP%20Side-bar%20Geneva%2010-12-10%20Precis%20Final.pdf.  This Article was 
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I. INTRODUCTION—HISTORICALLY, CAPITAL-
INTENSIVE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND 
COMMERCIALIZATION  HAS INCLUDED SIGNIFICANT
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL RISKS AND OTHER
UNCERTAINTIES
The pathways that lead to the success of cutting-edge technologies are 
often fraught with risk, difficulty, and uncertainty.  These issues are
particularly prevalent under a regime involving lengthy time horizons for 
competent research, development, and commercialization, which may
require regulatory approvals.  These challenges are known to be endemic 
to capital-intensive technology development which requires significant 
follow-on funding, particularly in highly regulated industries such as life 
sciences (e.g., pharmaceuticals/biotechnology1 and electronic medical
devices2) and clean technology (which may be subdivided into clean or 
renewable energy generation3 and clean or renewable energy efficiency
technologies and services, the former having more direct exposure to the 
regulatory environment4). Such conditions also pose considerable obstacles
to the development and introduction of new paradigm-setting information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) categorized by reference to the
economic activities generated by their application to and use within other 
industry sectors,5 including healthcare, energy and the environment,
1. See Scott Gottlieb, Medical Innovation in Peril, in  REFORMING AMERICA’S 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: THE FLAWED VISION OF OBAMACARE 56–57 (Scott W. Atlas ed., 
Hoover Institution Press 2010) (citing C. Johnston, Clinical Trials: Rising Costs Limit
Innovation, 62(6) ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY A6, A6–A7 (2007) and J. A. DiMasi, R. W. 
Hansen, & H. G. Gradbowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 151, 151–85 (2003), available at http:// 
www.aei.org/docLib/Reforming-Americas-Health-Care-System-Gottlieb-101810.pdf).
 2. Impact of the Medical Device Safety Act on Venture Capital Investment in 
Medical Technology and Innovation: Before the Health Subcomm. of the H. Energy and 
Commerce Comm. 2–3 (May 12, 2009) (statement of Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n.), 
available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download
&gid=453&Itemid=93. 
3. See Cleantech Investment and Private Equity: An Industry Survey, NORTON 
ROSE LLP, 5 (July 14, 2010), available at http://www.nortonrose.com/files/clean tech-
investment-and-private-equity-an-industry-survey-pdf-5mb-30016.pdf. 
4. See Cleantech and Renewables Update, SJ BEWIN, 1 (July 14, 2010), 
http://www.sjberwin.com/Contents/Publications/pdf/210/e421e383_70c2_4d12_8caf_b54  
b582b4fc6.pdf. 
5. See U.N. DEP’T. OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, STATISTICS DIV., INT’L STANDARD
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF ALL ECON. ACTIVITIES REV. 4, at 278, ¶¶ 218–20, tbl.4.3, 
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transportation, information and education, emergency and disaster
management, and defense and national security.6  According to one recent 
study, “the ICT sector undertakes large investments in R&D and is very
innovative.  In terms of R&D expenditures, patents, and venture capital 
investment, it exceeds other industries by a large margin.”7 
The establishment of a technology’s economic value is one of the most
formidable obstacles faced by inventors and innovators of technologies with
long gestation periods (e.g., development, testing, and scaling) and
sustained high capital flows.  Such economic value is determined by
management’s ability to reduce associated economic and legal uncertainties
that otherwise would impede technology development, commercialization, 
and market entry.  This assessment of value, which is increasingly sought 
through greater cooperation between financial and corporate investors,8 
is highly contingent on elements of certainty such as, principally robust 
enforcement of intellectual property rights to ensure market exclusivity. 
This is especially the case in the life sciences sector.  According to 
one well-known venture capitalist, the expectation of substantial revenue 
losses resulting from a large number of drug patents expiring within the 
next few years and the reality of reduced R&D productivity “creat[es] an
incentive for pharmaceutical companies to pay a lot of money for early-
stage program[s] . . . [and to] . . . look[] to create partnerships externally 
to reduce R&D expenditure.”9  Yet, patent protection has also become
U.N. DOC. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/4/Rev.4, U.N. Sales No. E08.XVII.25 (2008), 
available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/isic-4.asp.
6. See Graham Vickery & Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, R&D and Innovation in the 
ICT Sector: Toward Globalization and Collaboration, in  THE GLOBAL INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY REPORT 2008–2009 95, 95–97 (World Economic Forum 2009), available at
http://www.tubisad.org.tr/Tr/Library/Analizler/Toward%20Globalization%20and%20Co
llaboration.pdf.
7. Id. at 97. 
8. James Harris, A Design for Life Sciences: Q&A Stephen Bunting, REAL DEALS
EUROPE 22, 24 (May 20, 2010), available at http://www.abingworth.com/images/Real
Deals2010.pdf; see also UPDATE 3-GE, Partners to Invest $55 Mln in Power-Grid
Tech, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/16/ge-grid-
idUSN1611244920101116 (“General Electric Co and a group of venture capital firms
said . . . they would invest $55 million in a dozen start-up ventures and partnerships working
on new power-grid technologies.”). 
9. See Harris, supra note 8, at 25. See also Strategy Consultants, Fight or Flight?:
Diversification vs. Rx-focus in Big Pharma’s Quest for Sustained Growth, ROLAND
BERGER (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.rolandberger. com/media/pdf/Roland_
Berger_Fight_or_flight_Shortversion_20101025.pdf; see also Ben Adams, Two
Thirds of Pharma Companies Face “Strategic Crisis”, INPHARM (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.inpharm.com/news/101025/two-thirds-pharma-companies-face-Strategic-crisis;
see also Andrew Jack, Drugs Groups Diversify Away from Patents, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
Oct. 21, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d6fb3f60-dc9d-11df-84f5-
00144feabdc0.html; see also Kenneth Getz & Rachael Zuckerman, Anticipating 
Structural Change in the CRO Market—Sponsor Crises Lead to an Unstable Landscape, 12 
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an important element in the valuation of computer software companies.
For example, a recently released patent study reveals that 60% of venture
capitalists negotiating with software firms:
indicated that patents were an important factor in their investment decision . . . 
[compared with] . . . 73% for biotech and 85% for medical devices . . . [and
that] . . . substantial percentages of other types of investors, such as angels, 
investment banks, and other companies found patents important to their
investment decisions.10 
At least one other study suggests that “the economic and strategic value 
of patents is subject to a very high degree of uncertainty.  Patents vary
widely in their value, and much of the value associated with intellectual
property depends on endogenous outcomes in technology and product 
markets” (i.e., commercialization efforts).11  However, this study also shows 
how certain exogenous (i.e., formal institutional or systemic) factors can
be quite determinative of the commercial success of patented technologies. 
Indeed, there are many economic and legal uncertainties surrounding the
patenting of technologies: (1) patent allowance, (2) patent scope, (3) patent
grant delay, (4) patent enforceability, and (5) patent value.  In particular,
the study’s findings show that delays surrounding the issuance of a Notice
of Patent Allowance by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) will effectively delay cooperative commercialization efforts vis-
à-vis technology contracting and licensing.  This is especially the case in
technologies requiring long development periods12 where alternative 
forms of intellectual property (IP) protection are not available, leading to
longer patent allowance lags.13  In other words, reduced patent allowance
uncertainty can result in reduced patent scope uncertainty, which in turn, 
CONTRACTPHARMA 70, 70–74 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.contractpharma.com/
articles/2010/10/anticipating-structural-change-in-the-cro-market.
10. Robert Merges & Pamela Samuelson, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: The Berkeley 
Patent Survey (Part III of III), PATENTLYO BLOG (July 21, 2010), http://www.
patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/patenting-by-entrepreneurs-the-berkeley-patent-survey-
part-iii-of-iii.html. 
11. Joshua S. Gans, David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, The Impact of Uncertain
Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant
Delays, 54 MGMT. SCI. 982, 982–97 (May 2008), available at http://works.bepress. 
com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=joshuagans. 
12. “[A patent allowance lag is] the time between patent application and patent
allowance.”  Id. at 989.  “While electronics and scientific instruments are associated with 
a relatively short patent allowance lag (27months), average allowance lags are much 
longer in biotechnology (38 months).” Id. at 991. 
13. Id. at 29. 
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can significantly increase both the probability and the frequency of
securing patent cooperation and licensing agreements within a relatively 
shorter period of time.14  These findings have important implications for
start-up and repeat innovators, many of whom are likely to increase their
rate of licensing, absent “significant [lingering] uncertainty . . . [about] . . . 
their ability to enforce those claims through the applicable legal system.”15 
It is precisely for these reasons that law and policy proposals, enactments, 
or implementations potentially impacting the strength, scope, and duration
of patents can and often do alter the course of investment, innovation,
and market presence and increase the economic and legal uncertainties 
affecting the measurement of value.
II. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN REGULATORY AND POLICY RISKS 
ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT,
COMMERCIALIZATION, AND MARKET BEHAVIOR
A. Domestic Risks 
Technology innovators, financial and corporate investors, and
commercialization partners, despite their different return expectations 
and respective roles in the innovation process, must overcome challenges
posed by national and regional-level regulators, particularly where greater
innovation is perceived as capable of significantly disrupting the
marketplace status quo ante and transcending the definitions, rules, and
principles of extant law.  To the extent that overly intrusive or otherwise 
ill-conceived or inadequate government policy and legal promulgations 
—including those relating to intellectual property rights for emerging 
technologies—either create or are themselves a symptom of16 legal and 
economic uncertainties, it may be expected that actual and intended capital 
availability may be placed at risk or withdrawn prematurely as measured
by the recipient’s economic model. 
Financial and corporate investors understand how U.S. domestic
regulatory policy can increase economic and legal risks as well as impair
the success of new pharmaceutical, medical device, and clean technologies.
For example, in June 2009, the National Venture Capital Association and
the Medical Device Manufacturers Association, together and individually, 
urged Congress to consider the likely adverse economic impacts17 that
14. Id. at 990 tbl.1B, 991. 
15. Id. at 984. 
16. Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright
Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1853, 1861–62 (2009). 
17. See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
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the Medical Device Safety Act of 200918 would have upon venture capital 
flows to the medical device sector and its ability to innovate: 
[P]olicymakers must evaluate the potential impacts and consequences of new
rules and regulations with great care. They must also weigh the benefits of such 
policies against the possibility of hampering future innovation . . . Even minute 
changes in the number of length of required clinical trials or steps for
reimbursement approval can significantly alter risk profile and projected cost of
a given product.19 
Approximately one year later, during November 2010, the National Venture
Capital Association and its partner organization, the Medical Innovation 
and Competitiveness Coalition, released a white paper20 that reported the
results of a survey of over two hundred medical technology companies to
evaluate the impact of U.S. medical device regulation on innovation and
patients.21  Generally speaking, ninety-three percent of those surveyed
agreed that the “[U.S.] FDA ha[d] become more risk-averse toward . . .
and hesitant to make decisions” concerning new products [during] the last
decade,” which they believed could seriously delay the introduction of new 
products and render the regulatory approval process less predictable and
more costly.22  More specifically, the survey revealed that medtech
innovators faced significant regulatory uncertainties arising from unclear,
unreasonable, nonscientific and unjustified U.S. FDA testing requirements, 
unpredictable and inefficient U.S. FDA pre-market reviews and inquiry
response times, and insufficient transparency in U.S. FDA decision-making
18. See Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills
&docid=f:h1346ih.txt.pdf. 
19. See Medical Technolgy and Venture Capital: A Fruitful Yet Fragile Ecosystem, 
MED. DEVICE MFRS. ASS’N & NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL, 13 (June 2009), available at 
http://www.medicaldevices.org/sites/default/files/MDMA%20NVCA%20Final.June
2009.pdf.
20. See Press Release, National Venture Capital Ass’n, NVCA Commends
Makower Study on the FDA Impact on Med Tech Innovation, (Nov. 18, 2010), available 
at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=671 
&Itemid=93.
21. See Josh Makower, Aabed Meer & Lyn Denend, FDA Impact on U.S. Medical 
Technology Innovation: A Survey of Over 200 Medical Technology Companies, NAT’L 
VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N & MED. INNOVATION & COMPETITIVENESS COAL. (Nov. 2010), 
available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download
&gid=668&Itemid=93. 
22. Id. at 25. 
 207








   
    
 
 



























which, in turn, has dampened medtech innovation in the United States 
among both established and startup companies.23 
When it comes to premarket data requests for new products, medtech innovators
say they face more uncertainty regarding the FDA’s expectations, and that 
bench, animal, and clinical testing requirements are mounting without clear 
justification or benefit. Even more troubling are an increasing number of 
examples from industry representatives that FDA reviewers are requesting
esoteric scientific testing, or posing questions that are not reasonably answerable, 
sometimes at great expense and with little relevance to safety and effectiveness. 
Moreover, medtech innovators have reported that the FDA is becoming less 
predictable and increasingly inefficient in its premarket review role.
Stakeholders maintain that the CDRH, over the last several years, has become
even less transparent in how it makes decisions, as well as slower in responding
to inquiries and regulatory submissions. . . .  According to device companies, 
these changes have created nearly insurmountable barriers to medtech
innovation in the U.S., with no apparent off-setting public health benefit.  The 
current regulatory environment is particularly challenging for start-up companies, 
which have historically played a key role in driving innovation, because of their
limited financial resources.  As a result, regulatory submissions for innovative 
new medical devices have been declining in the U.S. over the last several
years.24 
These conclusions were subsequently reaffirmed in the context of 
biologic and pharmaceutical drugs at a subsequent congressional hearing
convened on July 7, 2011, by the House of Representatives Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health, to discuss the Prescription 
Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA).25  In his prepared testimony, Mr. Jonathan S.
Leff, Managing Director of Warburg Pincus, LLC, highlighted the greater
regulatory uncertainty that has resulted from the U.S. FDA’s increasingly
risk-averse posture. In his opinion, such risk aversion has disturbed the
delicate balance struck by regulators and policymakers between innovation
and safety and thereby triggered the movement of investment capital
away from the U.S. life sciences industries and abroad towards non-U.S.
markets where regulators impose lower regulatory thresholds for market
approval of such technologies. 
As a long-standing investor in the development of innovative new therapies, I
want to emphasize that the way this balance is struck, by regulators and by
policymakers, has tremendously important implications for the health of the 
U.S. medical innovation ecosystem.  The FDA’s shift in recent years to an
increasingly cautious, risk-averse posture toward new drug approvals has had
the unintended consequence of reducing investment in life sciences innovation
23. Id. at 14. 
24. Id. (emphases added). 
25. See PDUFA V: Medical Innovation, Jobs, and Patients: Hearing Before the 




KOGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:56 AM     
  
   
 
 




























[VOL. 13:  201, 2011] Commercial High Technology
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
due to the significant additional time, cost, and[,] uncertainty it has added to the 
drug development process.26 
. . . All drugs present risks as well as benefits to patients.  Rigorous science
helps to identify and measure the benefits and the risks, but the question of how 
to balance the benefits versus the risks, and the question of how much 
uncertainty to accept when releasing a new product to the market, is inherently a
value judgment. On this score, while the FDA continues to bring great 
scientific rigor to its decision-making, the last decade has witnessed a major
shift in the nature of the value judgments the FDA is making.  Compared to a
decade ago, the FDA of today is on the whole more risk-averse, and tends to
emphasize the risks of new products more than their benefits to patients.  This
leads the Agency to demand more and more data—larger trials, longer follow-
up, and greater statistical certainty about efficacy and safety—before being
willing to approve a new product.27 
. . . As the FDA becomes more cautious, demands more and more data, and
emphasizes the risks of new products over their benefits, the cost, time, and risk
of investment in medical innovation all go up, driving investment capital away
from U.S. life sciences and into other industries and other countries. While this 
is surely an unintended consequence of a cautious, risk-averse regulatory
environment, its impact is very real.28 
Thereafter, during October 2011, the National Venture Capital
Association and the Medical Innovation and Competitiveness Coalition 
released the results of a more recent survey of more than 150 venture 
capital firms (accounting for some $10 billion worth of venture investing
in life sciences over the past three years).29  The survey identified 
“regulatory challenges as the most significant factor [along with
reimbursement concerns and the adverse financial environment] driving 
away investment from startup companies that are bringing critical
therapies to market” (emphasis added)30  Notwithstanding apparent FDA
 26. See PDUFA V: Medical Innovation, Jobs, and Patients: Hearing before the 
Health Subcomm. on Energy and Commerce (July 7, 2011) (testimony of Jonathan S. 
Leff, Managing Director, Warburg Pincus, LLC), available at http://democrats.energy 
commerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/image_uploads/Testimony_HE_07.07.11_Leff.pdf.
27. Id. at 5. 
28. Id. at 6 (emphases added). 
29. See Vital Signs: The Threat to Investment in U.S. Medical Innovation and the 
Imperative of FDA Reform, NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N & MED. INNOVATION &
COMPETITIVENESS COAL. (Oct. 2011), available at http://www. nvca.org/index.php?
option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=796&Itemid=93.
30. See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n & Med. Innovation & 
Competitiveness Coal., U.S. Medical Innovation at Risk: Fewer Companies and
Therapies Receiving Funding, Says Report (Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://www.
nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=795&Itemid=93. 
 209




















   
  




   
 
 





   
efforts to address these concerns,31 the report revealed, furthermore, that 
VC firms were expecting to significantly reduce their investments in 
companies operating in the highly regulated U.S. biotechnology and 
medical device sectors and working within several critically important 
therapeutic areas.  These included companies targeting highly prevalent 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, obesity, cancer, and neurological diseases.32 
The VC firms also indicated that they would likely increase their
investments in less regulated life science industry sectors, such as
diagnostics life science tools/equipment, healthcare services/consumer
health, and healthcare IT.33  However, one must seriously question the
extent to which an investment in healthcare IT could avoid significant
regulatory/policy risk if the U.S. FDA were to aggressively implement
its proposed “Sentinel Initiative” to electronically monitor the safety of 
medical products.34  A key principle of such initiative is to develop 
royalty-free open source tools and capabilities for transforming,
characterizing, and analyzing disparate data sources,35 which will
undoubtedly affect companies’ ability to generate future revenues both 
within and beyond the government procurement market.  Indeed, this 
Article reveals in great detail how IT employed by the health, energy, and
telecommunications sectors in connection with government procurement
initiatives, both within the United States and abroad, may not be as free 
from regulatory and policy risk as the VC industry believes it to be. 
31. See Timothy Hay, FDA Tries To Mend Fences With Med-Tech Start-Ups, 
Investors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2011, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/venture
capital/2011/10/05/fda-tries-to-mend-fences-with-med-tech-start-ups-investors/. 
32. See  NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N & MED. INNOVATION & COMPETITIVENESS 
COAL., supra note 29, at 10, 12. 
33. Id. at 10. See also Timothy Hay, VCs Take Their Case For FDA Reform To 
Capitol Hill, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2011, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/venture
capital/2011/10/06/vcs-take-their-case-for-fda-reform-to-capitol-hill/; Timothy Hay, VC-
Focused Group Says More Voices Better In Pushing FDA Reform, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2011, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2011/09/15/vc-focused-group-
says-more-voices-better-in-pushing-fda-reform/; Timothy Hay, Is FDA Dysfunction
Linked To Failed Start-Ups?  WALL ST. J., June 23, 2011, available at http://blogs.
wsj.com/ venturecapital/2011/06/23/is-fda-dysfunction-linked-to-failed-start-ups/.
34. See The Sentinel Initiative: National Strategy for Monitoring Medical Product 
Safety, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FDA OFFICE OF CRITICAL PATH PROGRAMS
(May 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/
UCM124701.pdf.
35. Id. at 15; see Judy Racoosin, Sentinel Initative Scientific Lead, U.S. FDA, 
Address at the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at Brooking: Overview of 
FDA’s Sentinel Initiative (Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
Files/events/2011/0907sentinelintiativeoverview/Sentinel%20UpdateBrookings%20 
20110907.pdf.  “Much of the data involved in the Sentinel Initiative will be covered 
by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (‘HIPAA’), which 
provides a floor of privacy protections for health information in the United States.”  See
FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, Electronic Privacy Information Center website, available at
http://epic.org/privacy/medical/sentinel/ default.html. 
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Similarly, an analyst at a Washington think-tank expressed deep concerns
about how the recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act36 restrictions on drug and medical device insurance expense
reimbursement creates legal and economic uncertainties that “will 
inevitably weigh on entrepreneurship, investment, and innovation” in this 
medical products sector.37 In particular, this analyst opined that higher
reimbursement uncertainty resulting from greater “government scrutiny 
of the reimbursement of new medicines . . . could diminish the capital 
formation that underpins the industry’s riskiest endeavors.”38  He also 
found that such uncertainty was “already chasing investment capital into 
other endeavors that are more lucrative when adjusted for their risk,”39 
resulting in the shrinkage of “the industry’s total R&D effort.”40 
It is also widely recognized within the venture capital and academic
communities that “any industry that revolves around energy is heavily 
dependent on public policy at both the federal and the local level, and 
much more so than the general high-tech sector . . . [which presents] . . .
a big problem when product development cycles and election cycles 
don’t mesh.”41  Nuclear energy technology is especially prone to public 
perceptions, policy influences, and related regulatory risk.42  Some also
believe that “too many [clean tech investments] feature significant 
regulatory risk” because their success is dependent upon whether they
are the ultimate recipients of government subsidies or grants.43  According 
to one recent Harvard Business School study, a startup company’s product
36. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–48, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111 publ148/pdf/PLAW-
111publ148.pdf.
37. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 54. 
38. Id. at 62. 
39. Id. at 67. 
40. Id. at 67–68. 
41. Carmen Nobel, Venture Capital’s Disconnect With Clean Tech, WORKING 
KNOWLEDGE, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Oct. 18, 2010), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6499.html  
(paraphrasing Harv. Bus. School professor Joseph Lassiter). 
42. See Eric Wesoff, Is There a Role for Venture Capital in Nuclear Power?: A 
Survey of VC Attitudes Towards Investing in Nuclear Power, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec.
14, 2009), http://www.greentechmedia.com/research-blog/post/is-there-a-role-for-venture-
capital-in-nuclear-power/ (Interviews with Peter Wagner of Accel Partners, Raj Atlaru of
Draper Fisher Jurvetson, Ullas Naik of Globespan Capital and Peter Nieh of Lightspeed
Venture Partners). 
43. Arleen Jacobius, High Costs Taking Wind Out of Clean-Tech Sails: Too Long 
a Wait for Too Small a Profit, VC Investors Complain, INV. NEWS 1–4 (Apr. 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100425/REG/304259991. 
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(e.g., biofuels) is contingent on whether it is provided a subsidy or
credit. 
[This susceptibility to policy changes and uncertainties is one of the] major 
factors hindering the potential investment by private sector players across the
clean energy investment landscape . . . particularly . . . when the periodicity of
the regulatory cycle is smaller than the investment cycle required for 
demonstrating commercial viability . . . [N]o one is willing to invest in the first
commercial plant if they do not know what the regulatory environment is going
to be by the time success has been demonstrated.44 
In addition, at least one commentator has opined how the U.S.
government’s piecemeal approach to energy policy has created regulatory 
risks which have inadvertently triggered a reduction in clean tech
investment: “It’s not just regulation that is important, it’s [also the]
certainty around regulation—whether it happens or not—that makes the 
wheels move.”45 
Information and communication technology (ICT) investors, in the 
course of undertaking their due diligence, frequently consider the level 
of regulatory risk of potential investment opportunities.  For example, 
investors “focus on the independence of the regulator . . . the transparency
of the regulatory process, the legal processes for regulation,” and
the overall impact of the proposed regulatory framework on competition 
and investment.46  Where the perceived regulatory risk surrounding a
given ICT is high and where the risk is not otherwise susceptible to
appropriate mitigation, such technology will less likely attract investment
amounts sufficient to assure its financial viability.47 According to at least
one expert, while ICT regulatory risk is quite pervasive throughout 
the world it is not easily quantified and varies in degree and magnitude 
from country to country.
There are only a limited number of ICT investment environments in which there 
is little or no regulatory risk and thus, great care must be taken in considering
the potential risks associated with the ICT framework in any given country.  As 
would be expected, the degree of risk varies from country to country and not all 
44. Shikhar Ghosh & Ramana Nanda, Venture Capital Investment in the Clean
Energy Sector 16 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-020, 2010), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-020.pdf (emphasis added). 
45. Michael Meehan, Uncertainty in US Energy Policy is Cleantech’s Real
Challenge, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 1, 2010) http://venturebeat.com/2010/11/01/uncertainty-in-
us-energy-policy-is-cleantech%E2%80%99s-real-challenge/. 
46. Lynne Dorward & Hal Peters, Impact of Effective Regulation on Investment: 
an Investor’s Perspective 5, 7 (Nov. 20, 2009) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 
9th Global Symposia for Regulators (GSR): Hands-on or Hands-off?  Stimulating Growth 
Through Effective ICT Regulation), available at http://www.itu.int/ITUD/treg/Events/
Seminars/GSR/GSR09/doc/GSR09_Regulation-Investment_Dorward.pdf. 
47. Id. at 7. 
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regulatory risks and their specific financial impact on an investment valuation
are easily quantifiable.48 
In the end, “government can make a significant contribution . . . through
stable, predictable and long-term policy measures . . . Removing uncertainty 
around policies reduces policy risk dramatically and makes it easier for 
the private capital markets to plan their investments accordingly.”49 
Government can also provide a market-friendly environment by selecting 
the least costly regulatory alternative available to reduce investors’
operational and capital expenditure costs which, in turn, can improve
companies’ ability to secure necessary investor funding.50 
In the absence of such a regulatory framework, institutional and
corporate investors in high technologies are likely to endeavor to
influence regulatory policy51 to the extent necessary to mitigate risks that 
would otherwise prevent them from emerging from the “valley of death”52 
and realizing a reasonable economic rate of return or, perhaps, even a 
return of their original capital.53  It must be kept in mind, however, that
regulatory and policy risks faced by institutional and corporate investors
do not arise in a vacuum.  Governments are also susceptible to “capture”
by other than economic entities.  For example, civil society interest groups 
may seek to embed their own economic, legal, or political positions and 
preferences at the expense of competing interests through the enactment,
repeal, or maintenance of a given regulation—a phenomenon known as 
“interest group regulatory capture.”54 
48. Id.
 49. See Ghosh & Nanda, supra note 44, at 18. 
50. See Mandla Msimang, Effective Regulation: The “Stimulus Plan” for the ICT 
Sector 14–15 (Nov. 20, 2009) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 9th Global 
Symposia for Regulators (GSR): Hands-on or Hands-off? Stimulating Growth Through
Effective ICT Regulation), available at http://www.itu.int/ITUD/treg/Events/Seminars/
GSR/GSR09/doc/GSR09_Regulation-Investment_Msimang.pdf. 
51. See Frederic Boehm, Regulatory Capture Revisited—Lessons from Economics 
of Corruption 3–6 (Internet Ctr. for Corruption Research, Working Paper No. 22, 2007), 
available at http://www.icgg.org/downloads/Boehm%20-%20Regulatory%20Capture
%20Revisited.pdf.
52. “The valley of death refers to the difficult period between proof-of-concept for
a technology and large-scale deployment.” See Stephen Lacey, Can Cleantech 
Entrepreneurs Rely on Venture Capital?, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/07/should-entrepreneurs-rely-
on-venture-capital.  See, eg., Arleen Jacobius, supra note 43. 
53. See, e.g., Ghosh & Nanda, supra note 44, at 18–19. 
54. See Boehm, supra note 51, at 3–6. 
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B. Foreign Risks
The phenomenon of regulatory and policy risk has also assumed an 
international dimension in the current era of globalization, especially
with respect to life science, clean energy, and information and
communication technologies.  Increasingly, foreign governments and 
international policymakers have deemed these technologies as “public
goods” necessary to establishing a twenty-first century domestic knowledge 
economy capable of competing effectively in the international trading
system.
At least one study has noted that “[t]he global exposure of [clean
energy] markets implies that changes in the regulatory regime in one 
country can affect the investment landscape across the entire sector.”55 
For example, the study found that Spain’s inability to honor its subsidy
commitments to the domestic solar sector not only damaged the credibility 
of the Spanish government, but also created policy uncertainties in other 
countries i.e., suspicions that other governments would be unable to 
meet their obligations to that sector, which effectively dampened investor 
enthusiasm for solar industry portfolios.56  According to a regulatory
director of Iberdola, a Spanish solar and wind technology company, the 
Spanish and European experience in such technologies57 revealed how
regulation is both the key driver for and the primary risk associated with
the development and deployment of renewable energy technologies.  In 
his opinion, the best way to reduce such related regulatory risk is for
companies to lobby for stable, predictable, fair, stringent, and efficient 
regulatory frameworks.58 
A more recent study—evaluating the effects of policy on large
onshore wind farms and utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) facilities 
located in the United States, Spain, and Italy, a concentrated solar power 
tower in the United States and an offshore wind farm in Denmark— 
concluded that “policy can affect the investment environment for renewable 
technologies by influencing the allocation of costs and revenues, the 
allocation of risks, and the technology choices and business practices of 
55. See Ghosh & Nanda, supra note 44, at 16–17. 
56. Id.
57. See Gerard Wynn, Regulatory Risk Mounts for European Green Energy, 
REUTERS (July 7, 2010), available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/07/07/us-renewable-
eu-support-idINTRE6662FU20100707. 
58. See Gonzalo Sáenz de Miera, Director of Regulatory Prospective, Iberdola, 
Presentation at Climate Policy Initiative-Launch Event: Regulation as a Key Driver for 
Renewable Energy Development: Lessons from the Spanish Case 2, 4, 8 (Apr. 16, 2011), 
available at http:// www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/files/attachments/67.pdf. 
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electricity market participants and other key stakeholders.”59  In particular, 
the study found that: (1) the duration of policy support measures often 
influenced a project’s financing term; (2) renewable energy project
electricity prices can be reduced to the extent policies directly or indirectly 
improve revenue certainty; (3) investors’ perceptions of project risks
are sufficiently intertwined with policy regimes that they often determine 
the amount and cost of available project financing; (4) policy prescriptions 
and up-front incentives requiring or encouraging establishment of reserve
accounts or performance guarantees can help reduce renewable energy 
project construction and operational uncertainties or otherwise shift them
to other stakeholders willing and able to bear those risks; (5) policy can
impact or shift the risk that a renewable energy technology-based generating
facility will not meet its target completion and operational dates;
(6) policy can broaden the base of interested investors by influencing
how risks are allocated among project stakeholders or the impact that 
such risks have on financing costs; and (7) policies can improve developer 
capital efficiencies and returns to attract greater investor interest by
contributing to the reduction of development timeframes and increasing 
success rates.60 
Furthermore, at least one other recent study revealed how the French
government has finally come to recognize that anti-science regulatory 
policies, such as those dependent on a broad and extensive application of 
the precautionary principle, can adversely impact a company’s
entrepreneurial, innovative, and investment behavior, ultimately
contributing to risk aversion and diminished national economic growth 
and retardation of scientific knowledge.61  Moreover, institutional investors
in Australia have also come to recognize how the “risk of regulatory 
59. See Uday Varadarajan, David Nelson, Brendan Pierpont & Morgan Hervé-
Mignucci, The Impacts of Policy on The Financing of Renewable Projects: A Case Study 
Analysis, CLIMATE POLICY INITIATIVE (Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://www.climate
policyinitiative.org/files/attachments/167.pdf.  “CPI is an independent, not-for-profit
organization that receives long-term funding from George Soros.” Id.
60. Id. at Executive Summary ii, 2.
61. See Jacques Attali, Commission Pour la Liberation de la Croissance
Francaise: Une Ambition Pour 10 Ans [Report of the Comm. for the Liberation of 
Growth, An Ambition for Ten Years] 34–35, 149–50 (Oct. 2010), available at http://
lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/104000541/0000.pdf, translated in Attali 
Commission, France Must Strictly Circumscribe Precautionary Principle to Promote
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change [can have] negative implications on renewable energy projects.”62 
For example, it was recently reported that the Victorian provincial
government enacted new rules requiring “all future wind farm projects to
build all turbines at least two kilometres away from residential dwellings” 
and all wind farm project “developers [to] submit proof of written 
consent [obtained] from all affected residents [with] homes [located] . . .
within the two kilometre setback.”63  According to the report, the wind
industry and their counsels are very concerned that “it will be quite hard
to find a development site that isn’t within two kilometres of a house” 
and that such rules “have [already] had a chilling effect on future Victorian 
investment”.64 
Similarly, the World Bank recently evaluated various regulatory 
strategies that national and regional governments can adopt to facilitate 
convergence of technologies among different ICT subsectors possessing
distinct and divergent business and regulatory histories.  It concluded 
that “[w]hen rules and policy frameworks overlap or conflict, regulatory
risk increases which can in turn increase the cost of capital by up to 6 
percentage points (depending on the country or region), [thereby] slowing
investment in infrastructure and services.”65  It also found that a
government’s employment of a “wait and see” ad hoc rather than a 
harmonized national response to ICT convergence issues can also 
diminish the global competitiveness of home country-based ICT companies 
and produce other suboptimal results.
The absence of a response can have a significant negative effect by failing to
provide certainty for investors, as well as not providing a means to overcome 
inconsistencies in the legacy frameworks.  The United States, for example, is
now concerned that it is falling behind its European and Asian peers in
broadband penetration and reduction of ICT-related tariffs (Windhausen 2008). 
This led to calls for government intervention and now the development of a 
national broadband strategy even in a market that has traditionally adopted a 
laissez-faire approach to the ICT sector.  Thus, while a wait and watch response 
might not prevent convergence, it may lead to outcomes that result in
suboptimal benefits.66 
62. See Rachel Alembakis, Renewable Energy Poses Opportunities, Risks for
Investors, THE SUSTAINABILITY REPORT (Sept. 16, 2011) (emphasis added), available 
at http://www.thesustainabilityreport.com.au/renewable-energy-poses-opportunities-
risks-for-investors/1105/. 
63. Id.  “The new rules . . . may also apply where an amendment is required to a
planning approval granted before the 15th of March 2011.” Id.
64. Id.
65. See Rajendra Singh & Siddhartha Raja, Convergence in Information and
Communication Technology: Strategic and Regulatory Considerations, THE INT’L BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV./THE WORLD BANK 24, 27 (May 30, 2010), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONANDTE
CHNOLOGIES/Resources/Convergence_in_ICT.pdf. 
66. Id. at 24–25. 
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One such suboptimal result is regulatory arbitrage, and perhaps, even 
regulatory protectionism, wherein “regulated [ICT] firms [are enabled]
to use regulatory processes to secure artificial competitive advantages. 
Thus, in some cases, regulation may not be picking winners as much as 
firms skilled in exploiting regulatory processes.”67 
Developed and developing country governments seeking to establish 
successful industrial, economic growth and technology innovation and 
transfer policies should therefore avoid enacting laws and regulations
that create significant economic and legal uncertainties and opportunities 
for regulatory arbitrage and protectionism that could increase R&D 
and licensing costs, and thereby, place the security of existing investments 
tied to anticipated royalty revenue streams derived from intellectual
property right (patents and trade secret) based inventions, at risk.
For example, the recently enacted America Invents Act68 introduces 
several new levels of post-patent grant review,69 including the temporary 
eight-year review of “covered business method patents”70 falling within
67. Id. at 47, 61.
 68. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (amending Title 35 of the United States Code and substantially reforming U.S. 
patent law), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ29/pdf/PLAW-
112publ29.pdf.
69. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 299-313 (amending ch. 31 of title 35
and adding new ch. 32 to title 35, codified as 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 “Inter Partes Review” 
and 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–29 “Post-Grant Review.”  In general, the AIA establishes a new 
post-grant review proceeding (modeled after a European opposition proceeding) that
permits any party to file a challenge to the validity of a patent on any ground for a period 
up to nine months from the date such patent was granted. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b)-(c); 35
U.S.C. § 324(a).  In addition, the AIA creates a new inter partes review process pursuant 
to which the validity of a patent can be challenged by any one other than the patent
owner on patentability grounds that could be raised under section 102 or 103, and only
on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications, throughout the life 
of the patent, upon showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will 
prevail with respect to at least one patent claim. See 35 U.S.C.§ 311(a)-(b); 35 U.S.C.
§ 314(a).  The inter partes review process can be accessed after the later of the nine
month post-grant review period or the completion of a post-patent review.  See 35 U.S.C.
§ 311(c). Both procedures will first be available one year after the AIA’s enactment—
September 16, 2012. 
70. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 329-331, § 18(a)(3).  A “covered business 
method patent” is defined as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus
for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or 
management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include
patents for technological inventions.”  See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(d)(1). 
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Patent Class ‘705’71 72 that brings the U.S. patent system much closer to 
the European patent system which does not recognize business methods
per se as patentable subject matter and narrowly construes software
patents.73  These new measures, which will for implementation purposes,
require the Administrator of the USPTO to promulgate new regulations,74 
could arguably delay and raise the cost of patent litigation, elevate economic
uncertainty associated with business method patent (BMP) licensing, 
and render software patents and related licenses more vulnerable to 
prolonged reexamination, possible invalidation, revocation, and economic 
71. See Class 705, “Data Processing: Financial Business Practice, Management, or 
Cost/Price Determination”, USPTO Classification Definitions (Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc705/defs705.pdf. 
72. Some have argued that this provision was intended to serve mainly as a 
protectionist device for the benefit of the financial services industry which was allegedly
besieged by patent litigation initiated by small company holders of business method
patents that disrupted the ability of these larger companies to license their own BMPs, 
which is BIG business. See Paul Michel, Rein in the Big Bank Bail-Out, PATENTLY-O 
(July 7, 2011) available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/guest-post-rein-in-
the-big-bank-bail-out.html. See Scott McKeown, Proper Business Method Patent
Challenges Under the America Invents Act?, PATENT LAW PRACTICE CTR., PRACTICING 
LAW INST. (Aug. 16, 2011), available at http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2011/08/16/
proper-business-method-patent-challenges-under-the-america-invents-act/ (“The clear
intent of the author of this provision (Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y) was to provide 
relief to the New York Banking Industry from the likes of Data Treasury. Some have 
gone as far as to label this provision a “bank bailout.” (note the provision in the bill 
excluding ATM machines as a venue tool Sec. 18(c))”); Patent Litigation Weekly:
DataTreasury Wins First Patent Trial, Against U.S. Bank, THE PRIOR ART BLOG (April
5, 2010), available at http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_prior_art/2010/04/datatreasury-
v-usbank-verdict.html; Robert Greene Sterne, Michael Q Lee & Richard M Libman, 
Business Method Patents for Financial Products and Services, STERNE, KESSLER,
GOLDSTEIN & FOX PLLC (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.buildingipvalue.com/ 
05_NA/147_150.htm.  “Large financial institutions have embarked on significant filing 
programmes to seek protection for their innovati[ve] . . . financial tools given the 
enormous applicability of business method patents in the financial industry.  The giants
of the financial industry have made huge investments to build immense systems and
methods to more effectively market, sell, administer and deliver financial products and
services to their customers, and these giants are protecting their substantial investment
with their own patents. But it is a two-way street—these giants are also having to address 
the business method patents of others that cover their core businesses.”  Id.
73. See, e.g., In Re Halliburton Energy Services Inc., [2011] EWHC 2508 (Pat), 
Appeal Nos: CH/2011/0154, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CHANCERY DIVISION PATENTS 
COURT (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://britishcaselaw.co.uk/re-halliburton-energy-
services-inc-2011-ewhc-2508-pat-05-october-2011 (The U.K. IPO Court allowed the
appeals of Halliburton Energy Services Inc.’s four patent applications which had been
previously rejected on essentially the same grounds, that the inventions were excluded
from patentability as schemes, rules or methods for performing a mental act and as 
computer programs. In the process it explained the case law supporting the treatment of 
business method and software patents under both the European Patent Convention and
the UK Patents Act 2004). 
74. See 35 U.S.C. § 316; 35 U.S.C. § 326; Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a), (d)(2).
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devaluation, with significant economic repercussions for all licensing
parties.75 
Indeed, according to at least one expert, business methods significantly 
contribute to the commercialization of many scientific and technological 
discoveries and inventions.  Consequently, the USPTO’s broad invalidation
of such patents would not only adversely impact entrepreneurs’ ability to
transfer their IP to the startups and new firms they establish, but would 
also jeopardize the commercialization of many ICTs directed toward
electronic commerce applications, thereby placing both mature and 
new business (startup) investments in the computer hardware, software,
communications, and internet sectors at substantial risk.76 
[The] undo[ing of] patent protections for business method inventions would
create substantial economic costs and would adversely impact technological
change in computer hardware, software, communications, and the Internet.77 
. . . [P]atents for business method inventions are important for entrepreneurship
and for the commercialization of many scientific and technological inventions. 
A major study conducted by Stuart Graham et al. (2009) finds that entrepreneurs 
tend to benefit from patents, which confer competitive advantage, protect
technology from copying by rivals, assist in obtaining financing, and enhance 
the startup’s reputation.  The work of Graham et al. illustrates the complex ways
that IP protections for business method inventions affect subsequent innovation
by entrepreneurs.  I argue further that business method inventions provide a 
major channel for commercialization of scientific and technological discoveries
and are important for entrepreneurship.  Business method inventions often contain
scientific and technological discoveries and help to commercialize scientific and
technological discoveries already developed.  Business method inventions that 
commercialize information and communications technology (ICT) often are 
targeted toward electronic commerce (e-commerce) applications.  Restrictions on
patenting business methods would cause inventors to present their discoveries 
under various other categories and could prejudice the awarding of patents against 
scientific and technological discoveries that have commercial applications.78 
75. See, e.g., Letter from Intellectual Ventures to U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on the Judiciary (Democrats) (June 8, 2011), available at http://democrats. 
judiciary.house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/IntelVentures1
10608.pdf.
76. Interestingly, “the top ten filers of Class 705 Patents are clear technology
companies, including: IBM (590 patents) Microsoft (185 patents) Sony (142 patents) 
Hewlett-Packard (113 Patents) Fujitsu (105 Patents).  Companies like AT&T, Oracle, 
Ebay, Amazon and Pitney Bowes round out the list (with only a sprinkling of companies
being clear banking/financial organizations).” See Scott McKeown, supra note 72. 
77. See Daniel F. Spulber, Should Business Method Inventions be Patentable?, 3 
OXFORD J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 266 (Spring 2011) (emphasis added), available at http://jla. 
oxford journals.org/content/current; http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/265.full.pdf. 
78. Id. at 268. 
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In economic terms, it is critical to foster the development of new business 
methods as much as possible, if need be, through patent grants ensuring 
temporary monopoly profits, given their indispensable role in extending
IP protections to commercial discoveries “which are the foundation of 
subsequent Schumpeterian79 innovation.”80 
Similarly, the enactment of national laws and regulations promoting
the availability and flexible use by governments of a compulsory
licensing mechanism as an exception or limitation to the patent right to
secure foreign companies’ patented high technologies at less than their 
fair market value can increase economic risks and result in acts of 
regulatory arbitrage and protectionist opportunism by home country
as well as foreign companies operating pursuant to divergent business
models.  The security of property rights has been placed into question where 
compulsory licenses have been issued or threatened against foreign patented
high technologies.  Studies have shown that a corresponding reduction in
the flow of knowledge-based foreign direct investment (FDI) will
follow.81 82
 79. Austrian economist Joseph “Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction 
states that technological advance is the main source of economic growth and
improvements in the quality of life.  It further states that a significant part of the
incentive to produce leapfrogging innovations is the prospect of achieving monopoly
profits. The original ‘big-is-better’ account adds the view that large incumbent firms are
most likely to be the source of leapfrogging innovations.  In contrast, the new ‘small-is-
better’ account adds the view that small, new firms are most likely to be the source of
leapfrogging innovations.”  See Arthur M. Diamond, Jr., Schumpeter’s Creative
Destruction: A Review of the Evidence, J. OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, Vol. XXII No. 1 (Fall 
2006), at p. 139, available at http://journal.apee.org/index.php/Fall2006_7. 
80. See Daniel F. Spulber, supra note 77, at 329. 
81. See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on
Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 48
(2008), available at http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/d/r/drc13/Index_files/CL_and_ 
FDI.pdf.. “There is little doubt that developing countries who issue compulsory licenses
also face additional risks in attracting global capital.  Particularly for MDCs, a 
compulsory license can trigger the loss of significant FDI.  Thus, each nation has to 
weigh the benefits as well as the disadvantages of issuing such a license for the benefit of 
its citizens.”  Id. See also Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in
Investment Arbitration: the Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 357
(2010), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1072&context=auilr (“Intellectual property rights (‘IPRs’) have long been recognized
as a form of ‘investment’ entitled to protection under bilateral  investment treaties
(‘BITs’) and  other international investment agreements (‘IIAs’). . . .  The inclusion of IPRs
in the definition of ‘investment’ reflects that intellectual property, even as an intangible 
asset, can be a valuable part of a foreign direct investment (‘FDI’). Id. at 358–59. 
82. See also Lawrence A. Kogan, Rediscovering the Value of Intellectual Property 
Rights: How Brazil’s Recognition and Protection of Foreign IPRs Can Stimulate Domestic 
Innovation and Generate Economic Growth, 8 INT’L J. ECON. DEVELOPMENT, no. 1–2
(Southern Public Administration Education Foundation 2006) at 157–74, 224–48, 
available at http://www.spaef.com/article.php?id=970; http://www.spaef.com/file.
php?id=970 (describing how Brazil’s increase in IPR protection specifically and the rule of 
220
KOGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:56 AM     
  
   
 











   
    
 









     
  
 





[VOL. 13:  201, 2011] Commercial High Technology
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
[T]he practice of compulsory licensing comes with a price: the temporary or
permanent deprivation of some part of a patent owner’s right to exclude disrupts
the investment-backed expectation of the property right.  In the future,
pharmaceutical companies and other industries dependent upon intellectual
property rights may mistrust licensing nations’ promises to protect and enforce 
patent rights, not to mention copyrights, and trademarks.  As a result, industries 
that find the security of property rights lacking in a given nation may avoid
engaging in foreign direct investment with that nation. Because foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is a major potential source of economic growth for recipient 
nations, the loss of such investment resources arising from compulsory
licensing practices could force developing nations to pay a particularly heavy
cost for providing needed medicines for its citizens.83 
While government patent policy by itself is an incomplete measurement 
of a country’s market and investment friendliness, it is generally agreed
that such legal protections reflect a country’s interest in fostering business
and technology development.  Through effective deterrence of imitation,
“patents reduce the costs of enforcing contracts and at the same time
increase the expected returns on FDI and licensing, which will have a
positive effect on technology transfer.  Patent rights encourage technology 
transfer by providing owners with legal certainty.”84 Consequently, the
passage of IP laws that do not include a provision for compulsory licensing,
for example, may favorably signal to foreign investors that a government 
is willing to allow strategic business decisions without undue interference 
and ensure more transparent and unbiased application of commercial laws
with the prospect of reduced government corruption.85  “There is little doubt
that developing countries who issue compulsory licenses also face additional 
risks in attracting global capital. Particularly, for MDC’s [middle developing 
countries], a compulsory license can trigger the loss of significant FDI.”86 
If patent ownership rights indicate to prospective investors a firm’s 
proper regard for its intellectual property security, then surely a company’s 
willingness to engage in a foreign market where the government has
decided to adopt or enforce anti-patent measures will convey negative 
signals to the investment community about the company, the quality of 
law generally can improve its ability to attract innovative R&D- related foreign direct
investment flows funded mostly by multinational corporations from which other
collateral and ancillary skills and knowledge transfer benefits may be realized). 
83. See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, supra note 81, at 2–3 (emphasis added). 
84. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Report on the International 
Patent System, 10–11, ¶ 41, SCP/12/3 (Apr. 15, 2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/
edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_12/scp_12_3.pdf. 
85. See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, supra note 81, at 284, 297. 
86. Id. at 330. 
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its management, and the strength and economic value of its patents and 
associated projected revenue streams.
Just as the sale of a product through a low-status selling channel of a product can
signal a diminution in brand status to the consumer, exposure of a patent to an
uncertain legal environment can signal that the firm may not consider the patent 
to be as valuable as others believe.  Even the threat of an ‘anti-patent’ such as a
compulsory license can impair firm equity, thereby reducing the attractiveness
of a country as an investment partner.  Any firm calculating its returns from FDI
will have to account for the possibility of these signaling-based losses.87 
Lastly, increased foreign regulatory/policy risks have been triggered as
the result of the ongoing international sanctioning of foreign governments’ 
failure to ensure legal recognition and protection of pharmaceutical trade 
secret and other proprietary know-how and testing data, constituting 
intellectual property rights distinct from patents, which are sometimes 
referred to as ‘data/market exclusivity’ or ‘data protection’.88  Data/market
exclusivity consists of a temporary period of time (commencing from when 
a drug first secures regulatory market authorization) during which a
developed country government’s food and drug regulator affords the
originator of an approved branded drug (i.e., either small chemically
synthesized molecules or complex biological products) legal protection
against competing generic applications for marketing approval, and restricts
generic competitors’ ability to reference the data generated by such
brand-name manufacturers.89 
In the United States, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (i.e., the ‘‘Hatch-Waxman’’ Act90 which is
applicable to small chemically synthesized molecules) provides for a
market/data exclusivity period of five (5) years, while the recently enacted
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (‘BPCIA’91 which 
87. Id. at 298. 
88. See ITSSD Response to WIPO Circular C. 7998, and Comments Regarding 
SCP/16/7; SCP/16/9; SCP/17/4, INST. FOR TRADE STANDARDS AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., (Nov.
2011) at  http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/scp/en/meetings/session_17/health/ itssd.pdf.
89. See Lawrence A. Kogan, The U.S. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act of 2009 Triggers Public Debates, Regulatory/Policy Risks, and International Trade
Concerns, 6 GLOBAL TRADE AND CUSTOMS J., Nos. 11-12, 2011, pp. 513–15, 521–24, at 
http://itssd.org/GTCJ_6(2)_Lawrence%20A%20Kogan%20(3).pdf, Working Paper version 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953316. 
90. Public Law 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984), as enacted, at http://www.kenyon. 
com/Resources/Hatchman/HTMLHelp/!SSL!/WebHelp/Public_Laws/P_L__98_417__1984_
.htm. The provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act adding Section 505(j) to the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, are codified at 21 U.S.C. 355, at  http://www.law.cornell.
edu/uscode/21/usc_sec_21_00000355----000-.html. PL 98-417. PL 98–417 also amended 35
U.S.C. 271(e) and 35 U.S.C. 156 of the Patent Act. 
91. See Title VII, Subtitle A, Sec. 7001-7003, The Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act of 2009, of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public
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is applicable to complex biological products) provides for a market/data 
exclusivity period of twelve (12) years.  In each case, generics are approved 
by permitting appropriate reliance on what is already known about the 
branded drug, thereby saving time and resources and avoiding unnecessary 
duplication of human or animal testing.92 These relative periods of
market/data exclusivity, in effect, compensate drug originators for the
significant economic risks they assume and costs they incur undertaking 
the extensive testing, comparative studies and analyses necessary to secure 
U.S. government regulatory approval of a new pharmaceutical product.93 
The research and development process is characterized by a high degree of
scientific, regulatory, and economic risk. Enormous quantities of time, effort,
and money are invested in the research and development process to bring a new
medicine to the market. Typically, discovering and developing a new medicine
takes an average of 10–15 years, and for every 5,000–10,000 compounds
investigated, only one is approved and marketed. The cost of developing a new
medicine now totals on average more than USD 1.2 billion [fn]. These 
investments in R&D have no guarantee of a return, with statistically far more 
failures than successes in the laboratory. The generation of pre-clinical and
clinical trial data takes considerable time, effort and expense, and begins when a 
compound is identified as a potential medicinal product. Scientists and
researchers may think that a compound has certain properties and will act in a 
certain manner, but to ascertain the underlying proof of concept, extensive 
testing is required. Authorities use these data to assess the product’s quality, 
efficacy and safety before a medicinal product is approved for use in patients. 
Even after marketing, clinical studies and pharmacovigilance continue. In this 
entire process, it is important to note that the innovator assumes the entire risk
for the generation of the data. The innovator will not know in advance whether
the data will demonstrate a safe and effective product and/or whether the 
regulatory authorities will consider the data sufficient to support the marketing
of that product. If, at any stage of the development process, a test or clinical
trial is unsuccessful, or if the authorities require further testing, the
Law 111–148, 124 STAT. 118, 804 (111th Cong.) (2010), at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ148/pdf/PLAW-111publ148.pdf. The U.S. Senate passed the
U.S. House of Representatives’ version of comprehensive healthcare reform legislation
known as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590) on December 24, 
2009. The House passed this legislation on March 21, 2010. It included Section 7002
amending the Public Health Service Act to permit approval of biosimilar biological 
products through an abbreviated biological license application (ABLA) submitted to the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
92. Lawrence A. Kogan, The U.S. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
of 2009 Triggers Public Debates, Regulatory/Policy Risks, and International Trade
Concerns, supra, at 513, 515. 
93. Id. at 513, 521–24. 
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development process may be substantially delayed or stopped altogether94 
(emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the economic costs and risks endemic 
to the drug development process, which are typically borne entirely by 
pharmaceutical innovator companies and their investors, developing and 
least developed country (LDC) governments have continued to seek 
additional derogations from their World Trade Organization (WTO) TRIPS
obligations—including those contained within TRIPS Article 39.395  On
November 17, 2011, for example, it was reported that LDCs, had likely
secured, with the support and assistance of developing country members
such as India (the world’s largest exporter of generic drugs96 and an
opponent of market/data exclusivity protections97), the approval of the
WTO TRIPS Council to extend, beyond July 1, 2013, their ability to not
“protect trademarks, patents, copyright, geographical indications and
other types of intellectual property.”  Should the TRIPS Council decide 
in favor of this additional derogation, continued LDC government non-
94. See International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations, 
Data Exclusivity: Encouraging Development of New Medicines (July 2011) at p. 5, at 
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Publication/IFPMA_2011_Data_Exclusivity__E
n_Web.pdf.
95. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.  Lawrence A. Kogan, The U.S. Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 Triggers Public Debates, Regulatory/Policy 
Risks, and International Trade Concerns, supra, at 528–530, 538.  See also International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations, Data Exclusivity:
Encouraging Development of New Medicines, supra (“Today, a number of countries
maintain that the proprietary data that is provided to the Ministries of Health for 
obtaining registration of the innovator’s products is protected under their unfair 
competition laws and that it is, consequently, not necessary for them to enact legislation 
that expressly implements TRIPS, Article 39.3.  As a general rule, such protection, 
which requires non-disclosure of information and puts the burden of enforcement on the
owner of the proprietary information, is insufficient to meet the TRIPS, Article 39.3
obligation.”). Id. 
96. “India tops the world in exporting generic medicines worth U.S.$11 billion,
and currently, the Indian pharmaceutical industry is one of the world’s largest and most
developed”.  See Corporate Catalyst India, A Brief Report—Pharmaceutical Industry in 
India (Jan. 2011), Par. 1.2.2 at http://www.cci.in/pdf/surveys_reports/indian-pharmaceuticals 
-industry.pdf; http://www.cci.in/survey_report.html. 
97. See  No Data Exclusivity Clauses in Trade Pacts, Assures India, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK (July 8, 2011) at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/info.service/2011/
fta.info.185.htm (“The Commerce and Industry Minister of India, Mr Anand Sharma, has 
given assurances that India will reject any efforts to include ‘data exclusivity’ clauses in 
bilateral trade agreements.”) Id. See also India’s Commerce Minister Pledges Continued
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protection of pharmaceutical company trade secrets, proprietary know-
how and other confidential information, and clinical and non-clinical 
testing data would be permitted without the risk that developed country
WTO Members would initiate ‘non-violation’98 dispute proceedings.99 
This anticipated derogation from WTO TRIPS Article 39.3 obligations 
would compliment other WTO (e.g., TRIPS Article 31 compulsory
licensing) derogations developing country and LDC Members had
previously secured in 2001 and 2005 with respect to pharmaceutical patents,
in the name of promoting widespread governmental use of TRIPS
‘flexibilities’ already sanctioned by the WTO 2001 Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,100 the World Health Organization
and the World Intellectual Property Organization.101 
98. See TRIPS: ‘NON-VIOLATION’ COMPLAINTS (ARTICLE 64.2)—Background and 
the Current Situation, World Trade Organization website at http://wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/nonviolation_background_e.htm.
99. “Ministers are now expected to ask the council to consider extending the mid-
2013 deadline for least developed countries to implement intellectual property protection 
under the WTO agreement. They are also expected to agree that their countries will 
continue to refrain from bringing ‘non-violation’ cases to the WTO dispute settlement 
system for another two years.  The least developed countries are seeking more time in
order to identify their needs for assistance, to use the assistance to beef up their ability to
protect intellectual property, and ultimately to protect it. They were represented in the 
discussions by their general coordinator, Bangladesh, and their TRIPS coordinator, Angola, 
who want ministers to make a political statement, and noted that only six countries have 
submitted their priority needs (Sierra Leone, Uganda, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Tanzania
and Senegal). A number of countries have said they support extending the deadline, 
some adding that this would be in order to help least developed countries eventually
protect intellectual property fully, which in turn will encourage economic activity. (The
[2013] deadline does not apply to pharmaceutical patents. The 2001 Doha Declaration 
on TRIPS and Public Health extended the period for least developed countries to comply 
with provisions on pharmaceuticals to 2016) ” (emphasis added). See Draft Decisions 
Agreed On Poorest Nations’ Intellectual Property and ‘Non-violation’, WTO 2011
NEWS ITEMS (Nov. 17, 2011), at  http://wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/trip_17nov 11_e. 
htm. 
100. Id.; Poorest Countries Given More Time to Apply Intellectual Property Rules, 
WTO 2005 PRESS RELEASE (PRESS/424) (Nov. 29, 2005) at http://wto.org/english/
news_e/pres05_e/pr424_e.htm; Declaration On the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
DOHA WTO MINISTERIAL 2001: TRIPS (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2) (adopted Nov. 14, 2001)
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.  
101. See William New, IP, Trade And Public Health Leaders Turn A Page In
History Together, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Nov. 24, 2011) at http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2011/11/24/ip-trade-and-public-health-leaders-turn-a-page-in-history-
together/ (“The focus of the event was the 2001 WTO Doha Declaration on the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and Public Health . . .
The core issue cutting across the areas of trade, IP and health is that market forces do not 
provide sufficient incentive for private-sector research for some diseases predominately
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Therefore, investors would surely be remiss if they did not carefully
scrutinize a high technology company’s business plan and financial
statements to ascertain management’s strategy for, and its actual success
or failure in, mitigating foreign IP regulatory and policy risks to secure a 
reasonable rate of return on investment (ROI). 
III. THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO)
AS A PLATFORM FOR WEAKENING PATENT RIGHTS: HOW
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE WIPO CREATE ADDITIONAL REGULATORY
AND POLICY RISKS FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a specialized
agency of the United Nations that “administers several treaties aimed at
creating a standard global system . . . [by] tak[ing] patent law in
the direction of international harmonization.”102  It is one of only two
intergovernmental organizations that anchor the current international 
intellectual property system—the other being the World Trade Organization 
affecting poor populations, and for the others IP rights provide incentives but drive up 
prices.”) Id.; see also WTO, WIPO and WHO Examine Role of Patent Information in 
Access to Medicines, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
(ICTSD) (Mar. 2, 2011) (“According to the WHO’s Richard Laing, patents do not at 
present appear to be a major barrier to access to essential medicines on the WHO Model
List in low and middle income countries.  Access was largely influenced by other factors,
such as lack of know-how or financing, and regulatory issues. However, he pointed to
other non-patent barriers such as bilateral trade agreements with ‘TRIPS-plus’
intellectual property rules related to data exclusivity and patent linkage”) (emphasis 
added).
102. What is WIPO?, About WIPO, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int//about-wipo/en/ 
what_is_wipo.html (last visited July 13, 2011) (These several treaties include the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT), the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) and the Budapest Treaty (BT)).
See Patent Cooperation Treaty, Contracting Parties, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 
U.N.T.S. 231, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ documents/
pdf/pct.pdf (showing 142 contracting parties when last modified on Oct. 3, 2001, with
the supplementing Regulations under the Patent Cooperation Treaty of Jan. 1, 2004); see 
also Patent Law Treaty, Contracting Parties, June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en& treaty_id=4 (showing 18 
contracting parties when adopted at Geneva on June 1, 2000, with the supplementing
Regulations under the Patent Law Treaty, adopted the same date); see also Budapest
Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure, Contracting Parties, Apr. 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1241 1861
U.N.T.S. 361, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/ www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/ 
budapest.pdf (showing 72 contracting parties when amended Sept. 26, 1980; the
Regulations Under the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit
of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure were adopted Apr. 28, 1977 and
amended Jan. 20, 1981 and Oct. 1, 2002). 
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(WTO)103 which administers the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) Agreement.104 
Several WIPO secretariat reports released and discussed during the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Session meetings of the Standing 
Committee105 on the Law of Patents (SCP) reflect an emerging global
view about patents and related trade secrets that will surely exacerbate
legal uncertainties and economic risks associated with high technology 
innovation and investment.  A growing number of WIPO members from 
emerging markets and developing countries generally believe that patent-
based technology markets are inherently flawed, that patent holders are 
monopolists who exploit the period of temporary exclusivity at the expense
of the public interest,106 and that an irreconcilable conflict exists between 
the patent and standards systems that undergird technology development 
and industrial innovation, and are thus inconsistent with the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals.107  The allegations are supported by a 
number of sympathetic academicians and political agenda-based 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) pressure groups, and to a 
103. “The World Trade Organization (WTO), established on January 1, 1995 . . . 
functions as the principal international body concerned with multilateral negotiations on 
the reduction of trade barriers and other measures that distort competition. . . .  The basic 
aim of the WTO is to liberalize world trade and place it on a secure basis, thereby 
contributing to economic growth and development.” U.S. Proposal for Global 
Agricultural Trade Reform, WTO (July 2002), available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/
info/factsheets/wto.html.
104. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
105. Decision-Making Bodies, About WIPO, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/members/
en/decision_bodies.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
106. See, e.g., Report on the International Patent System, supra note 84.  The term 
“public interest” is discussed at paragraphs 130, 141, 172, 236, 286–87, 289, 298, 310, 
313–14, and Annex II (pp. 72–136), where it is referenced expressly within the 
descriptions of national laws provided by no fewer than twenty-four (24) countries: 
Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Uzbekistan, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Mauritius, Pakistan, Papau New Guinea, Poland, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Tunisia,
Ukraine and Uruguay.  Although not catalogued here, it is certain that the laws of other 
WIPO members also include “public interest” exceptions and limitations to the exercise
of privately held intellectual property rights. 
107. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, U.N.  Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18,
2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf (Resolution
adopted by the General Assembly 55th Session).  See United Nations Millennium Declaration, 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 55th Session (A/RES/55/2) (Sept. 18, 
2000), at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf. 
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lesser extent, by some in industry.108  If successful, this movement will 
effectively recharacterize, for international law purposes, most privately 
conceived, developed, and commercialized health, clean energy, and ICT as 
“public goods” which may then be appropriated for less than adequate 
compensation and few substantive or procedural checks and balances to
serve the public interest.109 
Two governmental regulatory instruments have galvanized debate 
among government, civil society, and industry stakeholders participating 
in the WIPO SCP process: broadly defined compulsory licenses for 
healthcare and clean energy technologies and emerging government 
procurement rules expressing direct and indirect preferences for patent- 
or royalty-free “SMART” technologies embedded in open national
healthcare, energy, and ICT standards. 
The growing popularity of such measures reveals a deep-seeded, multi- 
polar, philosophical antipathy toward the institution of exclusive private 
property rights generally and IP rights specifically.110 This creates more
legal uncertainty and related policy and regulatory risk for patented high
technology innovation than has been acknowledged by the investment
and corporate communities within OECD member nations. Therefore,
unless this emerging world view is peremptorily challenged, such measures
are likely to severely jeopardize scientific and technological innovation
and investment in promising high technologies conceived and developed
108. See, e.g., Laura DiNardis, E-Governance Policies for Interoperability and 
Open Standards, 7, 14, 23–24 (Yale Information Soc’y Project, Working Paper No.
1629833, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629833. Laura DiNardis, E-
Governance Policies for Interoperability and Open Standards, Policy & Internet: Vol. 2: 
Iss. 3, art. 6, POLICY AND INTERNET http://www.psocommons.org/policyandinternet/
vol2/iss3/art6/ (last visited July 13, 2011). 
109. This emerging view of patents has identified “public interests” as including the 
facilitation of knowledge dissemination, technology and wealth transfers, and access to
affordable healthcare, clean energy and broadband communications at prices far less than 
fair market value. 
110. See, e.g., Pat Sewell, A Review by Pat Sewell, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE (2003)
(reviewing AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY 
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY, (2003)), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/
about/sewell.jsp (reflecting the thesis that, “When free market democracy is pursued in
the presence of a market-dominant minority, the almost invariable result is backlash.
This backlash typically takes one of three forms. The first is a backlash against markets,
targeting the market-dominant minority’s wealth.  The second is a backlash against 
democracy by forces favorable to the market-dominant minority.  The third is violence,
sometimes genocidal, directed against the market-dominant minority itself, and
recommending, among other things, the ‘controversial strategy’ of majority-backed
governmental intervention to ‘correct’ ethnic wealth ‘imbalances’ through programs
similar to those called ‘affirmative action’ within the West.  This would seem effective
and feasible, given a popularly-elected government.  But it would violate free-market 
expectations and, immodestly used, threaten the individual rights (including property
ownership rights) or rights of the minority that liberalism associates with majority rule”).
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within and beyond the United States, both by entrepreneurs and more
established global companies.
A. Government Regulations and Proposals for the Compulsory 
Licensing of High Technologies 
1. WIPO Reports, UN Agency Initiatives and BRICS Nation 
Regulations Seek an Expansion of Exceptions and     
Limitations to the Patent Right on “Public        
Interest” Grounds
The government of Brazil is perhaps the staunchest global advocate of 
establishing a flexible compulsory licensing mechanism within both
international treaty and customary international law. Such a globally
harmonized licensing mechanism would grant national emerging and 
developing country governments, which are host to many of the world’s 
future growth markets,111 the broad discretion to appropriate and secure
third-party reverse engineering of foreign, privately-held, patented
medical and ICT technologies whenever a “public interest” is claimed.112 
Most troubling, however, is that Brazil’s views and efforts in this 
regard influence a large group of developing countries generally known 
within the United Nations as the “Group of 77.”113  Their views are
currently being shepherded through the WIPO SCP via a report entitled,
Exclusions From Patentable Subject Matter and Exceptions and Limitations 
to the Rights,114 by a more focused, agenda-based group of developing 
countries referred to as the WIPO “Development Agenda Group (DAG).”115 
111. See Top 10 Largest Economies in 2020, EUROMONITOR INT. (July 7, 2010), 
http://blog.euromonitor.com/2010/07/special-report-top-10-largest-economies-in-2020.html.
112. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Kogan, Brazil’s IP Opportunism Threatens U.S. Private 
Property Rights, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 1–139 (2006), available at http:// 
www.itssd.org/Publications/IAL105-II(frompublisher)[2].pdf. 
113. See About the Group of 77, THE GROUP OF 77 AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.g77.org/doc/ (last visited July 24, 2011). 
114. World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of 
Patents, Mar. 23-27, 2009, Exclusions From Patentable Subject Matter and Exceptions and 
Limitations to the Rights: Rep. of the WIPO Secretariat, U.N. Doc. SCP/13/3, 13th Sess. 
(Feb. 4, 2009) [hereinafter WIPO Rep. SCP/13/3], available at http://www.wipo.int/
edocs/mdocs/scp/ en/scp_13/scp_13_3.pdf. 
115. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Committee on Development and 
Intellectual Property (CDIP) (Apr. 26–30, 2010), Information on the Development 
Agenda Group Guiding Principles, ¶ 4 & n.1, U.N Doc. CDIP/5/9 Rev., 5th Sess. (Apr.
26, 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_5/cdip_ 5_9_rev.pdf. 
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According to the DAG, in order to “preserve[e] national policy space,”
WIPO should exploit the implementation of IP “flexibilities, exceptions 
and limitations as well as other special provisions, options[,] or safeguards 
. . . essential to the needs of developing countries” wherever possible to
address “developmental and global challenges such as environment, public 
health, food[,] [and] security.”116  A compulsory or non-voluntary license
refers to the practice by a government to authorize itself or third parties to use 
the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder for
reasons of public policy . . .  In [such] cases, the public interest in broader
access to an invention is considered more important than the private interest of
the right holder to fully exploit his exclusive rights.117 
As one recent WIPO secretariat report reveals, compulsory licenses
were historically issued118 outside the United States,119 provided certain
statutory conditions were first satisfied “to prevent the abuses which might 
result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by [a] patent,”
including the “failure to work or [the] insufficient working” of a patent.120 
Governments eventually broadened the definition of “patent abuses,”
and hence, the grounds for issuance of compulsory licenses, to also
encompass: (1) “the refusal [to] grant[] a license on reasonable terms and
conditions;” (2) “the failure to supply the national market with sufficient
quantities of the patent product;” (3) “demanding excessive prices for
such product;” and (4) “anticompetitive” behavior.121  Gradually, by the
early 1990’s, approximately one hundred national governments other than 
the United States had opportunistically expanded their use of compulsory
licensing to cover non-abuse, or public interest situations which included 
compulsory licenses “in the fields of military security[,] . . . public health[,] 
. . . [and] public interest in unhampered technological progress . . . [as in the
116. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. 
117. Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing of 
Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and
an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA, INT’L CENTRE  FOR  TRADE AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (ICTSD) & UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV.
(UNCTAD), 1 (June 2003), http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf
[hereinafter Reichman & Hasenzahl]. 
118. See WIPO Rep. SCP/13/3, supra note 100, ¶¶ 138–84.
119. Reichman and Hasenzahl, supra note 103, at 4–5.  (“[T]he US never adopted
a general statute to regulate non-voluntary licensing of patented inventions either on
grounds of misuse or on public interest grounds,” while the federal courts and the 
Federal Trade Commission from time to time issued non-voluntary licenses to regulate
misuses of patent rights and antitrust violations and/or within consent decrees bearing on
corporate mergers and acquisition.).
120. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20 1883,
art. 5A(2), 5A(4), as amended, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html 
#P123_15283.
 121. WIPO Rep. CP/13/3, supra note 100, ¶¶ 78, 160. 
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case of] . . . so-called dependent patents.”122  According to at least 
one international IP law expert, governments’ resort to compulsory licensing
in cases of non-abuse was an “unintended consequence,” practiced mostly 
by countries “seeking to regulate patents covering medicinal products and
food products”123 and later justified by reference to “Article 31 [of the
WTO TRIPS Agreement which they alleged] . . . indirectly vindicated
the public interest as a ground separate from the category of abuse.”124 
What emerging and developing country governments have failed to
acknowledge, however, is that TRIPS Article 31 circumscribes such 
practices with a robust statutory framework that “imposes strict conditions
and procedural requirements for such issuance,”125 consistent with “one
of the two primary objectives of the treaty—the recognition that intellectual 
property rights are private rights” entitled to affirmative due process
protections.126 International IP law commentators have argued that such
recognition is enshrined within various provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
These provisions include TRIPS Preamble Paragraph 4 and TRIPS Articles 
31(h) and 44.2 (ensuring payment of adequate, just, and complete 
remuneration upon issuance of a compulsory license); TRIPS Articles 
31(k) and 62.4 (ensuring against the diminution of patent owner rights 
which would otherwise follow from the imposition of remedies/sanctions, 
including compulsory licenses, for judicially or administratively determined
anti-competition violations); and proposed new TRIPS Article 31.2bis 
contained within the pending Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPS
Agreement intended to codify Paragraph 3 of the Decision of the General
Council of August 30, 2003, on the Implementation of paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.127 
Arguably, these provisions individually and collectively require that a 
122. World Intellectual Property Organziation,World Intellectual Property Handbook:
Policy, Law and Use, ¶¶ 5.51–5.53, at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/iprm/
pdf/ch5.pdf. 
123. Reichman and Hasenzahl, supra note 103, at 1 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 2. 
125. See ITSSD Comments Concerning Document (SCP/13/3) Patent Exclusions,
Exceptions & Limitations, INST. FOR TRADE STANDARDS AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. 5–6 
and accompanying notes (Feb. 2009), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/scp/en/meetings/
session_14/studies/itssd_2.pdf [hereinafter ITSSD Comments Concerning Document 
SCP/13/3].
126. Id. at 6 (quoting NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF TRADEMARKS 
AND DESIGNS, 43 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2d ed., 2006)). 
127. See generally ITSSD Comments Concerning Document (SCP/13/3), supra
note 111, at 5–9. 
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government’s determination of “adequate remuneration” avoid prejudicing
a patent holder’s “legitimate expectations of commercial opportunity,”128 
consistent with the “market compensation theory followed by the United 
States in determining the accountability of the federal government for 
unauthorized use of a patent invention [pursuant to] 28 U.S.C. § 1498.”129 
Nevertheless, the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa)130 continue in their efforts to promote debate on the issue of
compulsory licensing in domestic as well as international fora such as
the WIPO. During the SCP’s Fourteenth Session in March 2009, for 
example, SCP members commissioned an external “experts study” on 
exclusions, exceptions, and limitations to the patent right which focused 
on the public policy and socio-economic dimensions of public health,
education, research and experimentation, and patentability of life form
issues, among others to be suggested by members.131  The completed study, 
which was released during September 2010 in advance of the SCP’s 
Fifteenth Session, discusses the use of compulsory licenses in two of its
six chapters. One chapter relates to life forms and identifies the various 
provisions of the E.U. directive on biotechnological inventions that establish
a compulsory licensing scheme “to deal with the overlap between patent 
and plant variety protection”132 and the analogues of several E.U. Member 
States,133 as well as the compulsory licensing statutes of IP stalwarts such as
Brazil134 and the Russian Federation.135  A second chapter details the use
of compulsory licensing with respect to pharmaceuticals, focusing on 
countries other than the United States that have issued compulsory licenses
on various grounds including public interest, anti-competition, national 
128. Id. at 20 (quoting Antony Taubman, Rethinking Trips: ‘Adequate Remuneration’
for Non-Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927, 970 (Dec. 2008)).
129. Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42
GA, L. REV. 131, 158 (2007). 
130. See Erin Conway-Smith, South Africa to be a BRIC, GLOBAL POST, Jan. 8, 
2011, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/southafrica/110107/south-africa-be-bric.; South 
Africa Receives BRIC Invite, SOUTHAFRICA.info (Jan 3, 2011), at http://www.southafrica.
info/news/international/brics-030111.htm. 
131. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law 
of Patents, Jan. 25–29, 2010, External Experts’ Study Regarding Exclusions, Exceptions 
and Limitations for the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, ¶¶ 1, 4, U.N. Doc. 
SCP/14/INF/2,14th Sess. (Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/scp/en/ scp_14/scp_14_inf_2.pdf. 
132. World Intellectual Property Organization, Exclusions from Patentable Subject 
Matter and Exception sand Limitations to the Rights—Biotechnology, 34–35, 56, U.N. 
Doc. SCP15/3 ANNEX III (Jan. 1, 2010) (by Denis Borges Barbosa & Karin Grau-
Kruntz), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_15/scp_15_3-annex3.pdf. 
133. Id. at 65–68 (concerning the laws of Belgium, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom).
134. Id. at 45–46.
135. Id. at 67. 
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security emergencies, health emergencies, failure to work, government
noncommercial use, or one of several other deemed “abuses” of patent
rights.136 
During the SCP’s Fifteenth Session which took place in October 2010, 
there was apparent agreement between Brazil, the DAG, and the experts’ 
study’s coordinator and spokesperson concerning the study’s articulation
of a utilitarian rather than a private property rights basis for patents.  In 
particular, the Brazilian delegate interpreted the experts’ study as
recommending that governments grant technology patents only to the 
extent necessary to rectify the failure of the market to foster innovation.137 
The Free Software Foundation Europe (FSFE), an outspoken NGO
observer and staunch advocate of royalty-free and nonproprietary open 
source software-based ICT standards, agreed with this Brazilian/DAG 
interpretation and proposed its own three-part test for adjudging the
necessity of a patent grant.138  According to the FSFE, a patent should be
granted only where there is: (1) “a demonstrated market failure to provide 
innovation; (2) a demonstrated positive disclosure of the invention for 
patenting and (3) a demonstrated effectiveness of the patent system in
the area to disseminate knowledge.”139 
The view that technology and knowledge are “public goods” and that
patents are merely temporary incentives provided by governments to
correct “market failures” is based on the economic rationale for
technology patents articulated within the WIPO SCP’s initial Report on 
the International Patent System.140  According to the report, since
136. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law 
of Patents, Oct. 11–15, 2010, Draft Rep. prepared by the Secretariat, ¶ 76, U.N. Doc. 
SCP/15/6/ PROV, 15th Sess. (Mar. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Draft Rep. prepared by the 
Secretariat: SCP/15/6/PROV].
137. Id.; see also DAG Statement on the Expert’s Study on Exclusion and
Exceptions/Limitations(SCP/15/3), at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/
2010/10/DAG-Statement-On-Exemptions-Limitations.doc. 
138. FSFE Submission to European Patent Office, FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION 
EUROPE (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.fsfe.org/projects/swpat/epo-response-42009.
en.html. “[T]he economic rationale for patents is based on providing incentives in cases 
of market failure, disclosure of knowledge into the public domain, as well as technology
transfer, commercialisation, and diffusion of knowledge.” Id.
139. Id.; see also Draft Rep. prepared by the Secretariat: SCP/15/6/PROV, supra
note 122, at ¶ 103. 
140. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law 
of Patents, June 23–27, 2008, Report on the Int’l Patent Sys., 30, U.N. Doc. SCP/12/3/Rev.2, 
(Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_12/scp_12_3_
rev_2. pdf. 
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technology and knowledge are “non-excludable” in the sense that they 
can be used simultaneously by many people and owned exclusively by
none in competitive markets, if left to their own devices, people would 
not invest in them. Consequently, governments have intervened by
developing patent systems to incentivize markets to undertake the costly 
and risky investments necessary to generate the production of
knowledge.141 
Cambridge University Law Professor Lionel Bently,142 the designated 
coordinator of and spokesperson for the experts’ study at the WIPO SCP,143 
in responding to a comment made during the SCP’s October 11, 2010 
plenary session, added one other dimension to this theory of market failure. 
He emphasized that a “neoliberal economics” property rights basis for 
technology patents is not possible in developing countries given the
added market failure of asymmetry of information caused by the lack of 
willing buyers and sellers to create a market for knowledge goods in 
such countries.144  This utilitarian patent “public interest” point of view
is also reflected in a related WIPO SCP study on “technology transfer,” 
which extols compulsory licenses as “tools to ensure that the patent system 
contributes to the promotion of innovation . . . and to the dissemination 
and transfer of technology . . . [thereby] responding to the public interest 
at large.”145 
Given the E.U.’s relatively weaker private property laws vis-à-vis the 
United States146 and its continued inability, despite the considerable efforts
of many, to enact a regional patent law,147 it is understandable why the 
141. Id. at ¶ 28. 
142. See Professor Lionel Bently, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, available at
http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/people/academic/l-a-f-bently/1109. 
143. See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the
Law of Patents, Oct. 11–15, 2010, Summary by the Chair, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. SCP/15/5 (Oct. 
15, 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_15/scp_15_5.pdf. 
144. During the Q&A portion of Professor Bently’s presentation, this author made
the following comment: “[Y]our study seems to begin with the flawed premise of market 
failure such that exclusive private property rights are deemed an impediment to the
public interest.” See Draft Rep. prepared by the Secretariat: SCP/15/6/PROV, supra
note 122, at ¶ 56. 
145. World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of 
Patents, Jan. 25–29, 2010, Transfer of Technology, ¶ 122, U.N. Doc. SCP/14/4, 14th
Sess. (Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_14/
scp_14_4.pdf.
146. World Intellectual Property Organization, Comments on the Report on the 
International Patent System Received from Members and Observers of the SCP, 18– 
26, U.N. Doc. SCP/12/3 Rev.2 ANNEX III. 
147. See, e.g., Unitary Patent/EU Patent, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://
www.epo.org/news-issues/issues/eu-patent.html (last updated June 1, 2011); Unitary
Patent/ EU Patent—Legislative Initiatives, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/
law-practice/legislative-initiatives/eu-patent.html (last updated July 28, 2011); Stephanie 
Bodoni, France, Germany Among Nations Urging for Patent Plan, BLOOMBERG 
234
KOGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:56 AM     
  









    
 
 







     
 








[VOL. 13:  201, 2011] Commercial High Technology
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
Belgian WIPO delegate representing the EU-27, for largely political
reasons, agreed with the experts’ study assessment.  According to the E.U., 
the relative asymmetry of information between patent holders and
prospective licensees within developing countries, and the relatively 
different capacities within developing countries to receive technology
transfer have resulted in a definition of property rights that is unclear and
which justifies the enactment of national legislation most suitable to each
country’s needs.148  This statement apparently emboldened the Brazilian
delegate to propose that a government intervention mechanism be
established that would match prospective patent licensors with prospective 
licensees to correct the perceived market failure deemed to impede
technology transfer.149 
It is quite clear that these views resonate with those of BRICS and
developing nations seeking an expanded global application of compulsory 
licensing on public interest grounds to include technologies other than
as troubling that this position derives “soft” legal support from the “UNEP 
medicines such as clean energy technologies.  And, it should be regarded
[United Nations Environment Program] Agenda 21 proposal [on sustainable 
development] that created the UNFCCC at the 1992 Rio Convention.”150 
During the December 2007 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP), the now-
former Brazilian Foreign Minister “proposed that a statement similar to
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health should
be considered in the climate change context.”151  This proposal was taken
seriously enough to attract the attention and analysis of University of
BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-12-08/france-
germany-among- nations-urging-for-patent-plan.html; Jonathan Stearns, EU Parliament 
Rejects Patent Law Backed by Technology Companies, BLOOMBERG (July 6, 2005), http:// 
www.bloomberg. com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a9_JRGCE0h6A. 
148. See Draft Rep. prepared by the Secretariat: SCP/15/6/PROV, supra note 122, 
¶ 144.
149. See id. ¶ 145. 
150. Charles Ebinger & Govinda Avasarala, Transferring Environmentally Sound
Technologies in an Intellectual Property-Friendly Framework 23–24 (2004), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/11_environmental_technologyebinger
/11_enfironmental_technology_ebinger.pdf. 
151. Background Paper, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
(ICTSD) Trade and Climate Change Seminar, Copenhagen, Den., June 18–20, 2008, 











   
   
    
 
     
 
 
     





   
     
 
   
  
 










    
Florida law professor Frederick Abbott who was one of the drafters of
the Doha Declaration on Public Health.152 
During the Accra, Ghana Climate Change Talks of August 2008,153 the
Group of 77 and China submitted a proposal that called for “enhanced
financial resources and investment to support action on mitigation and 
adaptation as well as the development and transfer of technology, as
required by the Bali Action Plan.”154  According to this proposal, an
Executive Body on Technology would be established as a subsidiary
body of the Convention (comprised of government representatives) to
facilitate climate mitigation and adaptation technology development and 
transfer.155  In addition, the Executive Body’s Technology Action Plan
would
ensure that privately owned technologies are available on an affordable basis
through measures to resolve the barriers posed by intellectual property rights
and addressing compulsory licensing of patented technologies . . . The [financing] 
mechanism w[ould] cover technologies in all relevant sectors and endeavor to
remove barriers to effective technology development, deployment, diffusion and
transfer . . .  [Among the] activities and costs eligible for support by the mechanism 
. . . [are the] . . . [c]reation of manufacturing facilities for EST [environmentally
sensitive technologies], including low-GHG emission technologies, inter alia, 
costs of:-Compulsory licensing, cost associated with patents, designs, and 
royalties.156 
During the November 2008 Beijing International Conference on carbon 
abatement technology transfers, 
China and India proposed that the TRIPS flexibility for medicines (i.e. compulsory
licensing) should be extended to cover carbon abatement technology. The argument
was that climate is a public good, just like health, and hence, the international
community should follow the principle of “guidance by government—
participation by enterprises.”157 
152. See, e.g., ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade Policies and
Sustainable Energy, Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change:
Lessons from the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health, at vi (June 
2009) (by Frederick M. Abbott), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1433579.
 153. See Accra Climate Change Talks 2008, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/intersessional/accra/items/ 
4437.php. 
154. See Matthew Stilwell, G77-China Propose “Enhanced Financial Mechanism” 
For UNFCCC, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Aug. 29, 2008), available at http://finance.
third worldnetwork.net/article.php?aid=186. 
155. See Proposal by the G77 & China for A Technology Mechanism Under the 
UNFCCC, 2 (Aug. 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_
groups/lca/application/pdf/technology_proposal_g77_8.pdf. 
156. Id. at 3–4 (emphases added). 
157. Are IPRs A Barrier To The Transfer Of Climate Change Technology?, 
COPENHAGEN ECON. & THE IPR CO. 7 (Jan. 2009) (emphasis added), available at http://
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Thereafter, during February 2009, the Chinese government proposed,
in comments submitted to the UNFCCC concerning the implementation 
of the Bali Action Plan, that “[c]ompulsory licensing related patented ESTs
[environmentally sound technologies] and specific legal and regulatory 
arrangement [] curb negative effects of monopoly powers . . . as part of the 
efforts to implement the UNFCCC.”158  In November 2009, European 
and American media reported how China and India had intended to
condition any agreement reached at the December 2009 Copenhagen
Climate Change Conference on developed countries’ acceptance of a 
broad compulsory licensing-based technology transfer regime relating to 
clean energy, carbon mitigation, and new green technologies.159  The U.S. 
and E.U. governments had agreed previously that they would reject and
eventually rejected such proposal out of deep concern that it would stifle
investment, research and development, technological innovation, and
“green” jobs creation within their economic regions.160 161 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2009/february/tradoc_142371.pdf a “report . . . commissioned
by the European Commission (DG Trade)”.
158. China’s Views on the Fulfillment of the Bali Action Plan and the Components 
of the Agreed Outcome to be Adopted by the Conference of the Parties At Its 15th 
Session, 7 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/
china060209.pdf. 
159. See China, India Push for ‘Patent Free’ Freen Tech, EURACTIV.COM (Nov. 23, 
2009),  available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/china-india-push-patent-free-
green-tech/article-187567; see also Jim Efstathiou Jr., Clean-Energy Cause Shouldn’t
Void Patents, Senators Tell Obama, BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov.4, 2009, 9:30 AM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aug9aycq0lJw.
160. Id.; see also Andrew C. Revkin & Tom Zeller, Jr., U.S. Negotiator Dismisses
Reparations for Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/12/10/science/earth/10climate.html; Bangkok Blues: Gloom and
Pragmatism Ahead of the Copenhagen Climate-Change Summit, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
15, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14646499 (“Poor countries suggested language
that would allow compulsory licensing of low-carbon technologies developed in the rich 
world.  Neither the EU nor America wanted that.”). Id.
161. In the case of the U.S. it would appear that such rejection had already been 
agreed upon during prior hearings convened by the U.S. House Select Committee on
Energy Independence and Global Warming in September 2009. See Roadmap to
Copenhagen: Driving Toward Success: Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy
Independence and Global Warming (2009), available at http://republicans.global
warming.house.gov/Media/file/PDFs/Hearings/091009Road_to_Copenhagen/Questions
_ForThe_Record.pdf.  At the hearings, ranking Republican Member F. James
Sessensbrenner entered into the congressional record the following information and 
posed the following question to U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, Todd Stern:
“Developing countries are leading efforts to weaken or even destroy intellectual
property rights (IPR) by seeking to gain free access to American and other developed
countries IPR for clean-energy technologies. Their proposals include preventing patenting in
 237
































   
 
Yet, Draft Decision D-/CP.15—Enhanced action on technology
development and transfer, contained within the February 2010 Report of 
the “Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-
LCA) under the Convention” continues to provide UNFCCC Parties 
with the option of interpreting or implementing any international
agreement on intellectual property “in a manner that [does not] limit[] or
prevent[] any Party from taking any measures to address . . . transfer of, 
and access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how.”162 
The draft decision indicates that one way to achieve this objective is to
ensure that “publicly funded technologies and related know-how is 
placed into the public domain, shared[,] and made universally accessible 
“in a manner that promotes transfer of and/or access to environmentally
sound technology and know-how to developing countries on royalty-free
terms.”163  Another way is to oblige Parties to “take all necessary steps in
all relevant forums to exclude from Intellectual Property Rights protection, 
and revoke any such existing intellectual property right protection
in developing countries and least developed countries on environmentally 
sound technologies to adapt to and mitigate climate change”(emphasis 
added).164  Alternatively, Parties can recognize “the right [of developing 
countries] . . . to make use of the full flexibilities contained in the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement, including 
compulsory licensing.”165 
developing countries, requiring compulsory licensing, and ensuring access to new 
technologies on non-exclusive royalty-free terms.  All of which ignore the fact that new 
technologies will only be developed if there are incentives to create them.  Is the
Administration committed to protecting our IPR from this assault?”  See Questions for 
the Record Submitted to Special Envoy Todd Stern by Representative James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (#9), H. SELECT COMM. ON ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND GLOBAL
WARMING, 15 (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://republicans.globalwarming.house.gov/ 
Media/file/PDFs/Hearings/091009Road_to_Copenhagen/Response_Stern.pdf.  Mr. Stern
answered this question, in part, in the following manner: “The Administration will not
support any language in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
that seeks to undermine or weaken protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. We will not support it in a Copenhagen outcome.  We have made this very clear
in the negotiations, where we have argued intellectual property is an essential building 
block for technology innovation that we will need if we are to achieve the ultimate 
objective of the Convention.”  Id. at 16. 
162. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, 
Den., Dec. 7–15, 2009, Draft Decision D.—/CP.15—Enhanced Action on Technology 
Development and Transfer, in Rep. of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention on its 8th Sess., 22–28 U.N. Doc. FCCC/
AWGLCA/2009/17,  Annex I (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2009/awglca8/eng/17.pdf.
163. Id. ¶ 17bis (b) (emphasis added). 
164. Id. ¶ 17ter  (Including environmentally sensitive technologies “developed through 
funding by governments or international agencies and those involving use of genetic 
resources that are used foradaptation and mitigation of climate change”) (emphasis added). 
165. Id. ¶ 17quater (emphasis added). 
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Apparently, by June 2010, these draft decision options had been
subsequently incorporated within Chapter III—Enhanced Action on 
Technology Development and Transfer of a text prepared by the Chair 
of the UNFCCC Secretariat under a mandate “to facilitate negotiations 
among Parties, drawing on the report of the AWG-LCA presented to the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) at its fifteenth session”166 and had triggered
objections from the government of Japan.167  Furthermore, such decision 
text was referenced by the Expert Group on Technology Transfer of the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice168 in a stocktaking
paper “on the role of IPRs in technology transfer”169 that has yet to be 
publicly released.170  Whether this report and its contents will ever be
released and subject to public scrutiny is uncertain. However, the issue 
of how best to facilitate and implement clean technology transfers via 
IPR law and policy changes was certainly discussed in less direct
terms and extensively referenced within a draft COP decision thereafter
166. Note by the Chair, June 1–11, 2009, Chapter III—Enhanced Action on Technology
Development and Transfer, Text to Facilitate Negotiations Among Parties, presented at
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention on its 
10th Sess., ¶ 1, 11, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/6 (May 17, 2010), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awglca10/eng/06.pdf. 
167. Divergent Views on Bodies of the UNFCCC Tech. Mechanism, TWN BONN
UPDATE NO. 16 (Ger.), June 8, 2010, at 3, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/
climate/news/Bonn06/TWN_bonn6.up16.pdf (“Japan advocated for strict protection of
IPRs and called for Option 2 of Paragraph 11 in Chapter III of the Chair’s text to be
eliminated.  (Option 2 relates to measures to address IPRS)”).  See also Rep. of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the Convention on its Tenth
Session, June 1–11, 2010, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/7 (June 28, 2010), 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awglca10/eng/07.pdf. 
168. Bodies of the Framework Convention, Actors in the Negotiation Process, and the
UNFCCC Secretariat, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, UNFCCC.INT, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/feeling_the_heat/2915
(last visited Jul. 20, 2011) (This body “counsels the Conference of the [UNFCCC] 
Parties on matters of climate, the environment,technology and method.”). 
169. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate, Rep. of the Expert Group
on Tech. Transfer—Note by the Chair of the Expert Group onTech. Transfer, Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and Subsidiary Body for Implementation
at III.A.2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SB/2010/INF.4 (Nov. 24, 2010) [hereinafter FCCC/SB/
2010/INF.4 (Nov. 24, 2010)], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/sb/eng/
inf04.pdf; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Expert 
Group on Tech. Transfer—Note by the Chair of the Expert Group on Tech. Transfer, 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and Subsidiary Body for
Implementation, The Updated Rolling Programme of Work of the Expert Group on Tech. 
Transfer for 2010–2011, at 11, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SB/2010/INF.1, Annex I (May 30, 
2010), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/sb/eng/inf01.pdf. 
170. See FCCC/SB/2010/INF.4 (Nov. 24, 2010), supra note 155, at ¶ 12. 
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issued following the December 2010 UNFCCC Cancun, Mexico climate 
change conference,171 despite some media reports that the issue of
intellectual property rights had been dropped altogether from the 
discussion.172 
Despite the failure to adopt such a compulsory licensing regime at
Copenhagen, the members of the DAG have continued to debate
compulsory licensing at the WIPO SCP.  For example, in January 2010
during the WIPO SCP’s Fourteenth Session meetings, the government of
Brazil proposed a new tool for implementing the WIPO Development 
Agenda—the establishment of an SCP working group to “carry out a wide
and sustained debate . . . in three phase[s]” on the issue of “limitations
and exceptions to patent rights,” including compulsory licensing.  According 
to the Brazilian proposal, the working group would: (1) exchange and 
compile information detailing all national or regional legislation on
limitations and exceptions and the reasons for and methods of their use; 
(2) investigate all effective legislation on limitations and exceptions and
the conditions for their implementation; and (3) develop “an exceptions 
and limitations manual” for WIPO Member reference.173  However, it 
remains to be determined whether such a working group will be capable of 
bringing any further enlightenment to such a highly complex, fact-specific
subject matter. 
Arguably, it was the ongoing legal uncertainty surrounding compulsory
licensing that prompted the Indian government to release a draft discussion 
paper in August 2010 to “develop a predictable environment for use of 
171. Advance unedited version, United Nations Climate Change Conference
Cancun, Draft decision [-/CP.16]—Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, U.N. Doc. COP 16/CMP 6, at 
paras. 1 and (2)(a), 2(c), 14(a), 18, 20(d), 40(a), 40(c), 42(b), 48, 53, 73, 76, 89; 113–116
(Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop16/application/pdf/ 
cop16_lca.pdf. 
172. See, e.g., Urmi A. Goswami, Experts raise questions over future of Kyoto
Protocol, THE ECONOMIC TIMES INDIA, Dec. 13, 2010, available at http://economictimes. 
indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/Experts-raise-questions-over-future-of-Kyoto-
Protocol/articleshow/7090659.cms; Catherine Saez, IP Issues In Shadows At Climate 
Change Conference, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, Dec. 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/12/10/ip-issues-in-shadows-at-climate-change-
conference/; Martin Khor, Strange Outcome of Cancun Conference, THE STAR ONLINE, 
Dec. 13, 2010, available at http://thestar.com.my/columnists/story.asp?col=globaltrends 
&file=/2010/12/13/columnists/globaltrends/7611715&sec=Global%20Trends; Final Accord 
Reached at Cancun Despite Bolivia’s Objection, XINHUANET.COM, http://news.xinhuanet. 
com/english2010/world/2010-12/12/c_13645374.htm (last visited July 24, 2011). 
173. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law 
of Patents, Jan. 25–29, 2010, Proposal from Brazil, ¶¶ 23–27, U.N. Doc. SCP/14/7,
14th Sess. Annex 3 (Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
patent_policy/en/scp_14/scp_14_7.pdf. 
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such measures.”174  One of the questions raised by the Indian government
concerned the wisdom of limiting a government’s discretion to issue
compulsory licenses, and whether alternative grounds beyond “national
emergency,” “extreme urgency,” and “public non-commercial use” as set 
forth in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement are and should be available
to justify the issuance of compulsory licenses.175 A second question
concerned the suitability of compulsory licenses to resolve anti-competition 
abuses.176  These two questions sidestepped the issue of employing
compulsory licenses on broader public interest grounds beyond “failure 
to work” abuses.  They also left unresolved the types of technologies
beyond medicines needed to treat frontline diseases such as HIV, AIDs,
Hepatitis C, cancer, and diabetes177 for which compulsory licenses could 
theoretically be issued, including climate change and carbon mitigation 
technologies.  A third question concerned the market failure theory, or 
the impact of compulsory licenses on technological growth in emerging
and developing economies.  With respect to this latter issue, the discussion 
cited a 2009 report which had found that “compulsory licensing has a
strong and persistent positive effect on domestic invention”.178  The 
same report concluded, without any further analysis, that “[e]ven without 
any effects on innovation, compulsory licensing may create significant
positive welfare effects on consumers in developing countries as a
mechanism to maintain product variety.”179  It remains uncertain whether 
India will seriously consider responses received from foreign and domestic 
industry stakeholders emphasizing how the discussion paper conveys the 
impression that patent rights susceptible to broad compulsory licensing 
in India will be weakened along with the incentive to innovate without 
resolving India’s healthcare problems.180
 174. INDIA DEP’T OF INDUS. POLICY AND PROMOTION (DIPP), DISCUSSION PAPER ON
COMPULSORY LICENSES, 1 (Aug. 24, 2010), available at http://dipp.nic.in/.
175. Id. ¶¶ 1–2, at 21–23. 
176. Id. ¶ 5, at 25. 
177. Id. ¶¶ 15–17, 30, 44 at 4–5, 9–10, 15. 
178. Id. ¶ 70 (citing Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, Compulsory licensing-
Evidence from The Trading With The Enemy Act 21, n.35 (NBER Working Paper No. 
15598, Dec. 2009)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1313867.
179. Id.
180. CropLife International, Commentary, Discussion Paper on Compulsory Licenses 
Published by the Dep’t of Indus. Policy and Promotion within India’s Ministry of Commerce 
and Indus. 2 (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.dipp.nic.in/ipr-feedback/
Feedback_CropLifeInternational30September2010.pdf.; Pfizer, Response, DIPP Discussion 
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The Indian government would be wise to consider however, that 
compulsory licensing is not the silver bullet that the Brazilian government 
and the DAG believe it to be.  First, “compulsory licensing does not 
[generally] oblige the patent holder to transfer [as yet undisclosed associated 
trade secret] know-how (nor does patent law in general).”181  The triggering 
of such an obligation will often depend on whether a simple refusal to
license rather than anti-competitive behavior or some other abuse of the 
patent right is involved.  Second, even where compulsory licensing is called 
for, it may prove ineffective in practice if the prospective developing 
country government or firm licensee “lacks the expertise to develop the
technology without more than just the [patent] blueprint,”182 such as, 
where a party is unable to “make the technology workable” in the absence 
of additional “significant tacit [as yet undisclosed trade secret] 
knowledge.”183  In addition, the Indian government should not interpret
the current lack of clear and uniform international legal standards for 
determining the appropriate level of market-based compensation due
private patent holders whose technologies fall subject to government 
compulsory licensing, as providing a “green light” for IP opportunism. 
According to one legal expert, the lack of such standards “can make patent 
property rights less predictable, encourage[s] gamesmanship by developing 
or developed countries wishing to cut expenditures and, most perversely,
even stifle access.”184 
While the government of India may recognize that the analysis it must 
undertake to determine an “abuse” of the patent right justifying the
issuance of a compulsory license is a facts and circumstances-specific
exercise not readily reducible to a fixed formula, it must understand that 
it cannot base any such determination exclusively on subjective criteria 
defined by simple reference to culturally motivated policy preferences or 
Paper on Compulsory Licensing 2–3 (Sept. 27, 2010), available at http://www.dipp.nic.in/ 
ipr-feedback/FeedBack_Pfizer_27September2010.pdf.; Biotechnology Indus. Org., 
Commentary, Discussion Paper on Compulsory Licenses Published by the Dep’t of 
Indus. Policy and Promotion within India’s Ministry of Commerce and Indus., 3 (Sept. 
29, 2010), available at http://www.bio.org/ip/international/20100929.pdf; Organization 
of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI), Views and Suggestions, DIPP ‘Discussion 
Paper’ on Compulsory Licensing 2 (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.dipp.nic.in/ipr-
feedback/Feedback_OPPI_30September2010.pdf. 
181. See Daniel K.N. Johnson & Kristina M. Lybecker, Challenges to Technology 
Transfer: A Literature Rev. of the Constraints on Environmental Tech. Dissemination 12 
(Colorado College Working Paper, July 2009), available at http://www.nationalpeace.
org/files/Paper%202%20-%20ccwp09-07_0.pdf, (citing Cameron Hutchison, Does 
TRIPSFacilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology Transfer into Developing




184. See Cahoy, supra note 115, at abstract. 
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on questionable interpretations of human rights law to the exclusion of 
WTO law.
Arguably, the European Court of First Instance (CIF) did not adhere to 
this standard when it affirmed in September 2007 the European
Commission’s 2004 de facto compulsory licensing decision against
Microsoft.185  In upholding the Commission’s determination186 in Microsoft 
Corp. v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., the CIF found that the failure 
of an already market-dominant Microsoft to license its Windows and
Media Player software separately (its refusal to deal on patent and trade
secret protection grounds) and its failure to render such software
interoperable (to authorize the use of interoperability information187 for
the public benefit of both Microsoft competitors and consumers)188 
constituted an impermissible abuse of its intellectual property rights that 
was per se inconsistent with and in violation of European regional
competition (antitrust),189 statutory and case law,190 and innovation policy.191 
The CIF’s ruling referred to interoperability as a “public interest” 
ancillary to maintaining effective competition in the marketplace.192  It  
implied “that in exceptional circumstances a refusal to license intellectual 
property rights could be an abuse of a dominant position” and that “the 
withholding [of intellectual property protected] interoperability information 
may constitute an abuse of a dominant position,”193) without regard to
any other alleged form of market abuse. The CIF’s decision was apparently
based on the following four premises: (1) companies holding an 
acknowledged market-dominant position have “a special responsibility
irrespective of the causes of that position, not to allow its conduct to
impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market;”194 
185. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n of European Cmtys, 2007
E.C.R. II-3601. 
186. See COMMISSION DECISION of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), C(2004) 900 final, 
(Mar. 24, 2004), at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/download/legal/european
commission/03-24-06EUDecision.pdf. 
187. Id. ¶¶ 100.1086, 1116, 1231. 
188. Id. ¶¶ 816–1167, 1231. 
189. Id. ¶¶ 229, 236, 240, 1086. 
190. Id. ¶¶ 331–33, 1086. 
191. See Alla Pozdnakova, Court of First Instance Issues a Judgment in Microsoft 
Case, INT’L LAW OBSERVER (Sept. 28, 2007), at http://internationallawobserver.eu/ 
2007/09/28/court-of-first-instance-issues-a-judgement-inmicrosoft-case/. 
192. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., at ¶ 691. 
193. Id. ¶ 1313. 
194. Id. ¶ 229 (emphasis added). 
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(2) “interoperability implies a ‘two-way’ relationship [wherein] the 
‘function of a computer program is to communicate and work together 
with other components of a computer system’ . . . [and is defined] . . . as 
the ‘ability to exchange information and mutually to use the information 
which has been exchanged,’”195 thereby enabling competing software 
systems to interoperate with the domain architecture of the dominant
software “on an equal footing with” the dominant software—referred to 
as “client/server interoperability and server/server interoperability;”196 
(3) market dominant companies that provide less than the degree of
interoperability deemed necessary to enable developers of competing 
software systems “to remain viably on the market for those operating
systems . . . retain a competitive advantage in terms of interoperability
that hinder[s] . . . the maintenance of effective competition on that
market . . . [by] discourag[ing] . . . competitors from developing and 
marketing . . . systems with innovative features”197; and (4) the failure of
market dominant companies to provide the degree of interoperability
deemed necessary to enable developers of competing software systems
“to remain viably on the market” for those operating systems “prejudices
consumers” and creates a situation wherein “an increasing number of 
consumers are locked into the dominant company’s solution,” thereby 
placing “a limitation . . . on consumer choice”.198 
During January 2011, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeals effectively 
repudiated this portion of the CIF’s holding in the Microsoft case as
being in contravention of E.U. law.  In a decision involving the
defendant’s invocation of the compulsory license antitrust defense permitted 
by E.U.199 200 and German law 201 in a patent infringement action alleging
195. Id. ¶ 226 (quoting Council Directive 91/250/EEC, On the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122), 42, 43). See also Council Directive 91/250/ 
EEC, supra note 120. 
196. Id. ¶¶ 230–31 (emphasis added). 
197. Id. ¶¶ 229, 653 (emphasis added). 
198. Id. ¶¶ 650–53 (emphasis added). 
199. Article 64(3) of the European Patent Convention (EPC)—“Rights Conferred
by a European Patent” provides that “[a]ny infringement of a European patent shall be 
dealt with by national law.”  See The European Patent Convention, EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, available at  http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2010/e/ar64.html.  
See also Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C
115/01 (May 9, 2008), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2008: 115:SOM:
en:HTML; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0001:
0012: EN:PDF; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115: 
0047: 0199:en:PDF.  “In order to ensure that the rules on competition concerning 
agreements, decisions of associations of undertakings and restrictive practices (Article 
101) and abuses of a dominant position (Article 102), which are liable to be
anticompetitive, are applied, the Commission has a number of powers to take
decisions, to conduct investigations and to impose penalties.  It exercises these powers 
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an abuse of the patent right by a market dominant holder of patents for 
the production of ink jet printer cartridges,202 the Dusseldorf (Germany) 
Higher Regional Court found that the right of the proprietor of a patent 
to exclude third parties from manufacturing, offering, and marketing a 
patented invention without its consent constitutes the substance of the 
exclusive patent right.  Therefore, even if a third party’s unauthorized use of
a patent were undertaken for an appropriate fee, it would still be deemed
a “taking” of the patent holder’s exclusive right, since a compulsory 
license attacks the core of an intellectual property right and thereby
devalues it. According to the Court, the CIF’s findings with respect to
interoperability ignored the four-point test articulated in the prior case
law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ),203 which had considered
the refusal to license a patent or other intellectual property right an
“abuse” of a dominant market position justifying the Court’s issuance
of a compulsory license only in “exceptional circumstances”.204  An “abuse”
of the patent right will be found, for example, only where the following 
evidence has first been presented: 
when, following a complaint or on its own initiative, it considers in a given case that
there has been a violation of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.”  See Application of Articles 101
and 102 TFEU (formerly Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty), Europa Summaries of EU 
Legislation, at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/firms/l26092_en.htm.  
200. Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, which prohibited
abuses of a dominant position, included within its scope “refusal[s] to license intellectual 
property” where there is an obligation “to supply the market” for the benefit of
consumers. See Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary
conduct by dominant undertakings, ¶¶ 75-85, OJ C 45/7 (2/24/2009), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:PDF (citing in
¶ 78, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and 
Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR 743; 
Case C-418/01 IMS Health v NDC Health [2004] ECR I-5039). 
201. See Patent Law (Ger.) art. 24, 81, 85, 139 (last amended 2009) (Ger.), available
at http://www.aspenlawschool.com/books/kieff_nack/custom1materials/490German
PatentLaw.htm. 
202. See Düsseldorf Court of Appeals, Decision of January 20, 2011, Case I-2 U 
92/10 (Ger.), available at http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2011/I_2_ 
U_92_10urteil20110120.html. 
203. See, e.g., Case C-481/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v. NDC Health
GmbH & Co KG, 2004 ECR I-5039. 
204. Id.; 2 U 92/10–ink cartridge (5), Düsseldorf Decision No: 1566, Düsseldorf
Higher Regional Court ruling of 20 January 2011, file number 2 U 92/10, CIP Dusseldorfer 
Archive, available at http://www.duesseldorfer-archiv.de/?q=node/3477. 
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(i) the use of the patent must be indispensable to exercise a particular activity,
(ii) refusing to allow the use prevents the appearance of a new product or
services for which there is potential consumer demand, (iii) the refusal is not
objectively justified, and (iv) the refusal is of such a kind as to exclude any 
effective competition on a neighboring market.205 
The Dusseldorf Court disagreed with the CIF on two significant points. 
First, it disagreed with the CIF’s conclusion relating to (i) above—“that 
an input is already indispensable if it is necessary for the input-seeker to 
viably compete in the market”.206  Rather, the Dusseldorf Court determined
that “an input is only indispensable if even a sufficient effort of the patent
user would not make an actual or potentially realistic substitute of the 
particular input available.”207  Second, the Dusseldorf Court disagreed with 
the CIF’s conclusion relating to (ii) above—“that it is sufficient for the 
new product criterion that the refusal to supply limits technical 
development to the detriment of consumers.”208  Rather, the Dusseldorf 
Court “argued that the new product requirement is only met if the new 
product is not substitutable with existing products that use the patent, 
i.e., it has to fall within a different relevant market.”209 
Arguably, the views and motivations of both the CIF and the
European Commission had likely been shaped by promoters of the
FOSS-driven210 “software-as-a-service” (SaaS) business model211 long 
favored by Microsoft competitors and civil society groups that had
intervened in the case to support the European Commission.212  With the
evolution of FOSS-based “cloud computing” service offerings that have 
since generated the interest of cost-conscious governments,213 it can be
 205. See Düsseldorf Court of Appeals Disagrees With Compulsory License Conditions 
in the Microsoft Judgment, CLEARY GOTTLIEB NATIONAL COMPETITION REPORT, 9 (Jan.–Mar. 
2011) (emphasis added), at http://www.cgsh.com/files/Publication/826fd136-ce10-4e23-
8ba7-5923a4774a5a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9f5544e5-7087-40f4-96fe-
592db37b3200/NCR%20Q1%202011.pdf; Eingestellt von Michael Thesen, Compulsory 





209. Id. (emphasis added). 
210. Id. ¶¶ 650–53 (emphasis added). 
211. Software as a Service: Strategic Backgrounder, SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS.
ASS’N 4, 6 (Feb. 2001), http://www.siia.net/estore/ssb-01.pdf [hereinafter SOFTWARE &
INFO. INDUS. ASS’N].
212. These interveners included Washington DC-based Software & Information
Industry Association (SSIA), Hamburg, Germany-based Free Software Foundation Europe
(FSFE), Brussels, Belgium-based European Committee for Interoperable Systems
(ECIS) and Los Angeles, California-based Audiobanner.com, trading as VideoBanner. 
213. See, e.g., Matthew Goodrick, GSA Presentation on Federal Cloud Computing
Initiative at the Software & Information Association Conference (June 17, 2010), 
http://www.siia.net/cloudgov/. 
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credibly argued in hindsight that the court’s ruling reflected a successful
lobbying effort to “capture” European governmental institutions for the 
ultimate purpose of laying the policy and legal groundwork for new 
regional and national Internet markets favoring a royalty-free or
proprietary-free, non-licensing-based business model.214  However, if the
recommendations contained within a recently released European
Commission Expert Study on public cloud computing215 are any indication, 
it appears that these interest groups continue to be quite persuasive216 
even though there are evident limitations to establishing a proprietary-free 
“open” cloud forum based on interoperability framework standards.217 
Therefore, the Indian government must seriously consider whether the 
CIF’s ruling could have been reached without resorting to the very 
broadly conceived and newly advanced concept of ICT “interoperability”
promoted by certain members of industry and civil society.  The notion
of interoperability articulated by the CIF was apparently derived from,
and consistent with, the questionably broad interpretation of the same 
overstretched socio-economic human rights theory discussed in the
WIPO experts’ study on compulsory licensing and human health.218  The
CIF’s ruling was not premised on an “objective” finding of “exceptional
circumstances” consistent with prior European statutory and case law,
despite legal commentators’ efforts to characterize it as such.219 
214. See SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 197, at 12–14. 
215. Lutz Schubert, The Future of Cloud Computing: Opportunities for European
Cloud Computing Beyond 2010, EUR. COMM’N, INFO. SOC’Y AND MEDIA, 3–4 (2010),
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/ssai/docs/cloud-report-final.pdf. 
216. Id. at 1–2. 
217. Id. at 19, 23.
218. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Patent Exceptions and 
Limitations in the Health Context, supra note 72, at 1–3. 
219. See, e.g., Pierre-André Dubois & Shannon Yavorsky, Cross-border: Europe, 
The Microsoft Decision: The Evolution of Compulsory Licensing in the European Union, 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS INT’L LLP (2008), http://www.buildingipvalue.com/08_EMEA/119-
122Kirkland.pdf. 
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B. Proposed Government Procurement Interoperability Regulations 
Expressing Preferences for Patent-Free and/or Royalty-Free 
“Open” Standards Applicable to High Technologies 
1. WIPO Reports, European Officials and NGOs Have Called         
for New Public Mechanisms to Regulate Private          
FRAND/RAND Licensing on 
“Public Interest” Grounds 
According to the WIPO Secretariat’s Report on the International Patent
System220 and its Report on Patents and Standards,221 new government
mechanisms are urgently needed to ease the “inherent tensions [that] exist
between patents and standards [in the telecommunications, electronic 
communications, and software sectors] which become apparent when
the implementation of a standard calls for the use of technology covered
by one or more patents.”222  Although at least one prominent European
standards development organization (SDO)223 and some within the
European Commission have tacitly acknowledged this cleverly cast 
disease and diagnosis, they do not share the fundamental principles
underlying it.  Rather, consistent with market-based principles reflected
in U.K. law, which recognizes patents and patent applications as a form
of personal property,224 they have generally argued that technological
innovation and technology transfer is possible, but only if stronger legal 
recognition and protection of exclusive private contractual and intellectual 
property rights are guaranteed at the domestic and international levels. 
The expanding WIPO SCP agenda championed by technology-
aspiring developing country governments and United Nations officials, 
however, generally characterizes this prognosis as overly simplistic and 
exploitative.225  In particular, such agenda views the ordinary exercise of 
220. World Intellectual Property Organization, Report on the International Patent
System, supra note 84. 
221. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law 
of Patents, Mar. 23–27, 2009, Standards and Patents, U.N. Doc. SCP/13/2/PROV, 13th
Sess. (Feb. 18, 2009). 
222. World Intellectual Property Organization, Report on the International Patent
System, supra note 84, ¶ 116; see also id. at ¶¶ 28, 54–64, 66, 117. 
223. See Karsten Meinhold, Chairman, ETSI IPR Special Committee, The ETSI
IPR Policy: A Key Element for the Success of ETSI’s Globally Applicable Standards, at 
1–2 at the EC Workshop on Intellectual Property Rights in ICT Standardisation (Nov.
19, 2008) (presenting at EC Workshop on Intellectual Property Rights in ICT
Standardisation), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id= 
3635. 
224. The Patents Act, 1977, c. 37 §§ 30(1), 31(2), (as amended) (Eng.) (Intellectual 
Property Office 2010), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf. 
225. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Addressing the
Interface Between Patents and Technical Standards in International Trade Discussions, 
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private IP rights as creating an impediment to the critical public role
served by technical standardization in promoting ICT system 
interoperability, innovation, jobs creation and investment, and recommends 
that patent rights be legislatively or administratively curtailed for the 
benefit of the public interest.  Apparently, a growing number of European
Commissioners and E.U. Member State government officials also share 
this negative outlook, especially concerning software.  It is arguable, for 
example, that the E.U. Commission’s prior recommendation to E.U.
Member States “to keep administrative systems independent of proprietary
technology” when “implementing a national interoperability framework”
modeled after the initial version of the European Interoperability
Framework (EIFv.1.0) (2004)226 was no less an indictment of exclusive
private contractual and patent rights.
European civil society pressure groups have also promoted the notion 
that patents impede software interoperability and should be severely
restricted by governments.  For example, the German-based Free Software 
Foundation Europe (FSFE),227 an outspoken NGO endeavoring to influence
regional and international ICT policy within both the E.U. and the WIPO, 
has insisted that because “both patents and standards derive their
justification from the public benefit” and “[the] [u]pholding [of] one 
deprives the other of its function,”228 “patents which limit or prevent
interoperability should be [rendered legally] unenforceable.”229 
Policy Brief No. 3, at 3–4 (Feb. 2009), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iprs_pb20093_ 
en.pdf; United Nations Development Programme, e-Government Interoperability: Guide, at 6
(2007), http://www.apdip.net/projects/gif/GIF-Guide.pdf. 
226. “When implementing a national interoperability framework the emphasis is 
obviously on ‘interoperability’.  Standardisation in technology and harmonisation in
legislation are just two ways to achieve this. Other recommendations are . . . keep 
administrative systems independent of proprietary technology.” European Interoperability
Framework for Pan-European eGovernment Services Version 1.0, European Communities
Brochure, at 26 (2004), http://www.apdip.net/projects/gif/country/EU-GIF.pdf, [hereinafter 
EIFv.1.0 Brochure]; European Interoperability Framework for Pan-European
eGovernment Services Version 1.0, European Communities, at 26 (Nov. 2004), http://
xml.coverpages. org/IDA-EIF-Final10.pdf, [hereinafter EIFv.1.0].
227. See FREE SOFTWARE FEDERATION EUROPE, http://www.fsfe.org/. 
228. George Greve, Innovation Policy: The Balance Between Standards and Patent 
Regulation, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH INSIDE VIEWS, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.
ipwatch.org/weblog/2009/02/26/inside-views-innovation-policy-the-balance-between-
standards-andpatent-regulation/. 
229. “During the software patent debate in the European Union there was consensus 
among SME, Free Software and big businesses representatives from companies such as 
IBM or Sun Microsystems that patents which limit or prevent interoperability should be 
unenforceable.  In the European Union, this could be introduced into the ongoing
 249
KOGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:56 AM     
 
 
   
 
 
     
  






   
 
   
  
   
  
 
   







     
  
 
A similar but more nuanced position has been advanced by the
European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS),230 an influential
Brussels-based NGO.  ECIS represents ICT companies seeking to secure
legislation at the E.U. and international levels that promotes their new 
services-rather-than-goods business model as the cure for the
“growing impediments” to software interoperability and innovation.  As 
can be gleaned from the comments contributed during a July 2006 hearing 
on the desirability of establishing a European Community patent, the 
ECIS has decidedly embraced a utilitarian view of patents. In other words, 
the ECIS advocates in favor of a patent system that: (1) “ultimately 
exists to benefit society as a whole and not merely to service individual 
interests;” (2) “promot[es] innovation in the public interest;” (3) “take[s]
into account the importance of interoperability of information and
communications technology;” and (4) ensures against “[o]verbroad patent 
protection that frustrates interoperability in the ICT sector”—in other
words, it “ensure[s] . . . [that] patents cannot be used as a means of confining 
users to a particular technology by closing off full interoperability.”231 
In its earlier comments submitted in response to an April 2006 
European Community patent questionnaire, the ECIS had plainly stated
that if a European Community Patent law were enacted, it should be
circumscribed by a provision that treats any interference with ICT
interoperability resulting from the exercise of a patent right as an abuse 
of that right.232  The implications of what the ECIS left unstated, however,
are quite obvious: such a legal characterization would logically entail the 
imposition of some type of statutory or judicial restriction on the
exercise of such rights, including the sacrifice or limitation of patent 
royalties. 
Interestingly, the ECIS’ position is strikingly similar in principle to the 
legislative proposal set forth in the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry’s (METI) 2005 Interim Report on the legal protection of
software,233 though the connection between them may never be known. In
Community Patent debate.  On a global level, WIPO should consider this as part of its 
ongoing Development Agenda discussions.” (emphasis added).  George Greve, Analysis
on Balance: Standardisation and Patents, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND. EUR. (Dec. 2, 2008),
http://www.fsfe.org/projects/os/ps.en.pdf. 
230. About ECIS, EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR INTEROPERABLE SYSTEMS, http://www. 
ecis.eu/about/index.html.
231. See ECIS Patent Consultation Contribution (July 2006), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/hearing/vinje_ecis_en.pdf. 
232. See ECIS Reply to the EC Patent Consultation, at 3 (Apr. 2006), available at
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/industrial_property
/patents/consultation_future/e_contributions/ecispdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d. 
233. See METI Commerce and Information Policy Bureau, Interim Report of
“Study Group on the Legal Protection of Software and Promotion of Innovation,” (Oct.
250
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addition to treating the mere interference with software interoperability
as an abuse of the patent right equivalent in magnitude to an anti-
competitive practice, the METI study proposal also recommended broad 
compulsory licensing or a general restriction on, or exception to, the
exercise of patent rights as a possible legislative remedy.234  Fortunately, 
these interim recommendations were never incorporated within the final 
proposed (non-binding) “General Rules on Software-related Intellectual 
Property” (General Rule) legislation METI subsequently released during 
2007235 which boasted other deficiencies.  If implemented, the proposed 
rule changes would have established a software interoperability exception to
the broad exercise of software patent rights on “public interest” (promoting 
software innovation) grounds.236  For example, such exception would have
entitled a party to a full release from liability for infringing another’s
software patent without a license upon a showing that there was “a need
to achieve interoperability.”237 
11, 2005), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/information/downloadfiles/051017 
LegalProtectionSoftware.pdf.
234. Id. at 3–4; see also Michael Chapin, Sharing the Interoperability Ball on the 
Software Patent Playground, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 220, 237 (2008), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/scitech/documents/Chapin.pdf
(“To promote innovation and to address the needs of interoperability, the study proposes 
three possible changes to the patent law specifically related to software.  These changes 
include a restriction on the exercise of patent rights on a case-by-case basis by using
some type of abuse of rights principle, a compulsory license granted on a case-by-case 
basis, or a general restriction on the exercise of patent rights through an amendment to 
the Patent Act specifically aimed at limiting the effects of software patents.”). Id. at 236. 
235. For an English translation and summary of the proposed rule, see Kenji
Shimada, Yi-Hsuan Chen, Chi-Yuan Kuo, Alfredo DeLaRosa, and Jeremiah Miller, Patents
as Property: International Injunctive Relief, 14 CASRIP ONLINE NEWSLETTER (Summer
2007), http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/default.aspx?year=2007&article=
newsv14i3Shimada; see also Comments on the Draft of Rule Concerning Software Related
Intellectual Property, BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE ASIA, 2 (July 12, 2006), http:// 
www.bsa.or.jp/file/BSA_Comments_English_060712.pdf. 
236. See, e.g., Kazuaki Okimoto, Patent Attorney, Yuasa & Hara Compulsory
License on Patented Drug for H1N1 Influenza Virus, 2, at APAA 56th Council Meeting
(Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.apaaonline.org/pdf/APAA_56th_&_57th_council_meeting/ 
emergingIP/2-Japan%Emerging%20IP%20Rights%20Cttee%20Country%20Report%20 
2009.pdf (presenting at Emerging Intellectual Property Rights Committee Meeting of the
APAA 56th Council); Michael Chapin, supra note 220, at 224. 
237. Michael Chapin, supra note 220, at 237 (referencing Press Release, METI, 
Request for Public Comments on Rules on Software Intellectual Property Rights (June 
13, 2006) (emphasis added), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/newtopics/data/
n060613e.html). 
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The ECIS’ position regarding “patent abuses” also borrows from the
“license of right,” a governmental mechanism 238 provided for under the
British239 and German240 patent laws and discussed within the WIPO Report 
on Patents and Standards.241  A license of right is essentially a nonexclusive
license entered into voluntarily and under reasonable terms by the patent 
owner with all interested prospective licensees in exchange for reduced 
Patent & Trademark Office registration and renewal fees.242  Once a
patent has been registered, any prospective licensee interested in taking a
license is effectively deemed, for purposes of the law, as possessing a
“license of right” even though the terms of such a license may not have 
been conclusively settled.  In cases where the patent owner and licensee 
cannot agree on reasonable terms, U.K. and German law provide that a 
designated national patent office official will make such determination.243 
“Licensees of right are entitled to request that the patent owner legally 
defend the patent, or may defend the patent itself by instituting an
infringement action against an unauthorized third party user or even the 
patent owner itself.”244 Also, if during the course of an infringement
action an E.U. defendant elects to take a license of right under the terms
demanded by the patentee, or by the licensee on behalf of the patent
owner, “no injunction . . . shall be granted against him and the amount 
(if any) recoverable against him by way of damages shall not exceed
double the amount which would have been payable . . . if such a license 
on those terms had been granted.”245  Since a patent owner’s taking of a
license of right necessarily entails the surrender of its entitlement to
injunctive relief, a license of right, by definition, is incomparable to a 
private “FRAND” (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory) contractual 
238. Open Letter to the European Commission, European Committee for
Interoperable Systems (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.ecis.eu/documents/Open
LettertotheEuropeanCommissionMarch2010.pdf.
239. See The Patents Act 1977, supra note 210, § 46. 
240. See Patent Law § 23 (Dec. 16, 1980) (last amended 1994) (Ger.), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=126195; see Tanuja V. Garde, Supporting 
Innovation in Targeted Treatments: Licenses of Right to NIH-Funded Research Tools, 11
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 280 (2005), available at http://www.mttlr.org/
voleleven/garde.pdf (stating “Licenses of right . . . provided for under the German patent
Laws . . . [are] called Lizenzbereitschaft[s]. . . .  The provisions and incentives for applying 
for a Lizenzbereitschaft are very similar to those provided for under the UK law.”).
241. See WIPO, Standards and Patents, supra note 207, ¶ 143. 
242. See id. at 279; Patent Law (Ger.), supra note 187, § 23(1). 
243. Tanuja V. Garde, supra note 226, at 279 (citing The Patent Act (Eng.), supra
note 210, §§ 46(3)(a), 46(3)(b)); Patent Law (Ger.), supra note 187, §§ 23(3), 23(4). 
244. ITSSD, ITSSD Comments Concerning SCP/13/2: Standards and Patents, 
supra note 135, at 39 (citing The Patents Act 1977, supra note 210, §§ 46(2), 46(4)). 
245. Id. (citing The Patent Act (Eng.), supra note 210, § 46(3)(c)). 
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undertaking pursuant to which the injunctive relief remedy remains
available to the patent owner.246 
A historical review of U.K. patent law (the U.K. Patents and Designs 
Act of 1919) reveals that the license of right once functioned as a
compulsory licensing statute.  Therefore, the fact that “the UK courts
[continue to] look to [UK] case law deciding issues arising under the 
compulsory licensing provisions as persuasive for cases decided under
Section 46, licenses of right” strongly suggests that licenses of right
remain closely related to and largely constitute nothing more than de 
facto compulsory licenses in disguise.247 
Clearly, while BRICS governments and the free and open source
software (FOSS) movement248 generally consider voluntary licenses of 
right and compulsory licenses (which are each legal measures internal to
the patent system) as attractive, they nevertheless recognize that such 
measures alone are incapable of remedying “refusals to license” on
reasonable terms and conditions.  These same parties similarly view
judicially imposed settlements (de facto compulsory licenses) in antitrust
actions involving patents (which are legal measures external to the 
patent system) as insufficient to curtail noncompetitive behaviors, such 
as refusals to license, that do not otherwise rise to the level of patent
“abuses.” In acknowledgement of the legal and political conditions that 
national laws implementing applicable WTO TRIPS Agreement provisions 
place upon the accessibility and utility of de jure and de facto compulsory 
licenses, the FOSS movement has promoted an alternative approach. 
Such approach invokes the “public interest” a priori to restrict the exercise 
246. The ECIS had previously tried to portray these two concepts as comparable at 
a panel organized by the European Commission during November 2010.  See Agenda of 
Information and Communication Technologies Conference, Certainty of Availability and 
Continuity of Essential IP Rights for Licensing, at Panel 4: Tensions Between Intellectual
Property Rights and Standardisation: Reasons and Remedies (Nov. 22, 2010), http://ec. 
europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ict/files/ictpolicies/agenda_ict_workshop_new_en.pdf 
(summarizing panel moderated by ECIS Legal Counsel Thomas Vinje, and organized by
the European Commission and the European Patent Office (EPO)); see also Press Release, 
European Community, Tensions Between Intellectual Property Rights and the ICT 
Standardisation Process: Reasons and Remedies (Nov. 22, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/sectors/ict/files/10-08-24_announcement_of_the_event.pdf. 
247. See Tajuna V. Garde, supra note 226, at 280–81. 
248. The FOSS movement is represented by the Boston, Massachusetts-based Free 
Software Foundation, its European sister organization FSFE (Free Software Federation 
Europe) and the Brussels, Belgium-based OpenForumEurope (OFE). See What We Do, 
FREE SOFTWARE FEDERATION, http://www.fsf.org; Who We Are and What We Do, OPEN
FORUM EUROPE, http://www.openforumeurope.org/about/who-we-are-and-what-we-do.
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of private patent and contract rights that could possibly impede the
development of “open ICT standards” designed to ensure interoperability.
If employed as intended, this approach would fundamentally enable
governments to oversee and determine the self-regulating patent licensing 
policies and procedures established and enforced by private standards-
setting organizations (SSOs) and standards development organizations 
(SDOs), including informal consortia, vis-à-vis their members, and also 
potentially, between SSO or SDO members and foreseeable affected
nonmembers.  It may ultimately even extend to specific FRAND contractual 
licensing terms.249 
Implicit in the “public good” of open standards-based interoperability
are the legal principles of detrimental reliance and promissory estoppel. 
According to at least one FOSS commentator, the 
crucial element distinguishing patent licensing in a standard setting from a 
normal patent licensing situation is that: 1) the IPR owners have promised to
license on FRAND terms; 2) the SDO has entered into an agreement to limit
inter-technology competition that would otherwise have existed in reliance upon
said promise; and 3) industry has relied on said promise by making investments
in innovation.250 
Nevertheless, companies have often successfully argued that an SSO 
or SDO member promise to license pursuant to FRAND terms is
unenforceable in contract or under promissory estoppel principles
because it is merely a promise to negotiate.251  As a result, FOSS-favoring 
NGOs have called for governments to define, if not to oversee, the
implementation of SSO or SDO ex ante patent disclosure rules, fair, 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory licensing terms, and reasonable royalty 
rates, despite the chilling effect it would have on SSO/SDO activities 
and member commercial transactions.252 
If widely adopted, this approach, which champions the broader
collective public interests of ICT technology users and consumers over 
the rights of individual patent holders, would likely serve to minimize 
the key economic incentives for securing ICT patent grants, whether or 
not the holders of such patents are members of an SSO/SDO and 
249. See Lawrence A. Kogan, The Complementarity of Patents and Standards, 
presented as Part 1–of the Panel on the Intersection of IP, Competition and International 
Trade, at The Inter-Pacific Bar Association 21st Annual Meeting & Conference (Kyoto, 
Japan, Apr. 24, 2011), Unabridged Outline, at 11–25, available at http://itssd.org/
The%20Complementarity%20of%20Patents%20and%20Standards%20-%20Unabridged 
%20Outline.pdf [hereinafter Kogan, The Complementarity of Patents and Standards].
250. See, e.g., Maurits Dolmans, A Tale of Two Tragedies—A plea for open standards, 2
INT’L FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE L.R. 115, 123, at n.38 (Issue 2, 2010), at
http://www.ifosslr.org/ifosslr/article/view/46/72. 
251. Id. at 134. 
252. See Kogan, The Complementarity of Patents and Standards, supra note 235. 
254
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participating in standards development activities.  The evidence seems to 
reflect that the European Commission had systematically incorporated
this approach into the E.U.’s initial interoperability framework for
eGovernment services released during 2004, which the European Court 
of First Instance thereafter relied upon in the Microsoft case.
The WIPO Report on the International Patent System reflects that the 
FOSS movement has helped the BRICS nations to characterize ICT
“interoperability” as falling within the penumbra of “public interest” 
concerns anticipated by the WTO TRIPS Agreement.253  In addition, the
WIPO Report on Patents and Standards reveals that ICT “interoperability,” 
as a “public interest” concern, must ensure societal “balance” that
generally works to the benefit of “the many,” namely, commercial 
information and communication technology users and consumers, at the 
expense of the relatively few ICT patent holders.254 This latter report
also emphasizes that ICT interoperability, especially in the context of e-
Government solutions,255 necessitates the least costly and most universally 
accessible “open standards” incorporating only those patented technologies 
deemed “essential” to the functioning of the standard.256  For example,  
the report suggests how the FOSS movement was influential in redefining 
the term “open standard”—from one focused primarily on the “openness”
and inclusiveness of the standard development process and on the 
253. “Article 8 [of the TRIPS Agreement] provides ‘principles’ which recognize the
rights of Members to adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition,
and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic 
and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement. It also recognizes that appropriate measures, provided that 
they are consistent with the Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.”  See World
Intellectual Property Organization, Report on the International Patent System, supra note 
84, at ¶ 141, at 42 (emphasis added).  The subjects of ICT interoperability and related 
standards issues are discussed in ¶¶ 7, 111–22, 252, and 269 of said report. 
254. See WIPO, Standards and Patents, supra note 207, at ¶¶ 41, 87, 117, 137, 140,
142, 145 (‘balance’); World Intellectual Property Organization, Report on the International 
Patent System, supra note 84, at ¶¶ 37, 62–63, 106, 117, 119, 141, 172, 235 (‘balance’). 
255. See WIPO, Standards and Patents, supra note 207, at ¶ 44; ITSSD, Supplement to
ITSSD Comments Concerning the WIPO Report on Standards and Patents (SCP/13/2)
Paragraph 44. 
256. See WIPO, Standards and Patents, supra note 207, at ¶¶ 3, 41 (‘open standards’); 
¶¶ 44, 128 (‘open source’ software). 
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prevailing FRAND/RAND private contract-based pricing model257—to 
one now focused on the FOSS contractual and pricing model that calls 
for patent-free or unlimited royalty-free patented technology usage as 
practiced by Internet standards-setting consortia such as W3C.258 
The WIPO Report on Patents and Standards, moreover, betrays the 
assumption that predefined and ex ante disclosed royalty-free and
unlimited use patent licensing terms employed by such consortia are 
more compatible with FOSS licenses and less conflict-ridden259 and 
legally risky,260 and hence, more economically efficient than non-
binding, flexible, unfixed patent royalty pricing terms that traditional 
SSOs and SDOs remain unwilling to and incapable of enforcing against 
member or nonmember technology patent owners.261  This “public interest”
approach also assumes that the allegedly less precise, less transparent, 
and economically inefficient market-driven private contractual FRAND/
RAND pricing and licensing policies adopted by traditional SSOs/SDOs, 
when implemented by their members, can and often do contribute to a 
violation of the public trust.262  In other words, such policies rarely result 
in the least costly alternative for society due to “royalty stacking” and 
anti-competitive contractual “tie-ins,” especially in the case of procurement 
contracts where it was found that several E.U. Member State governments
had fallen victim to “vendor lock-in” at taxpayer expense.263 
However, this last point begs the proverbial question, “which came
first, the chicken or the egg?” considering that the national and provincial
257. For a discussion of the definition traditionally adopted by recognized national
and international standards organizations such as ANSI and the ITU, see WIPO, Standards
and Patents, supra note 207, ¶¶ 41–42 and accompanying footnotes. 
258. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 43, 111–16 and accompanying footnotes; see generally Lawrence 
A. Kogan, How SMART are Standards that Sacrifice Intellectual Property Rights? (Apr.
15, 2010), http://itssdinternationaliprights.blogspot.com/2010/04/how-smart-are-standards-
that-sacrifice_18.html (presented at American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Intellectual 
Property Rights Policy Committee (IPRPC) Meeting), at http://itssd.org/How%20SMART 
%20are%20Standards%20that%20Sacrifice%20Intellectual%20Property%20Rights%20-
%20Full%20Outline.doc.
259. See WIPO, Standards and Patents, supra note 207, at ¶¶ 111, 128. 
260. See Rishab Ghosh, Reinier Bakels & Patrice-Emmanuel Schmitz, Patents and 
Open Source Software: What Public Authorities Need to Know, EU IDABC OPEN 
SOURCE OBSERVATORY (Apr. 5, 2005), Executive Summary at 2–3,  http://www.osor.eu/
idabc-studies/expert-docs/patents-and-opensource-software; http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/
servlets/Doce6a8.pdf?id=28129. 
261. See WIPO, Standards and Patents, supra note 207, at ¶¶ 117–24, 126–27. 
262. See Rishab A. Ghosh, Free/Libre/Open Source Software: An Economic Basis 
for Open Standards, MERIT UNIVERSITY OF MAASTRICHT, 13 (Dec. 2005), http://www.
flosspols.org/deliverables/FLOSSPOLS-D04-openstandards-v6.pdf. 
263. See Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, Ruediger Glott, Patrice-Emmanuel Schmitz &
Abdelkrim Boujraf, OSOR Guidelines: Public Procurement and Open Source Software 
public draft version 1.0: 10 (Oct. 2008), at 48–51 and 104–10, http://www.osor.eu/idabc-
studies/OSS-procurement-guidelinepublic-draft-v1%201.pdf.
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governments of several E.U. Member States had already been promoting 
and expressing preferences for open source software in government
procurement bids264 by the time these debates had unfolded (Germany
(2001), Spain (2002), France (2004) and the United Kingdom (2004), with 
the Netherlands (2005), Denmark (2006), Belgium (2009), and Hungary
(2009) to follow thereafter).265 
Arguably, the E.U. Commission was driven initially to establish a 
FOSS-centric ICT interoperability framework at the E.U. regional level
for the following reasons. First, it was believed that such a framework
would serve to reconcile and harmonize the differing national
government open source software procurement practices consistent with 
the E.U. regional public interest, namely, to “ensure public policy
objectives and societal needs are respected.”266  Second, it was believed
that such a framework would likely facilitate the exercise of the E.U.
Commission’s public procurement function, which as of 2007–2008 had 
already exceeded 16.3% of E.U. Community GDP.267 Since government
procurement had been predicted to reach 19% of E.U. Community GDP 
by end of 2010,268 ambitious E.U. government officials, furthermore,
viewed the framework as potentially helping them to also shape and 
sustain the growth of private open source technology markets throughout 
the E.U. region.269  Third, it was believed that such a framework would
fall within the clear parallels drawn by the FOSS movement between
their preferred approach concerning ICT patents and standardization and 
that ultimately adopted in the EU Software Copyright Directive.270 
264. See ITSSD, Supplement to ITSSD Comments Concerning the WIPO Report on 
Standards and Patents (SCP/13/2) Paragraph 44, supra note 241, at 4–7 and accompanying
endnotes (Jan. 2010). 
265. Id. at 7–10. 
266. See Commission White Paper: Modernising ICT Standardisation in the EU–
The Way Forward, at 3, 4, COM (2009) 324 final (July 3, 2009); http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/ict/policy/standards/whitepaper.pdf.
267. See Patrick Van Eecke, Paulo Pinto Fonseca & Tineke Egyedi, EU Study on
the Specific Policy Needs for ICT Standardization, 107 (July 2007) [hereinafter DLA
Piper Study], http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ict/policy/standards/piper/full_report.pdf (prepared 
for the European Commission). 
268. See Kevin J. O’Brien, Technology Rivals Lobby to Break Microsoft’s Hold, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 18, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/technology/
19iht-eusoftwar19.html?_r=1. 
269. See Commission White Paper: Modernising ICT Standardisation in the EU–
The Way Forward, supra note 252, at 2.
 270. DLA Piper Study, supra note 253, at 109. 
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Indeed, at least one E.U. Commission-sponsored report specifically
recommended that
open standards for software markets should be defined in order to be compatible 
with F[]OSS licenses . . . [that] . . . compatibility with proprietary technologies 
should be explicitly excluded from public procurement criteria . . . [and that] . . . 
open standards should be mandatory for eGovernment services and preferred for 
all other public procurement of software and software services.271 
It would appear in hindsight that the initial version of the European 
Interoperability Framework (EIF v1.0) contained many of these underlying 
assumptions and recommendations.272 
Thereafter, however, the open source community became increasingly
dissatisfied with the ICT stakeholder engagement process that had
evolved because none of the subsequent versions of the draft EIFv2.0 
((EIF v2.0’A’ (2008),273 (EIFv2.0’B’ (2009)),274 or (EIFv2.0’C’ (2010)275) 
reflected all of these features.  According to the FSFE, with each successive 
version of the draft EIFv2.0, the original concepts of interoperability and 
“open standards” originally championed by the FOSS movement had
been steadily pared back by industry276 so that it would become possible
for E.U. regional and Member State government officials to continue 
selecting proprietary ICT standards alongside open source ICT standards 
in satisfying their procurement needs, a result which the FOSS movement
finds completely unacceptable.277  For example, after comparing the
changes contained within each of the versions of the draft EIFv2.0, the
OFE accused the E.U. Commission of having been unduly influenced by 
industry “outside of the democratic and transparent processes that bind 
271. Ghosh, Free/Libre/Open Source Software: An Economic Basis for Open
Standards, supra note 248, at 3, 21 (emphasis added). 
272. See EIFv.1.0 Brochure, supra note 212, at 8, 9. 
273. European Interoperabiliity Framework for Pan-European eGovernment Services,
Draft for Public Comments–As Basis for EIF 2.0, European Communities (© Jan. 15,
2008).
274. European Interoperability Framework for European Public Services, Version
2.0, European Commission Unofficial Leaked Draft (Nov. 2009), http://blog.web
wereld.nl/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/European-Interoperability-Framework-for-European-
Public-Services-draft.pdf. 
275. European Interoperability Framework for Pan-European eGovernment Services,
Version 2.0 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished manuscript). 
276. Karsten Gerloff & Hugo Roy, EIFv2: Tracking the Loss of Interoperability,
FREE SOFTWARE FOUND. EUR. (Dec. 16, 2010), http://fsfe.org/projects/os/eifv2.en.html#. 
277. Stephan Krempl, Protests Against Proposed Redefinition of Open Standards 
Within the EU, THE H (Nov. 10, 2009, 11:12 AM), http://www.h-online.com/open/news/ 
item/Protests-against-proposed-redefinition-of-open-standards-within-the-EU-854651.html. 
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the European institutions . . . to maintain past practice,” and insisted that 
the E.U. Commission reinstate the first draft of EIFv2.0.278 
Irrespective of whether these allegations were true, they were largely
premised on the E.U. Commission recommendation contained within 
EIFv1.0 that “EU Member States . . . keep administrative systems
independent of proprietary technology” when “implementing a national 
interoperability framework.”279  In other words, these stakeholders had 
continued to endeavor to influence the European Commission so long as 
it remained possible for the “open standards” definition in Section 5.2.1
of EIFv.1.0 to be incorporated within a final EIFv.2.0.  In such an instance, 
E.U. government procurement officials could have conceivably precluded
the implementation of a technical specification in proprietary software,
whether or not royalty-based, and whether or not otherwise functionally
“interoperable” with open source software or compatible with FLOSS
licensing terms.280 
Judging from the final EIF the European Commission released on
December 16, 2010,281 however, it would be difficult for these groups to
claim that their efforts were successful.  First, the new E.U. EIF eliminates 
all references to the term “open standards” and instead employs the term
“formalized specifications.”  This change in terminology is significant
considering that in Europe, only technical specifications approved by a 
recognized standardization body can qualify as “standards.” Consequently, 
the term “formalized specification” was selected to cover both the 
proprietary specifications developed mostly by recognized standardization 
bodies and the non-proprietary specifications developed mostly by informal 
ICT consortia and fora.282 Second, the new E.U. EIF eliminates the
requirement in EIFv.1.0 that in order to be “open,” a standard specification
must be “made irrevocably available on a royalty-free basis.” Instead, the
278. Letter from Graham Taylor, CEO, OpenSource Europe (Mar. 22, 2010), 
available at http://www.openforumeurope.org/press-room/press-releases/ofe-eif-v2-0-
response.pdf/view.
279. EIF v.1.0 Brochure, supra note 212 (emphasis added). 
280. Id.
281. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions 
‘Toward interoperability for European public services’, Annex 2, COM (2010) 744 final 
§ 5.2.1. (Dec. 16, 2010). 
282. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Adopts Interoperability
Strategy and Framework for Public Services—Frequently Asked Questions, MEMO/
10/689 (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/10/689&form. 
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new E.U. EIF adopts a more logical, equitable, and economically reasonable
approach to interoperability that recognizes how the public interest is 
best served when government procurement officials prefer “open
specifications.”  It achieves this objective by viewing technical standard 
specifications as falling along a continuum of “openness.”  “Full openness,”
where available, requires public administrations to grant all stakeholders the
same possibility of contributing to the development of a standard
specification relating to a software component(s).283  It also requires that
any intellectual property rights associated with such specification are 
licensable on FRAND or royalty-free terms that permit the specification’s 
implementation in both proprietary and open source software.  As the 
European Commission explained, “full openness” would enable “companies
working under various business models [to] compete on an equal footing 
when providing solutions to public administrations[,] while administrations
that implement the standard in their own software (software that they 
own) can share such software with others under an open source license if 
they so decide.”284  And, where “fully open” specifications are either
unavailable (because they are not yet mature or are unsupported by the
market) or are incapable of satisfying functional interoperability needs, 
government agencies could seek less open specifications.285  Although 
the new E.U. EIF “is not subject to the approval of the European
Parliament or member states,” it is expected that Member States and the 
Commission will act together to implement it, notwithstanding the
potential for Member State and interest group arbitrage and gamesmanship
to enter into the political equation.286 
In any event, the ongoing debate that led to the several redrafts of the 
EIFv2.0 clearly reflected the economic and legal significance of the
lobbying battle in which these competing domestic and international
industry and civil society interest groups had long been engaged.  To this 
283. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions 
‘Toward interoperability for European public services’, supra note 267, § 5.2.1.
284. See European Comm’n, Commission Adopts Interoperability Strategy and
Framework for Public Services—Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 268. 
285. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions 
‘Toward interoperability for European public services’, supra note 267, § 5.2.1 (stating 
recommendation 22: “When establishing European public services, public administrations
should prefer open specification, taking due account of the coverage of functional needs, 
maturity and market support”). 
286. See id. §§ 1.5.2, 2.2, 3.2.2.1, 4.2–.3, 4.5; see also Press Release, European 
Comm’n, Towards Interoperability for European Public Services, IP/10/1734 (Dec. 16
2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1734 
&, David Meyer, Europe Backs Open Standards in Interoperability Drive, ZDNET (Dec.
16, 2010, 5:14 PM). 
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end, it must be remembered that the results of these stakeholders’ efforts
to shape future European ICT interoperability standards will likely
transcend the Internet to include also broadband,287 health,288 energy,289 
and transport.290  Consequently, the E.U. Commission’s recent ability to
ostensibly reconcile these various EIF drafts to the apparent satisfaction 
of all concerned parties substantially diminishes the regulatory risks that
proprietary technology industry stakeholders and their investors must 
bear and the legal and economic uncertainties those risks engender.
What appears to have been ignored or forgotten in the heat of this 
debate, however, is the likely required interface of software with
technologies developed by and used within other industry sectors, and
the probability that any ICT government procurement preference for 
universally accessible and disclosed nonproprietary or royalty-free ICT 
technologies, especially in BRICS and developing nations, will implicate 
related trade secret protected knowledge and information.291  Trade 
287. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A
Digital Agenda for Europe, § 2.4, COM (2010) 245 final/2 (Aug. 26, 2010). 
288. See Flora Giorgio-Gerlach, European Comm’n, Info. Soc’y & Media Directorate-
Gen., ICT for Health, European Commission Strategy for eHealth Interoperability, 
Presentation at CALLIOPE Open Session (Oct. 9, 2008), available at http://www.
calliope-network.eu/Portals/11/assets/documents/Crete_Presentations/CAL%202008-10-
09%20s11%20Giorgio%20%20EC%20Strategy%20Interoperability.pdf; Communication  
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: E-Health—Making Healthcare 
Better for European Citizens, at 16–17, COM (2004) 356 final (Apr. 30, 2004). 
289. See ICT for a Low Carbon Economy: Smart Electricity Distribution Networks, 
EUROPEAN COMM’N, INFO. SOC’Y & MEDIA DIRECTORATE-GEN., ICT FOR SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH UNIT (July 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/
sustainable_growth/docs/sb_publications/pub_smart_edn_web.pdf (summarizing the role 
of the ICT sector in smart grids); ICT and e-Business Impact in the Energy Supply 
Industry: Sectoral e-Business Watch Study Report No. 03/2009, INT’L DATA CORP. (IDC)
EMEA on behalf of the European Comm’n, Enter. & Indus. Directorate-Gen. (Dec. 
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/archives/e-business-watch/studies/
sectors/energy_supply/documents/FR03-2009_Energy-supply.pdf. 
290. See European Commission, Enterprise & Industry Directorate-General,
Standardisation Mandate Addressed to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in the Field of 
Information and Communication Technologies to Support the Interoperability of
Cooperative Systems for Intelligent Transport in the European Community, M/453 EN 
(Oct. 6, 2009). 
291. See Lawrence Kogan, Précis of ITSSD Side-Bar Event: Can Government
Intervention Sustain Economic Incentive, Technological Innovation, and Capital Flows?, 















   
         
  
 
   
 
     
    
   
  
 









    
  
   




secret-protected information and know-how needed to implement patented
inventions often accompany patents and are chosen by entrepreneurs as
an alternate form of economic assurance despite the inherent inconsistencies
between patents and trade secrets.292 
Perhaps the E.U. Commission finally recognized that it could not simply
ignore that legal practitioners frequently advise their clients to seek 
patent protection for an invention and trade secret protection for related 
information.293  Given the increasing “difficult[y] for e-commerce companies to
come up with inventions that are truly novel and non-obvious as required by
the Patent Act,” such scrupulously undisclosed “[i]nformation and know-
how may be a company’s most valuable asset . . . [and] . . . for many
Internet companies, it may be their only asset.”294  Indeed, as the vaunted
Berkeley Patent Study which focuses heavily on software firms295 reveals,
two of the key reasons why startup firms often decide against patent 
protection, aside from “the high costs associated with prosecuting and 
enforcing [a] patent,” are a “fear of disclosure.”  Simply stated, startups do
not want “to disclose information” in a patent capable of being reverse 
engineered and the “belie[f that] trade secret was adequate protection.”296 
The study, in fact, shows that “the reluctance to disclose information
appears to be more of a deterrent for large firms than for . . . early-stage 
[firms.]”297  And, perhaps the E.U. Commission finally recognized that it
could not simply ignore that public
[c]orporations, through their boards and management, are duty bound to take 
informed action to protect the company’s assets . . . [and that] . . . individual
directors and officers can also be liable [to shareholders] for failing to monitor 
the company’s activities to ensure compliance with the [corporate governance 
aspects of common and statutory] law.  Where trade secrets are concerned . . . 
management [has a duty] . . . to conserve the corporation’s property from loss 
292. “[S]ince patent protection depends on publishing the invention to the world 
and trade secret protection depends on keeping the matter secret, consideration should be 
given to protecting the same invention by both methods.” Peter J. Toren, Protecting 
Inventions as Trade Secrets: A Better Way When Patents are Inappropriate, Unavailable 
(2000), FINDLAW, http://library.findlaw.com/2000/May/1/130451.html. See also Karl R.
Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1 (2008) (“What I have practiced in my career, and what I endorse as 
the best policy and practice, is to obtain patents as the centerpiece in an intellectual
property portfolio and maintain trade secrets as underpinnings for patents to protect 
unpatentable collateral know-how and show-how.”). 
293. See Jorda, supra note 278, at 1.
294. See Toren, supra note 278 (emphasis added). 
295. See Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman,
Hich Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley 
Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1312 (2009). 
296. Id. at 1309–10. 
297. Id. at 1312. 
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through theft or dissipation [through] . . . control of information leaving the 
organization . . .  This involves . . . keeping close track of the company’s secrets.298 
Ultimately, it is possible that the E.U. Commission came to understand 
that had it incorporated the “open standards” definition established by 
EIFv1.0 which expressed a preference for nonproprietary or royalty-free
ICT technologies within its recently issued final EIF.  It would have
unwittingly eliminated the trade secret option for and trade secret assets
of many startup and large software firms, thereby contributing to an
even greater future economic and legal risk scenario. 
Furthermore, the European Commission may also have learned, albeit 
lately, of the deleterious downstream impacts that its serious consideration 
of such an administrative preference for nonproprietary or royalty-free
ICT technologies had already had on third-country government ICT
procurement law and policy formulation.299  Indeed, it could no longer
ignore how the prolonged EIF debate had managed to encourage similar
adventurism within the U.S. government to reshape the American
healthcare and energy sectors. 
For example, at the insistence of the same or similar interest groups
and industry stakeholders,300 the Obama administration, like certain E.U.
Member States, such as the United Kingdom and Portugal,301 had
enacted legislative and administrative royalty and license-free government 
procurement open standards criteria to ensure software interoperability
of electronic health records302 (“the standard to govern the transmission 
and interoperability of medical data between healthcare facilities and 
insurers, doctors, pharmacies and the wider healthcare establishment”)303 
298. See James Pooley & Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Trade Secrets and Corporate
Governance: Best Practices, INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, 1–2, http://www.ipo.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Trade_Secrets&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&Conte
ntID=22924 (footnote omitted). 
299. See discussion infra. 
300. See Supplement to ITSSD Comments Concerning the WIPO Reports on Standards 
and Patents (SCP/13/2) Paragraph 44, supra note 241, at 20–26, 39–43 nn.184–243; 
Kogan, supra note 165, at 4–8. 
301. See discussion infra. 
302. See Supplement to ITSSD Comments Concerning the WIPO Reports on Standards 
and Patents (SCP/13/2) Paragraph 44, supra note 241, at 21–22, 40 n.198; Kogan, 
supra note 165, at 9–21. 
303. Ken Zita, China Healthcare ICT: Reinventing China’s National Healthcare 
System Through Electronic Medical Records, Telecom Networks and Advanced IT Services, 1
JOURNAL ON EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS 47, 52 (2009), http:// 
digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=jekem.
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and similar but less than transparent final regulations304 implementing a
recently enacted law to ensure the interoperability of electronic medical
records305 (“the data standard for formatting ‘cradle-to-grave’ patient
medical history information.”)306  Furthermore, the Obama administration 
remains in the process of developing royalty or proprietary-free government
procurement open standards criteria to ensure software interoperability
of evolving smart energy grid technologies and to avoid vendor lock-in 
which, in each case, as in Europe, favors the user and consumer rather
than the innovator and investor viewpoint.307 Moreover, the Obama
administration arguably has misguidedly ignored industry stakeholder 
claims that the adoption of such policies will negatively influence
standards development and law and policy formulation in third countries 
such as China.308 
304. In response to comments seeking confirmation that “that enhanced FFP 
[Federal financial participation (FFP)] should be available for COTS [commercial off-
the-shelf software products] initial licensing and implementation service costs as well as 
ongoing software licensing and maintenance costs,” and questioning “why there [was] no
language [in the final regulations] confirming established protections for COTS pre-
existing intellectual property (IP) and newly developed IP used in eligibility modernization
initiatives,” the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS responded as 
follows: “We are not dictating specific solutions to States as they undertake their 
technology projects, as long as the standards and conditions of this final rule are met and 
we expect to work with States in an effort to share, reuse, and leverage other State 
solutions. For COTS products, we have a longstanding rule that the State must own any
software that is designed, developed, installed or improved with 90 percent FFP (see
§ 433.112(b)(5)). In other words, software that is developed with public funds must be
owned by the public and as a ‘‘public product’’ is available to be shared with other
States.  COTS-based solutions may still receive a 75 percent enhanced funding (that is, 
for licensing and implementation services costs), if they are related to the MMIS . . . a
Medicaid management information system . . . (including the eligibility determination 
system) and meet all the requirements of this final rule.  In addition, current rules
protecting intellectual property (such as copyright and/or patent laws) would simply
apply in the way that they already do apply to intellectual property. Nothing in this final 
rule is attempting to alter those rules.” See Final Rule: Medicaid Program; Federal
Funding for Medicaid Eligibility Determination and Enrollment Activities, 76 Fed. Reg.
21950, 21955 (Apr. 19, 2011). 
305. The final regulations superceded rules previously proposed during November
2010. See, e.g., Medicaid; Federal Funding for Medicaid Eligibility Determination and 
Enrollment Activities, 75 Fed. Reg. 68583 (Nov. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 
433).
306. Zita, supra at note 289. 
307. See Supplement to ITSSD Comments Concerning the WIPO Reports on Standards 
and Patents (SCP/13/2) Paragraph 44, supra note 241, at 24–26; Kogan, supra note 165, 
at 4, 8–14, 19–21. 
308. See Karsten Gerloff, Carlo Piana & Sam Tuke, Defending Open Standards:
FSFE Refutes BSA’s False Claims to European Commission, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND.
EUR. (Nov. 15, 2010), http://fsfe.org/projects/os/bsa-eif-letter-fsfe-response.pdf. 
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2. The Lessons Not Learned by the U.K. Government
The U.K. government, unfortunately, has not since gained from the 
knowledge or experience acquired by the E.U. Commission as the result 
of this painful political process.  During January 2011, U.K. Cabinet Office
of Government Commerce (OGC) issued a Procurement Policy Action 
Note that defined “open standards” as including only those which “have 
intellectual property made irrevocably available on a royalty-free basis.”309 
And, two months later, during March 2011, the U.K. Cabinet Office 
released its Government ICT Strategy310 which detailed how the U.K. 
government would, among other things: (1) “publish a toolkit for procurers 
on best practice for evaluating the use of open source solutions”; 
(2) “establish an Open Source Implementation Group, a System Integrator 
Forum and an Open Source Advisory Panel . . . to educate, promote[,]
and facilitate the technical and cultural change needed to increase the use of
open source across government”; and (3) “procure open source solutions . . .
where appropriate.”311 
Although both documents clearly reflected the influence of the FOSS 
community, the Action Note was more publicly hailed by FOSS
commentators (OpenForumEurope (OFE) and American Attorney Andy
Updegrove)312 given its 
(1) inclu[sion of] informal regional as well as national standards consortia 
among the internationally recognized specification or standards organizations
 309. See Procurement Policy Note—Use of Open Standards when specifying ICT 
requirements, Action Note 3/11 UK CABINET OFFICE, ¶ 6 (Jan. 31, 2011) (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/PPN%
203_11%20Open% 20Standards.pdf. 
310. See Government ICT Strategy UK CABINET OFFICE 9, 13 (Mar. 2011), at http://
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/uk-government-government-
ict-strategy_0.pdf.
311. Id. at 9, 13.
312. See Andy Updegrove, United Kingdom: U.K. Comes out for Royalty-Free
Standards for Government Procurement, MONDAQ (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.
mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=126448; Andy Updegrove, U.K. Comes out for
Royalty-Free Standards for Government Procurement, THE STANDARDS BLOG (Feb. 25, 
2011), available at http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.php?story=2011 
0225075112254. See also Jochen Friedrich, UK government issues modern procurement
policy statement focussing on openness and interoperability, JOCHEN FRIEDRICH’S OPEN 
BLOG (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://jfopen.blogspot.com/2011/03/uk-government-
issues-modern-procurement.html; Graham Taylor, Government takes action on open 






















   
 




    
 







    
 
 
whose “open” standards can and should be considered by the UK for
government procurement purposes; (2) its definition of “open” standards [which]
constitute[d] a legally acceptable “repudiation” (allegedly consistent with
the policy space afforded EU Member State governments vis-à-vis the European
regional lawmaking institutions) of and permissible derogation from the final, 
binding European Interoperability Framework adopted by the European
Commission during December 2010, following many years of thoughtful
deliberation and contentious debate; (3) it[s]emulat[ion] and embrace [of] a
robust definition of “open” standards that is very similar to that contained
within the national interoperability framework adopted during November 2010 
by the Indian Government; and (4) its [showing] that corporate lobbying and
forum shopping undertaken at the EU Member State governmental level on
behalf of the . . . open source and “software-as-a-service” (SaaS) industry
communities can be successful, at least temporarily.313 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the FOSS community’s support
for the Action Note was its obvious encouragement of E.U. Member 
States seeking to retain national government procurement interoperability 
framework preferences for royalty-free and proprietary-free “open” ICT 
standards modeled after EIFv1.0, and the corresponding implication that 
such Member State behavior would likely go unpunished in light of the 
complex European concept of subsidiarity.314  Remarkably these activities
were permitted to occur in blatant disregard of the E.U. Commission’s 
determination in final EIFv2.0, which although legally nonbinding, 
implemented legally binding DECISION No 922/2009/EC issued by the
European Parliament and Council which called for government 
procurement ICT standards that are technology and business model-
neutral.315 
A second troubling aspect of such support was the parallel it drew
between the 
UK definition of open standards and that contained within the ICT
interoperability framework adopted by the Government of India during
November 2010. Such a comparison implied that although Britain “ha[d] [long] 
been part of the high tech intellectual property business regime since its
inception,” its recent actions reflect that it has [since] changed course and
313. See Lawrence A. Kogan, UK’s Promotion of Royalty-Free Government
Procurement Standards—NOT AS REPORTED, MONDAQ (Apr. 14, 2011), available at
http://www. mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=129510. 
314. Id. (citing Foreword: Achieving European Interoperability, Report based on an 
Openforum Academy Roundtable discussion, OPENFORUM EUROPE (Feb. 4, 2011), 
available at  http://www.openforumacademy.org/insights/1102ofa%20insights_report 
%20interoperability_final.pdf); Éva Bóka, The Idea of Subsidiarity in the European
Federalist Thought (A historical survey), GROTIUS (2007), available at http://www.
grotius.hu/publ/displ.asp?id=ECICWF; http://www.grotius.hu/publ/displ.asp?id=ECICWF.
315. See Lawrence A. Kogan, UK’s Promotion of Royalty-Free Government
Procurement Standards—NOT AS REPORTED, supra (citing COM(2010) 744-2 final,
(12/16/2010), supra note 299, § 2.12, at 12). 
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apparently learned from India, “a comparative newcomer to the practice of
automatically patenting everything in ICT that can be patented.”316 
It is doubtful, however, that such support could be considered to presage 
a positive trend in the U.K.’s IP evolution, as was suggested by one FOSS 
community commentator, in light of a recent U.K. study’s findings
indicating a distinct pattern of under-appreciation of the use and value 
of IP by U.K. businesses.317 
A third disquieting aspect of the FOSS community support that such
activities engendered concerns the actual level of lobbying influence the 
FOSS community wielded in securing the U.K. Cabinet Office’s production
of these documents.318  Indeed, it is now clear, “given the New York 
Times’ revelation reported last year[,] that the Brussels-based OFE has 
long served as a ‘lobbying front’/mask for U.S.-based industry members 
IBM, Google, Oracle and Red Hat—a/k/a/ ‘IGOR’—which quietly but 
unsuccessfully endeavored to shape the European Commission’s EIF 
project”319 to suit their own view of patents as being predominantly 
“defensive” rather than innovative (offensive) in nature.320  Considering
the size of the U.K. government procurement market (£16.9bn spend) 
316. See Lawrence A. Kogan, UK’s Promotion of Royalty-Free Government
Procurement Standards—NOT AS REPORTED, supra note 299 (citing Andy Updegrove,
United Kingdom: U.K. Comes out for Royalty-Free Standards for Government Procurement, 
supra note 298). 
317. Id. (citing Robert Pitketh, UK Intellectual Property Awareness Survey—2010, 
UK INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ip 
survey2010.pdf).
318. See Lawrence A. Kogan, supra note 299. 
319. See Lawrence A. Kogan, UK Government Must Heed Dutch Audit Court Warning
Prior To Implementing ‘Open’ IT Procurement Action (May 9, 2011), available at
http://www.mondaq.com/x/131628/Government+Contracts+Procurement+PPP/UK+ 
Government+Must+Heed+Dutch+Audit+Court+Warning. See also Kevin O’Brien,
Technology Rivals Lobby to Break Microsoft’s Hold, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/technology/19iht-eusoftwar19.html; Florian Meuller, 
OpenForum Europe: hypocrites lobby the EU but don’t get their own houses in order,
FOSS PATENT BLOG (July 21, 2010), http://fosspatents.blogspot.com/2010/07/open
forum-europe-hypocrites-lobby-eu.html; About OFE—Our Members, OPENFORUM EUROPE, 
http://www.openforumeurope.org/about/our-members. 
320. In an April 2011 interview with Tech Crunch following Google’s unsuccessful 
bid at the Nortel bankruptcy auction to secure the latter company’s patent portfolio,
Google’s Senior Vice President and General Counsel remarked that, in today’s spaghetti
bowl of Silicon Valley, patents play a greater defensive rather than offensive role for his 
company.  “A patent isn’t innovation.  It’s the right to block someone else from innovating.”
See, e.g., MG Siegler, Google On The Nortel Loss, Patents As Government-Granted 
Monopolies, And Plates Of Spaghetti, TECH CRUNCH (July 25, 2011), http://techcrunch. 
com/2011/07/25/google-patent-fight/. 
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and its growing influence over private market behavior, the promptness 
with which the U.K. Cabinet Office warmed to IGOR’s FOSS-centric 
ideas,321 and the U.K. Cabinet Office’s more recent appointment of Liam
Maxwell322 as an adviser to the Efficiency and Reform Group and the
government’s Chief Information Officer323 “to increase the drive towards
open standards and open source software,”324 is there any lingering doubt 
that IGOR has influenced and continues to influence the thinking in
Whitehall? 
A fourth alarming aspect of the FOSS community’s support of U.K. 
ICT activities concerns the lack of deference that the Dutch government’s
Open Standards and Open Source Software (OSOSS) Programme325 has
received in the U.K. Cabinet Office.  Without logic or explanation, the 
U.K. government has failed to carefully review and heed the warnings of 
the Netherlands Court of Audit regarding the utility of and economic costs 
associated with government procured open source software.326 During 
2010, at the request of the Dutch House of Representatives, the Audit 
Court investigated “whether the phasing out of closed standards and the 
introduction of open source software would improve the operation of
market forces and save costs for the government.”327  On March 15, 2011,
321. See Lawrence A. Kogan, UK Government Must Heed Dutch Audit Court
Warning Prior To Implementing ‘Open’ IT Procurement Action, supra note 305 (citing 
Cabinet Office Draft Structural Reform Plan, UK CABINET OFFICE, Departmental
Priorities #s 3 and 4 (June 2010), http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 
cabinet-office-srp.pdf).
322. Liam Maxwell co-authored the 2009 report for then shadow chancellor George 
Osborne on promoting the use of open source in government.”  See Mark Say, Liam 
Maxwell Appointed to Advise on Government ICT: Conservative Adviser Takes Cabinet 
Office Position for 11 Months, GUARDIAN PROF’L (June 27, 2011), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/government-computing-network/2011/jun/27/liam-maxwell-appointed-director-
of-ict-futures; Bryan Glick, Tory Technology Advisor Liam Maxwell Appointed to




 324. See Liam Maxwell Engaged by Efficiency and Reform Group, UK CABINET
OFFICE NEWS (June 24, 2011), http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/liam-maxwell-
engaged-efficiency-and-reform-group. 
325. “By 2007, [the OSOSS Programme] had evolved into an affirmative procurement
preference action plan that strongly urged all Dutch federal ministries and subsidiary
government bodies to use open source software based on open standards wherever 
possible.” See Lawrence A. Kogan, UK Government Must Heed Dutch Audit Court Warning
Prior To Implementing ‘Open’ IT Procurement Action, supra note 305. 
326. Id.; Lawrence Kogan, Comment: A Call for Caution on Open Source, GUARDIAN 
PROF’L (May 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/government-computing-network/2011/ 
may/23/lawrence-kogan-itssd-caution-open-source-government-ict. 
327. See Open Standards and Open Source Software in Central Government, Report 
No. 2, from the Netherlands Court of Audit to the Netherlands House of Representatives 
(Mar. 15, 2011) (English Translation), http://www.rekenkamer.nl/Actueel/Onderzoeks
rapporten/Bronnen/2011/03/Open_standaarden_en_opensourcesoftware_bij_de_rijksove 
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the Audit Court issued a report releasing the results of its investigation.328 
The report “concluded amongst other things that the potential savings 
the government could [realize] by making more use of open source 
software were limited,” and that the “switch to open source software . . . does 
not necessarily . . . lead to cost savings” at all.329 The Audit Court reasoned
that although there are no licensing or acquisition fees generally associated 
with open source software, there are, nevertheless, other significant and 
accumulative fees, such as those relating to software implementation, 
management updates and maintenance, that governments must incur to
ensure the smooth and uninterrupted operation of open source eGovernment 
IT systems.  Moreover, in some other instances, the switch to open source
software may even lead to “destruction of capital because the kingdom 
has many current license agreements.”330 
In addition, the U.K. Cabinet Office has failed to vigorously assess the
relative worth of other official and unofficial reports released by or to 
other Netherlands government agencies that had secured the support of
the FOSS community.  One example is the March 2009 report prepared
by the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy,331 which was largely an 
aspirational and academic document.  Its purpose was 
to analy[z]e the economic effects of promoting open source software on
competition and innovation . . . [b]ased on existing insights from the economics
literature . . . [and] . . . policy options in the light of software market
characteristics, such as the incentives to innovate under different software




328. See Open Standards and Open Source Software in Central Government—
Background, Netherlands Court of Audit News (Mar. 15, 2011) (English Translation),
http://www.courtofaudit.com/english/News/Audits/Introductions/2011/03/Open_standards
_and_open_source_software_in_central_government. 
329. See National Savings with Open Source Software May be Limited, Netherlands 




331. See Michiel Bijlsma, Paul de Bijl & Viktória Kocsis, Competition, Innovation and
Intellectual Property Rights in Software Markets, CPB, no. 181 (Mar.  2009), http://www.
cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/competition-innovation-and-intellectual-
property-rights-software-markets.pdf. 
332. Id. at 7. 
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The NBEP report also set forth propose[d] “guidelines to determine
the circumstances under which various types of policy intervention may
be desirable to improve dynamic efficiency.”333  However, the report’s
scope was rather limited—it “exclusively focused on open source versus
proprietary licensing in software markets [and it did] not consider problems
and issues related to open versus closed standards.”334  The  authors found 
that the relative benefits that proprietary and open source licenses could 
bring depended largely on the specific situation, and that “open source 
licensing across the board would not necessarily bring any benefits
compared to proprietary license.”335  In other respects, the report’s analysis
was less than precise and its findings were quite general and conclusory
in nature.  For example, it focused on “the potential role of [] government” 
intervention to address “market failures [which] lead to inefficient market 
outcomes,” when desirable,336 but declined to make policy recommendations
that stressed specific interventions because of the risk of government
failure.337 
It is important to acknowledge that “good intentions” are not sufficient to
motivate government interventions, since they can have benefits as well as 
costs.  Accordingly, to be able to conclude that a policy indeed corrects a 
market failure, one must ask whether it actually reduces the inefficiency or
welfare loss that was caused by the market failure at hand.  In other words, one 
must take into account the possibility of government failures, which are failures
that arise when the government introduces a new inefficiency “because it should
not have intervened in the first place or when it could have solved a given
problem . . . more efficiently, that is, by generating greater net benefits.”338 
Furthermore, the U.K. government inexplicably failed to publicly
evaluate why the 2010 informal memorandum prepared for the Dutch 
Ministry of the Interior339 had been rejected by the Dutch government. 
Although the informal memorandum had been prepared under contract 
jointly by civil administrators from the ministries of the Interior, Finance,
and Defense and two IT consultants, it was never used in decision
making or officially embraced by the Interior Ministry.340  An English  
333. Id.
334. Id. at 18. 
335. Id. at 35. 
336. Id. at 37. 
337. Id. at 49. 
338. Id. at 46. “Because of the risk of government failure, policy instruments have 
to be used carefully.  The government has an information disadvantage compared to
market participants; therefore it is generally advisable to abstain from policies that select
a winner in advance.” Id. at 11. 
339. See Sorry We’re Open—How the Government Can Improve the ICT Market
(May 11, 2010) (English translation), available at http://www.leugens.nl/wp-content/ 
uploads/2011/03/ICT-rapport-Sorry-we-re-open.pdf. 
340. See Gijs Hillenius, NL: Court of Audit ‘Failed’ in its Independent Review of 
Open Source, OSOR.EU (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.osor.eu/news/nl-court-of-audit-
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translation of this Dutch language document reveals that it was intended 
as “an exploration of how a significant [and] . . . necessary savings in IT
can be realized.”341  In addition, the memorandum states that its putative
conclusions were based on “rough” prognostications bearing a rather broad 
range of outcomes—from between 60 million and four billion euros 
worth of savings.342  Without substantiation, the memo posits that “[t]he
use of open standards and the use of software under open source licenses 
is seen as the most appropriate means to break through the situation . . .
[of] ‘vendor lock-in’” reinforced by closed standards, where the government 
is strongly dependent on a few suppliers of ICT components.343  In  
support of this proposition, the memorandum lists several software
applications limited to a few large software companies that are alleged to 
dominate 99% of the market for government IT systems,344 though it
does not reveal the source of this data.
To achieve independence from such suppliers, the memorandum 
recommends that the government reduce its use of close standards rather 
than increase its use of open standards, which is based on the assumption
that the vendor lock-in problem will remain for as long as the Dutch
Government continues to use closed standards.345  This memorandum, 
further discusses how vendor licensing restrictions do not currently 
permit the sharing of solutions between and among different government 
agencies and limit the reuse of solutions by the same agencies; but, it 
does not substantiate such claims with data.  It also recommends that 
governments use software under open source licenses not subject to such
failed-in-its-independent-review-of-open-source; Gijs Hillenius, NL: Moving to Open
Source Would Save Government One to Four Billion, OSOR.EU (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://www.osor.eu/news/nl-moving-to-open-source-would-save-government-one-
to-four-billion; Jasper Bakker, ICT Open Secret Report Taken Offline, Webwereld (Mar. 
11, 2011) (English translation), http://webwereld.nl/nieuws/105998/geheim-rapport-
open-ict-offline-gehaald.html; Interior Challenged Report: Open Source Delivers Billion, 
Binnenlands Bestuur (Mar. 9, 2011) (English translation), http://www.binnenlands 
bestuur.nl/nieuws/2011/03/gewraakt-bzk-rapport-open-source-levert-miljard-op.855044. 
lynkx; Letter from J.P.H. Donner, Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations To the 




341. Id. at 2. 
342. Id.
343. Id. at 2–4. 
344. Id. at 4. 
345. Id.
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restrictions, because they can be taken over by independent administrative
bodies, provincial governments and national governments.346 The
memorandum also claims that since open source software becomes public 
property, governments will not become dependent on particular ICT
vendors to maintain their ICT systems.  Rather, government open source 
ICT systems may be serviced under contract by any number of vendors
and can continue to be used at all times without regard to whether a
particular ICT vendor is acquired or declares bankruptcy.347  The  
memorandum nowhere substantiates any of these claims with data, 
however. 
Moreover, the memorandum admits that exact expenditure figures 
needed to substantiate the costs savings that can be secured through wider 
use of open standards and open source software are not easily obtainable
because of the diversity of different government department standards, 
infrastructures and particular licenses and contracts, and that consequently, 
its data reflect only extrapolations from existing contracts.348  The
memorandum then provides the following caveat: open source software 
procurement costs include only the direct license costs; the secondary 
(indirect) costs of maintaining and upgrading the license are not included.349 
In effect, despite being unable to provide precise costing data, because
none apparently exists, the report’s authors proceeded to make the bold and 
incredible claim that the open source version of a proprietary application 
is approximately 50% cheaper than the closed version!350 
A fifth alarming aspect of the FOSS community’s support of U.K. ICT
activities concerns its subsequent behind-the-scenes influential role in also
shaping the thoughts and proposed policies of the Public Administration
Select Committee (PASC) of the U.K. House of Commons. On July 25,
2011, said committee announced its forthcoming publication of a report351 
focused on government procurement-related ICT interoperability352 that 
the U.K. Cabinet will likely rely upon in justifying its ambitious emerging
national open-source-friendly, royalty-free-leaning government procurement
346. Id. at 6–7. 
347. Id. at 7. 
348. Id. at 12. 
349. Id. at 14. 
350. Id. at 14–15. 
351. See PASC to Publish Government IT Report, PARLIAMENT.UK (July 25, 2011), 
available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/ committees-a-z/commons-
select/public-administration-select-committee/news/pasc-to-publish-it-report/.
352. See Government and IT—A Recipe for Rip-offs”: Time for a New Approach, House 
of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2010–
12, HC 715-I (July 28, 2011), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 
cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/715/715i.pdf. 
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ICT standards strategy.353  Apparently, the prior March 2011 testimony 
of at least one witness who had echoed the U.K. government’s prior
characterization of its relationship with major IT suppliers as an
“‘oligopoly’ [consisting] of systems integrators354 that dominate so many
government IT contracts,”355 resonated with MPs working within the
House of Commons PASC356 and its Public Accounts Committee.357 
Nevertheless, while “the dominance of Government IT by a small number
of large systems integrators (SIs)” constituted a “recurring theme 
throughout” the Select Committee report,358 the report was rather light on 
specific practical recommendations to address this alleged problem.359
 353. See Information and Communications Technology in Government, House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Fortieth Report of Session 2010–12, HC 1050
(July 5, 2011), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/
cmpubacc/1050/1050.pdf.  This report criticized the UK government’s IT strategy as 
“lack[ing] detail about how it will be delivered . . . [such as] . . . quantitative targets . . .
lack[ing] a baseline of current performance, which will make it difficult to measure
success” [,and as lacking a] “proposals . . . to address the longstanding problems of high
turnover of Senior Responsible Owners (SROs), their lack of experience and their lack of
accountability.”  Id. at 3, 5–6. See also Kathleen Hall, Government IT Strategy ‘Lacks
Detail on Delivery’, Say MPs, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (July 5, 2011), http://www. 
computerweekly.com/Articles/2011/07/05/247179/Government-IT-strategy-lacks-detail-
on-delivery39-say.htm. 
354. “A systems integrator is a person or company that specialises in bringing 
together component subsystems into a whole and ensuring that those subsystems function
together.”  Government and IT—A Recipe for Rip-offs”: Time for a New Approach, supra
note 338, at 14, n.46. 
355. See Government ICT Strategy UK Cabinet Office (Mar. 2011) supra note 296, 
at 8 ¶ 14. For example, “Martin Rice, chief executive of software development company
Erudine, slammed the IT sector for taking advantage of the government’s lack of in-
house IT expertise.  Since Rice gave evidence to the select committee, Erudine has
collapsed after a major private sector customer refused to pay an unpaid bill.  But Rice
also cited the difficulty of winning government deals as a factor in the firm’s demise” 
(emphasis added). See Bryan Glick, MPs to Publish ‘Rip-off’ Report into Government
IT, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (July 27, 2011), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/
2011/07/27/247428/MPs-to-publish-39rip-off39-report-into-government.htm. Mr. Rice further 
“described the situation as a ‘cartel.’” Government and IT—A Recipe for Rip-offs”:
Time for a New Approach, supra note 338, at 14 ¶ 28 and accompanying note 53. 
356. Government and IT—A Recipe for Rip-offs”: Time for a New Approach, supra
note 338, at 14 ¶ 27, and accompanying notes 51–52. 
357. “The Government ICT strategy described the current situation as an
‘oligopoly’, a sentiment echoed by the Public Accounts Committee.”  See Government 
and IT—A Recipe for Rip-offs”: Time for a New Approach, supra note 338, at 14 ¶ 27. 
358. Id. ¶ 26, at 14. 
359. The Committee did, however, recommend that the following general courses 
of action be taken: “The Government should urgently commission an independent, 
external investigation to determine whether there is substance to these serious allegations
of anti-competitive behaviour and collusion. The Government should also provide a 
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Perhaps, the Public Administration Select Committee report could have
done more to emphasize how successive U.K. governments, through 
excessive software systems integration outsourcing, have left the current
U.K. government vulnerable to the vendor lock-in problem.360  In other
words, the real issue is government failure, not market failure.361  As the
result of excessive outsourcing, U.K. government agencies and personnel 
now lack the IT skills and knowledge to ensure the interoperability of
eGovernment systems which the U.K. Cabinet desires to build in
furtherance of its public IT policy objectives.  The PASC is correct in 
focusing on organizational and structural issues within government, but
it needs to examine the outsourcing problem in much greater depth. 
Consequently, it may be credibly argued that the U.K. Cabinet policy 
actions undertaken during January and March 2011, as influenced by the
FOSS community, including IGOR,362 are misguided.  It is not primarily
the cost of patent license (royalty) fees and the restrictions imposed by
FRAND/RAND licensing terms (i.e., a market failure) that have largely
impeded eGovernment systems interoperability at the expense of the 
“public fisc”. Rather, it has been primarily a government lack of IT 
knowledge and skills brought about and exacerbated by the U.K. 
government’s ongoing outsourcing of the systems integrator function that 
has resulted in its present IT predicament.  Indeed the PASC’s recognition 
of this fact is belied by the report’s relatively limited discussion of open 
standards and open source software.363  The U.K. public should be able
to learn of the multitude of challenges faced by its new government, 
including those legacy problems generated by prior governments’ actions,
and the Cabinet should account to the public for such failings. 
For all of the above reasons, and more, the U.K. Cabinet must seriously 
study the lessons learned by the Dutch Government and the E.U.
Commission.  Furthermore, the U.K. Cabinet must also carefully review
the potential regulatory and policy risks and economic impacts engendered
by the pursuit of its own emerging ICT policy agenda initiatives,
trusted and independent escalation route to enable SMEs confidentially to raise allegations of
malpractice.” Id. at 49 ¶ 30. 
360. The report discusses the issues of “vendor lock-in” and “legacy systems.”  Id.
at 15–16 ¶¶ 31–34. 
361. “It is these underlying causes of failure which we sought to assess in our inquiry.
There was a recurring theme in our evidence: that the failure of ‘IT projects’ was rarely
due to the technology itself.  Failure occurred because of flaws in the underlying policy, 
or its implementation.” Id. ¶¶ 12, at 9 (emphasis added). 
362. See discussion supra. “IGOR” consists of FOSS allies IBM, Google, Oracle 
and Red Hat. 
363. See Government and IT—A Recipe for Rip-offs”: Time for a New Approach, 
supra note 338, at 140–42 ¶¶ 138, and conclusion ¶¶ 27–28 (“open standards”); ¶ 167 
and conclusion ¶ 32 (“open source software”). 
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focusing particularly on inventors and patent and trade secret holders, to 
ensure against the impairment of U.K. ICT innovation.  As discussed
above, it might even consider whether the real problem at hand concerns 
the use of open standards and open source software at all, considering 
the organizational, logistical, and structural difficulties created by the steady 
outsourcing, by successive U.K. governments, of IT knowledge and skills to
third party IT systems integrators.  BRICS nation governments would be 
wise to do the same. 
3. BRICS Officials and NGOs Have Called for New            
Public Mechanisms to Regulate Private            
FRAND/RAND Licensing 
The E.U. and U.K. ICT interoperability debates have also likely triggered
downstream impacts in the BRICS nations where the governments have
been encouraged to reshape their national ICT standardization efforts364 
and to rebalance their national IP rights regimes in favor of the public 
interest. 
a.  Brazil
Since 2005, the government of Brazil has published an evolving set of 
interoperability standards for electronic government known as the e-PING 
program, which “address technical, semantic, and organizational issues, 
as well promote open standards and public or free software.”365  It covers
federal government-to-government, federal government-to-state government,
federal government-to-citizen, federal government-to-business, and federal 
364. As early as 2005, China proposed to the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) Committee that it further study with respect to IPR-based technologies how 
standardization interoperability needs at the societal level may be appropriately balanced
with IPR protection needs at the innovator level, in order for standards to facilitate and 
eliminate barriers to international trade, especially in the case of WTO Developing 
Country Members which typically require technical assistance and capacity building. 
See Intellectual Property Right (IPR) Issues in Standardization, Background paper for 
Chinese Submission to WTO on Intellectual Property Right Issues in Standardization, 
Communication from the People’s Republic of China Addendum (G/TBT/W/251) (Nov.
9, 2006), http://chinawto.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/200702/1171346578955.doc. 
365. Global Meeting on Government Interoperability Frameworks 2010, Rio de 
Janiero, Braz., May 4–6 2010, Report on the Global Meeting on Government Interoperability






















   
   
   
 
   
   
 
 
   
     










government-to-foreign government information exchanges. The most
recent version of e-Ping was released during December 2009 (Version
2010).366 
E-PING standards and policies are mandatory for all federal
government agencies367 and apply to all new and legacy systems.368  As a
matter of general policy, government agencies are to prioritize the adoption 
of “open standards” meeting technical specifications wherever possible.
In the absence of open standards, proprietary standards will be accepted, 
but only on a temporary interim basis until an open standard replacement
can be secured.369  In addition, consistent with the general policy,
government agencies must prioritize the use of public software or free
software in the implementation of interoperability standards.370  For  
purposes of implementing such policy, “free software” has been defined
as source code available for anyone to use, copy, and distribute in its
original or modified form either for free or at cost, and “is necessarily
non-proprietary.”371  And an “open standard” is one that: (1) “enables the
interoperability between several applications and platforms, internal and 
external”; (2) “enables application without any restriction or fee payment”; 
and (3) is capable of being “fully and independently implemented by
multiple suppliers of computer programs, in multiple platforms, with no
charge relating to intellectual property for the necessary technology.”372 
Accordingly at least one Brazilian commentator has opined that the e-
Ping definition of “open standard” is that contained within former EU 
EIFv1.0.373
 b. China
On November 2, 2009, the Standardization Administration of the
People’s Republic of China (SAC) released proposed standardization 
interoperability rules374 (interim draft regulations) governing the disposition
366. See BRAZILIAN GOV’T EXECUTIVE COMM. OF ELEC. GOV’T, E-PING ELECTRONIC
GOVERNMENT INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS, 7 (2009), available at http://www.governo 
eletronico.gov.br/anexos/versao-2010-da-e-ping-ingles. 
367. Id. at §§ 2–2.1.
368. Id. at § 2.1. 
369. Id. at § 3.1. 
370. Id. at § 3.2. 
371. Id. at § 11. 
372. Id. (emphasis added). 
373. See Jomar Silva, Standards and the Control of Communication, in CITIZENSHIP
AND DIGITAL NETWORKS 238 n.4 (Sergio Amadeu da Silveira, ed., 2010), http://www. 
cidadaniaeredesdigitais.com.br/_files/011jomar_ing.pdf. 
374. Regulations for the Administration of the Formulation and Revision of Patent-
Involving National Standards (Interim) (Exposure Draft), STANDARDIZATION ADMIN.
CHINA (Nov. 2, 2009) [hereinafter SAC Interim Draft], available at http://www.giprs.
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of patents involved in the development or revision of both compulsory375 
and voluntary376 national standards.377  If adopted, these rules would have
treated patented technologies even more harshly than would EIFv1.0.
Pursuant to the proposed rules, only patented technology that is
“essential” to the implementation of a voluntary national standard may
be incorporated into its development.378  Once deemed “essential,” a 
patented technology may be included in a voluntary national standard
only if the patentee chooses to license on a free-of-charge, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory basis or on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis 
at a price significantly lower than the normal royalties.379  A patentee’s
refusal to enter into a license at all will deny the patent inclusion within 
such a standard.380  In addition, the failure by any patentee or affiliate
involved in the drafting of a voluntary national standard to “promptly”
disclose the existence of a technology patent during the formulation or 
revisions phases381 will result in the deemed (implied) free licensure of
the patented technology, and will trigger legal liability in the event such
disclosure failure is subsequently found to be a purposeful concealment.382 
In general, a “compulsory national standard,” compliance with which 
is mandatory,383 shall not involve any patents.384  However, where “a
org/sites/default/files/National%20Standard%20Involving%20Patent_Reg_Draft_20091
119_En.pdf.
375. “National standards . . . for safeguarding human health[] and ensuring the
safety of the person and of property and those for compulsory execution as prescribed by
the laws and administrative rules and regulations shall be compulsory standards, the 
others shall be voluntary standards.”  Standardization Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, art. 7 (emphasis added), http://www.sac.gov.cn/sac_en/AffairsOpening/Lawsand 
Regulations/201011/t20101123_4214.html (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat. People’s
Cong. Dec. 29, 1988, effective Apr. 1, 1989). 
376. Id.
377. See SAC Interim Draft, supra note 360, art. 2. 
378. See id. at art. 3.
379. See id. at art. 9(1)–(2). 
380. See id. at art. 9(3).
381. See id. at 222, art. 5.
382. See id. at art. 8.  A purposeful concealment is defined as an act of concealment 
that “bring[s] losses to the setting and implementation of national standards.”  See Zhong
Yi, Ni Jia & Liu Jiayin, The Comparison and Commentaries on Regulation on the 
Administration of Setting and Revision of The National Standard Involving Patent 
(Interim) (Exposure Draft) (2009 Nov.) and Regulations on National Standard Involving 
Patent (Interim) (Exposure Draft) (2004 Sept.), GLOBAL IPRS RESEARCH CTR., 5 (Nov.
21, 2009), available at http://www.giprs.org/sites/default/files/Comparison%20and%20 
Commentaries_National%20Standard%20Involving%20Patent_20091120_En.pdf. 
383. See Standardization Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 361, 
art. 14. 
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compulsory national standard needs to involve a patent the patentee shall
grant a license free of charge [i.e., royalty-free]” or shall enter into
licensing negotiations with the appropriate administrative authorities.385 
If the patentee and the authorities fail to enter into a mutually agreeable
licensing arrangement, the compulsory national standard’s release will
be temporarily withheld or the patent will fall subject to a compulsory
license by force of law.386 
The recently released results of the U.S. International Trade
Commission investigation of China’s intellectual property laws, policies,
and practices clearly reflects USTR’s view that the practices called for
by the SAC Interim Draft discussed above are “in conflict with those 
followed by standards developing organizations in other countries, where
reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) licensing policies are 
incorporated into the standards.”387  When combined with China’s national 
“indigenous innovation” policy, the purpose of which is to promote “the
development of technological innovation in domestic firms, eventually
leading to the ownership of their own core IP rights,”388 it is clear that
the proposed Chinese standardization interoperability rules (interim draft
regulations) if adopted, would have had a severe impact on developed
country renewable or alternative energy companies, especially considering
that most manufacturing of solar panels windmills, hybrid auto batteries,
and compact fluorescent light bulbs occurs in China.389 
Pursuant to and in implementation of Article 17 of the SAC Interim 
Draft, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine, and the Standardization Administration of the People’s 
Republic of China jointly issued draft Disposal Rules for the Inclusion of 
Patents in National Standards in January 2010.390  Although these rules
384. See SAC Interim Draft, supra note 361, at art. 12. 
385. See id. at art. 13. 
386. Id.
387. China: Intellectual Prop. Infringement, Indigenous Innovation Policies, and
Frameworks for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. Econ., Inv. No. 332–514, USITC 
Pub. 4199, at 5–19 (Nov. 2010). 
388. See Peng Heyue, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy and its Effect on Foreign
Intellectual Property Rights Holders, CHINA L. INSIGHT, (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.china
lawinsight.com/2010/09/articles/intellectual-property/chinas-indigenous-innovation-
policy-and-its-effect-on-foreign-intellectual-property-rights-holders/.
389. “Only one of the top ten solar photovoltaic (PV) producers in the world is 
American; only one of the top ten wind turbine producers is American; and only two of
the top ten advanced battery producers are from the U.S. China and Japan host seven of 
the ten leading producers of photovoltaics.  India’s Suzlon Corporation is a leading
producer of wind turbines, another renewable energy category dominated by Chinese 
firms.” See Ebinger & Avasarala, supra note 136, at 30. 
390. See Disposal Rules for the Inclusion of Patents in National Standards (Draft
for Comments), GEN. ADMIN. QUALITY SUPERVISION, INSPECTION, & QUARANTINE, &
STANDARDIZATION ADMIN. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter
278
KOGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:56 AM     
  
   
 
   
  
 
   
   
 








   
      
 





   
  
  





[VOL. 13:  201, 2011] Commercial High Technology
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
apply directly to the formulation and revision of public national standards,
they may be referred to within and thereby apply indirectly to private 
industry standards and local standards under formulation and revision.391 
Unlike the SAC Interim Draft, the Disposal Rules require disclosure of 
not only published and issued patents, but also published patents awaiting
examination and non-published patents (patents pending) during the
national standard formulation and revision phases.392  The sample disclosure
form accompanying the Disposal Rules requires at least a summary
description of the technology relating to the known or pending patent(s)
and a description of those features within the specific technical standard 
in question that relate to such patent(s).393 According to at least one legal 
commentator, the interests of holders of pending patents will be placed
at risk since the rules fail to provide any assurance of confidentiality prior to
patent publication.394 
With respect to the licensing of essential patents,395 the Disposal Rules 
provide patent holders with the same three options as does the SAC Interim 
Draft, namely: (1) a royalty-free license on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms (RF-RAND); (2) a royalty fee-based license on reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms (RAND); or (3) no license at all.396  However, a
royalty-based license issued under option 2 of the Disposal Rules need not
be “at a price significantly lower than the normal royalties” as required 
by the SAC Interim Draft.397  In addition, where a patent holder refuses 
to license a patented technology, both regimes require its exclusion from
the national standard.398  However, unlike the SAC Interim Draft, the
Disposal Rules do not impose a penalty on a patentee for nondisclosure 
of an essential patent or for failing to negotiate a mutually agreeable




391. Id. at art. 1. 
392. See id. at art. 4.1.1–.2.
393. See id. at art. 4.1.2, app. A at 10–11 (form A.1). 
394. See Patents and Standard-Setting in China, FRESHFILDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER
LLP, 2 (Mar. 2010), http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2010/Mar10/27730.pdf.
395. See Disposal Rules, supra note 376, art. 3.1.
396. See id. arts. 4.3.2(a)–(c), 3.2–.3, app. A at 13 (form A.3). 
397. Cf. SAC Interim Draft, supra note 360, at art. 9(1)–(2). 
398. See id. art. 5.3.5.
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licensing arrangement with the authorities, which may be attributable to 
their procedural rather than substantive nature.399 
At least one legal commentator has emphasized that the ministerial
nature of the SAC Interim Draft and the Disposal Rules precludes the
imposition against private entities or individuals of obligations and penalties
not otherwise prescribed by law, namely measures enacted by the legislature 
—the People’s Congress or its standing committee—or by a State
administrative regulation.  Consequently, in the absence of a compulsory
licensing law or administrative regulation, the implied compulsory license 
imposed by the SAC Interim Draft would not be binding upon private 
entities or individuals.400  Nevertheless this would not preclude the State
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) from “us[ing] the Interim Regulations 
Draft as a reference point in deciding whether to issue a compulsory 
licence [sic], because it is authorized to issue compulsory licenses in the 
public interest.”401 
c. India
On November 12, 2010, the Indian government finalized its national 
policy on open standards for e-governance 2010,402 ending approximately 
three years of debate403 and amid concern “that Europe’s equivalent
European Interoperability Framework had been hijacked by rights
holders.”404  The policy’s purpose is to “provide a set of guidelines for
identifying . . . Open Standards for the consistent, standardized[,] 
and reliable implementation of e-Governance solutions . . . [in order] to
facilitate interoperability between systems developed by multiple
agencies . . . promote[] technology choice, and avoid[] vendor lock-in.”405 
399. See Patents and Standard-Setting in China, supra note 380, at 2. 
400. See id. at 1. 
401. Id. (emphasis added); see also Mark Cohen et. al., Amendment Provides New
Roadmap for Compulsory Licenses, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 30, 2009, at 9, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bw/2009-11/30/content_9074436.htm (discussing how
“[t]he amendment makes it more feasible and likely for compulsory licenses to be 
granted in the area of pharmaceuticals under a new Article 50 and semiconductor
technology under a new Article 52”). 
402. See Policy on Open Standards for e-Governance, MINISTRY OF COMM’NS &
INFO. TECH.,  (Nov. 2010) (India), available at http://egovstandards.gov.in/policy/policy-on-
open-standards-for-e-governance/policy_doc_and_manual_used_in_printing__recd_on_
Nov_12.pdf/view.
403. See Michael Tiemann, Indian Open Standards Policy Finalized, OPEN SOURCE
INITIATIVE BLOG (Nov. 12, 2010, 3:10 PM), http://www.opensource.org/node/551. 
404. See Mark  Ballard, India Mandates  Open  IT Standards as Fears Grow Over EU 
Policy, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Nov. 19, 2010, 4:55PM), http://www.computerweekly.
com/Articles/2010/11/19/244014/India-mandates-open-IT-standardsas-fears-grow-over-
EU.htm.
 405. MINISTRY OF COMM’NS & INFO. TECH., supra note 388, at Preamble and Section 1. 
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The policy applies “at [the] interface and data archival level[s] of all
systems used for e-Governance . . . [and is] . . . applicable to all prospective 
eGovernance systems including businesses (G2G [government-to-
government], G2B [government-to-business], G2E [government-to-
employee] and G2C) [government-to-citizen].”406  Owners of “legacy
systems” will be responsible for ensuring that the interfaces between
legacy and existing systems and between new versions of legacy and
existing systems adhere to the mandatory characteristics of open
standards,407 i.e., that they are interoperable.408 
In fulfillment of these policy objectives, the Indian government will 
adopt a single royalty-free “open standard” for each specific purpose 
within a given domain that meets six mandatory characteristics.409  Two 
of these characteristics incorporate the key goals of the FOSS movement
whose efforts were assisted by the media, the academic community, civil
society pressure groups and a number of government agencies:410 (1) 
“[t]he Patent claims necessary to implement the Identified Standard shall 
be made available on a Royalty-Free basis for the life time of the
Standard”;411 and (2) “[the] Identified Standard shall be recursively 
open412 as far as possible.”413  However, contrary to the FOSS movement’s
desire to exclude proprietary technologies from the definition of an
“open standard,” the Indian government policy provides that a “standard 
with patents can be considered as [an] Open standard if [it] adheres to
[the] mandatory characteristics of the Policy.”414  In the event an open
standard fails to meet all of the mandatory characteristics, the policy allows 
for the temporary adoption of an interim standard that progressively
relaxes the mandatory characteristics in a prescribed order “until the 
406. Id. at §§ 3.1–3.2. 
407. Id. at § 3.3.
408. See Deep Kurup, A Radical Shift in e-Governance, THE HINDU, (Nov. 24,
2010), http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/article907442.ece. 
409. MINISTRY OF COMM’NS & INFO. TECH., supra note 388, at § 4. 
410. See Venkatesh Hariharan, Open Standards Policy in India: A Long, But Successful
Journey, OPENSOURCE.COM (Nov. 19, 2010), http://opensource.com/government/10/11/
open-standardspolicy-india-long-successful-journey. 
411. MINISTRY OF COMM’NS & INFO. TECH., supra note 388, at § 4.1.2. 
412. “The mandatory characteristics are applicable recursively to the normative 
references of the Identified Standard i.e. standards which are essential for the implementation 
of the Standard of a particular version of the Standard.” Id. at A-II-9, Annexure–II 
Frequently asked Questions (FAQs). 
413. MINISTRY OF COMM’NS & INFO. TECH., supra note 388, at § 4.1.4. 
414. Id. at A-II-3, Annexure–II Frequently asked Questions (FAQs). 
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standard becomes eligible.”415  For example, the life-time, royalty-free
characteristic is the first that must be relaxed to allow for the
consideration of standards with FRAND and RAND terms bearing
no royalty payment.416  If royalty-free FRAND or RAND standards are 
unavailable, then a royalty-based FRAND or RAND standard may be
considered.417  In setting forth a definition of a royalty-free standard, the
policy document brings these distinctions in terms to light by emphasizing
the non-monetary consideration aspects of the underlying license.418 
With the adoption of this policy, India has joined Brazil in becoming the 
second country in the developing world to mandate “open” royalty-free, 
and effectively, proprietary-free standards in e-governance.419 
d. Russia
On December 17, 2010, one day following the release of the European
Commission’s final EIF, Russian Federation Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin signed an executive order setting forth specific guidelines that
mandate the complete transition from proprietary to free software by all 
Russian federal executive bodies and agencies during 2011–2015.420 
Apparently, the concept underlying the executive order was first openly 
discussed by the Russian Ministry of Communication during 2007 when
Mr. Putin still held the Office of the Russian Presidency.  The open
forum had followed from the results of a cursory study entitled, Concept
of the Development and Use of Free Software in the Russian Federation, 
which cited “the importance of open source software for [the development 
of] Russia, [for the securing of] ‘significant budgetary savings’, [for]
‘reduc[ing] dependence on foreign manufacturers and software providers’
and [for] ‘increas[ing] the intellectual potential of the country.’”421 
Consistent therewith, in October 2008, the Russian Ministry of
415. Id. at § 4.3. 
416. Id. at § 4.3(a). 
417. Id. at § 4.3(c). 
418. Id. at Annexure–I, “Royalty-Free (RF). 
419. See Kurup, supra note 394. 
420. See Government of the Russian Federation, Executive Order No. 2299-p, 
Transition of Federal Executive Bodies and Agencies of the Federal Budget [to] the Use
of Free Software from 2011–2015 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://filearchive.cnews. 
ru/doc/2010/06/17/2299p.doc, English translation at http://translate.google.com/ translate?
hl=en&ie=UTF-8&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http://filearchive.cnews.ru/doc/2010/06/17/2299p. 
doc&prev=_t&rurl=translate.google.com&twu=1. 
421. See Vladislav Meshcheryakov, Ministry of Communications Invites Citizens to 
Talk about Linux, CNEWS (Mar. 14, 2008, 7:48 PM), http://open.cnews.ru/news/top/
index.shtml?2008/03/14/292161, English translation at http://translate.google.com/translate?
js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&layout=2&eotf=1&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F
%2Fopen.cnews.ru%2Fnews%2Ftop%2Findex.shtml%3F2008%2F03%2F14%2F292161 
(quoting Concepts of the Development and Use of Free Software in the Russian Federation). 
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Communication announced a framework for the mandatory installation 
of free software on all Russian school computers by year end 2009.422 
These activities were subsequently followed by a late February 2009 
meeting convened by “the principal of the Russian Federation’s Ministry
of Communications and Mass Communications [and] representatives of 
Russian Free and Open Source Software (RFOSS) development companies, 
including VDEL . . . to discuss concrete steps that [could] be taken by the
state to support the RFOSS development process.”423  One possible step 
that had previously been discussed but not resolved during an earlier
February 2009 roundtable meeting concerned whether the Russian
government should actively seek to create and control a closed national
system of open source software for Russian developers.  Apparently, some
within the Russian FOSS community did not favor such an outcome. 
According to VDEL CEO Milan Prohaska, 
[t]he governments of China and Brazil made efforts to control the process of
open source software development, i.e. to create closed operating systems.  This 
approach just led them to a dead end. . . .  The idea of creating an exclusive
Russian information system (to be developed in Russia and for Russian users 
only) is, in essence, an attempt to build an “information ghetto” for Russian 
programmers, to limit them both at home and foreign markets.424 
Rather, “in order to create a real operating system in Russia,” it was
recommended that Russia fully integrate itself “into the global development 
process.”425 
If recent Russian media announcements and the Putin executive order 
are any indication, it would seem that the Russian government continues 
to favor the creation of a closed and indigenous Russian FOSS similar to
that established by Brazil and China.  On September 13, 2010, the
422. See Glyn Moody, *All* Russian Schools to Use Free Software, COMPUTER
WORLDUK BLOG (Oct. 23, 2008, 10:12 AM), http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-
enterprise/2008/10/all-russian-schools-to-use-free-software/index.htm.  Until the End of
2009 Will Introduce Free Software in all Russian Schools, CNEWS OPEN (Oct. 22, 2008,




423. Russian Government IT Development Strategy: Free and Open Source Software, 
GOV’T TECH.’S DIGITAL CMYTS. (Mar. 2, 2009) (emphasis added), http://www.digital
communities.com/articles/Russian-Government-IT-Development-Strategy-Free.html. 
424. Id. (quoting Milan Prohaska, CEO of VDEL).
425. Id. (quoting Dmitry Efanov, Representative, of The All-Russian Research
Institute of Control Automation in the Non-Industrial Sphere (VNIINS)). 
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Russian press announced “that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was 
being briefed on the development of a ‘national operating system,’ which
could be launched in 2012.” The government-funded ($350 million 
annually) and supported Linux-based indigenous system “dubbed 
Linuksovskaya” was lauded as being capable of saving the Russian
government “‘hundreds of millions’ of dollars spent annually on Windows 
and Windows-based applications” and providing the Russian government
with “complete control over how computer security is implemented and 
enforced in the country’s infrastructure.”426 At least one IT commentator 
has alleged that the recently released executive order reflects Prime
Minister Putin’s direct and personal involvement in Russia’s emerging 
IT infrastructure to ensure the establishment of a FOSS-based indigenous 
national operating system that could provide the Russian government 
with control over not only source code, but also the ability to monitor
and censor private transactions.427 He has thus warned readers that the
executive order is not likely to be limited to government procurement 
markets.428  The commentator emphasizes, in particular, how the section 
of the executive order covering education charges several government 
ministries with “rewir[ing] the entire Russian education system to
preferentially use and teach open source software, from secondary school
through vo-tech [vocational technical training schools) to university for 
the edification of all students, not just those being prepared for civil
service.”429 
The technical and organizational sections of the Putin executive order 
identify other ministries responsible for implementing distinct mandates 
that must be completed within certain timeframes.430  For example, by 
the third quarter of 2011, the appropriate ministries must approve
specifications for free software-supported data formats431 and financial 
accounting rule changes that would facilitate the government’s fiscal 
recording of the economic value of free software for which no current 
provision exists.432  According to the same IT commentator, the fact that 
426. See Tim Negris, Has Microsoft Russia Gone Rogue on Redmond?, SYS-CON
NEDERLANDS (Sept. 15, 2010), http://ne.sys-con.com/node/1533165.
427. See Tim  Negris, Putin Says ‘Da’ to Free Software, CLOUD COMPUTING J. (Dec.
29, 2010), http://au.sys-con.com/node/1660689.
428. Id.
429. Id. (emphasis added). 
430. See Vladislav Meshcheryakov, Putin Ordered the Transfer of Power on Linux, 
CNews Open (Dec. 27, 2010, 7:23 PM), English translation at http://open.cnews.ru/ 
news/top/index.shtml ?2010/12/27/421556; http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en
&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http://open.cnews.ru/news/top/index.shtml%3F2010/12/27/421556.
431. See GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 406, at point 11. 
432. Id. at point 21.
284
KOGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:56 AM     
  
   
 
   



















    




   
   
 
 
[VOL. 13:  201, 2011] Commercial High Technology
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
the financial accounting changes are to be carried out by the Russian
Ministries of Communications, Finance, and Economic Development which
control most aspects of how business is done and how information technology is 
acquired and used in the country by both businesses and individuals . . . could
be speaking volumes about the (non-)future of commercial western software in
the Russian Federation. If Putin wants to tax Microsoft, Oracle, and others out 
of existence in Russia, this would be a good way to start making that happen.433 
Besides promoting indigenous innovation and saving money, it appears 
that the adoption of such a policy under cover of the current global recession 
would also enable the Russian government “to funnel any remaining
software expenditures to Russian firms instead of foreign software 
companies.”434 
In addition, a basic package of free software solutions including 
operating systems, drivers, and application software for servers435 must 
be approved for use in pilot sites by the second quarter of 2012.436  And,
free software containing transferred data from previously used 
information systems must be introduced within specific government and
financial institutions by the third quarter of 2014.437  Further, the executive
order provides for the creation of a single repository “for Linux distros 
[distributions]438 and other free operating systems by the second quarter
of 2012”439 which will be used throughout all of the federal bodies of
executive power.
Whether or not the Putin executive order will enable Russia to achieve 
its stated objective without jeopardizing its access to international
intellectual and financial capital and without violating international trade 
laws as it prepares itself for WTO accession440 remains uncertain.441  In
433. See Negris, supra note 413 (emphasis added). 
434. Eric Brown, Russia’s Latest Five-Year Plan Calls for Switch to Linux, 
DESKTOPLINUX.COM (Dec. 29, 2010) (emphasis added), http://www.desktoplinux.com/ 
news/NS8433092393.html. 
435. Ben Parr, Vladimir Putin Orders Russian Government to Switch to Free Software
by 2015, MASHABLE.COM (Dec. 27, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/12/27/vladimir-
putin-free-software-by-2015/. 
436. See GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 406, at point 7. 
437. Id. at point 15.
438. See Linux Distribution, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_ 
distribution. 
439. See GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 406, at point 6. 
440. See, e.g., Steve Gutterman & Gleb Bryanski, Putin Praises START Treaty,
Warns on WTO, REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2010, 4:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2010/12/29/uk-russia-putin-usa-idUKLDE6BS0Z520101229; Steve Gutterman, Russia’s
 285








   












   
 
    
  
   
 




    
 
fact, it is arguable that Mr. Putin’s quest for indigenous Russian innovation
already runs counter to the global focus and spirit of the Yaroslavl
Roadmap442 (specifically, Steps 5-7 and 10-11)443 delivered to President 
Dmitry Medvedev in early September 2010.444  That roadmap is intended to
guide Russia along the optimal path to “accelerate the creation of a 
knowledge-based economy” in light of international “best practices.”445 
Indeed, Mr. Putin’s indigenous innovation gambit and protectionist 
tendencies could undermine political efforts initiated by Mr. Medvedev
to follow the Yaroslavl Roadmap and secure WTO accession.446 In 
particular, President Medvedev has endeavored to establish industrial 
strategic alliances, a free trade zone, and scientific, technological, and 
educational cooperation with the E.U. and the U.S. for the ultimate 
purpose of securing badly needed private and public western know-
how447 and investment capital (foreign direct investment).448  President 
Putin Sees 2011 WTO Entry Despite Questions, REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2010, 12:19 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/29/russia-wto-putin-idUSLDE6BS19720101229. 
441. See, e.g., American Lobbyists Against Open Standards, Faced with Opposition 
from the Free Software Foundation, CNEWS SOFT (Oct. 21, 2010, 1:46 AM), http://soft. 
cnews.ru/news/softbox/10555/. 
442. See Karin Ezbiansky Pavese, Christopher Hayter, Daniel M. Satinsky, Ben
Levitan & Christopher Cooke, Yaroslavl Roadmap 10-15-20, International Experience
and the Path Forward for Russian Innovation Policy, THE NEW YORK ACAD. OF SCI. 
(Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.nyas.org/yaroslavlroadmap. 
443. Step 5 emphasizes the need to “[u]nderstand international and domestic 
markets”.  Step 6 emphasizes the need to “[s]timulate internal demand through world-
class standards, regulation, and procurement protocols”.  Step 7 emphasizes the need to
“[e]stablish a balance between large and small companies and between multinational and 
domestic companies with the understanding that all are necessary drivers for a successful 
innovation system.”  Step 10 emphasizes the need to “[e]stablish clear IP ownership rules
for government-funded research.”  Step 11 emphasizes the need to “[e]stablish trusted and
complete IP law.”  Id. at 106–10. 
444. See Adrienne Burke, Academy Executives Present Roadmap for Innovation to
Russian Leaders, Inside the Academy, THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. (Sept. 13, 2010), 
http://www.nyas.org/membercenter/AcademyNews.aspx?cid=af15db02-5ce0-4fe5-93bc-ab5
8b9242ae8. 
445. See Daniel Satinsky, A Global Context for Russian Innovation Policy, MODERN
RUSSIA (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.modernrussia.com/content/global-context-russian-
innovation-policy. 
446. See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, A Putin Torpedo Fired at the WTO?, SEEKING ALPHA
(Dec. 31, 2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/244316-a-putin-torpedo-fired-at-the-wto
(discussing in part how Putin’s recent provocative remarks about justifiable protectionism 
may reflect an indirect effort to “undermin[e] the WTO” with the goal of weakening
Medvedev and his clout). 
447. See, e.g., Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and 
the Russian Federation on a Strategic Partnership in Innovation, THE WHITE HOUSE
(June 25, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-joint-statements;
Deliverables for U.S.-Russia Innovation Dialogue, U.S.-Russia Innovation Dialogue, 
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES, MOSCOW, RUSSIA (Feb. 2010), http://moscow.us
embassy.gov/rustechdel022510.html; EU–Russia Cooperation on Innovation: INNO- 
Views Publishes the Summary Outcomes of Two Policy Workshops and the First EU-Russia
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Medvedev has also encouraged international participation in ambitious 
innovation projects such as the Skolkovo Center,449 a high tech innovation
hub modeled after California’s Silicon Valley.450  Its existence was largely 
made possible only by Russia’s adoption of WTO-consistent legislation
modeled after U.S. intellectual property, technology transfer, and public-
private partnership laws.451  Therefore, those western companies possessing 
valuable patents, trade secrets, and other intangible assets that have already 
pledged funds and technical cooperation to such projects should remain
especially vigilant to ensure that such laws are actually implemented as
written.452  While it is possible that Mr. Putin’s expected return to the
Innovation Forum, PRO INNO EUROPE (July 22, 2010, 11:54 PM), http://www.proinno-
europe.eu/inno-views/newsroom/eu-russia-cooperation-innovation-inno-views-publishes- 
summary-outcomes-two-policy. Indeed, Point 22 of Executive Order No 2299-p provides that
the Russian government should “investigat[e] . . . possible forms (methods) and the 
prospects for state support to Russian software developers involved in international 
projects for developing free software that can be used for purposes of federal executive 
bodies.” GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 406 (emphasis added). 
448. See Alexander Kolyandr, Russia Moves to Draw in More Foreign Investors, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 29, 2010, at A7; Gleb Bryanski, Putin Wants Russia to Ease Foreign
Investor Rules, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2010, 5:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSTRE6BR3RP20101228; Chris Weafer, Economic Glasnost, THE MOSCOW TIMES
(Dec. 20, 2010), available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/economic-
glasnost/427178.html.
449. See Alexey Drujinin, Russia, EU Must Cooperate in Innovation—Putin, RIA
NOVOSTI (Nov. 25, 2010, 9:43 AM), http://en.rian.ru/world/20101125/161489372.html. 
450. Cf. Simon Shuster, Russia Plans a Silicon Valley, TIME MAGAZINE (Apr. 19,
2010), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1978772,00.html. 
451. See, e.g., Evgeniy Krasowski, The New Russian Technology Transfer Legislation:
An Overview Of Federal Law No. 217-FZ, BFW NEWS (July 6, 2010), http://www.beyond
thefirstworld.com/?page_id=1958; Lawrence A. Kogan, Taking Advantage of IP Protection 
to Advance Russian Biotech, presentation at the First EurasiaBIO International Congress for
Biotechnology, Bioenergy and Bioeconomy, YU. A. OVCHINNIKOV RUSSIAN SOC’Y OF
BIOTECHNOLOGISTS AND NAT’L BIOFUEL ASSOC. (Apr. 25, 2008), available at http://
www.itssd.org/Programs/KoganPresentationEurasiaBIOMoscowConferenceApril2008.p
pt; Yelena M. Bakulina & Lawrence A. Kogan, How Market-Based Policies Could Spur 
Biotechnology Growth in Russia, 23 WASH. LEGAL FOUND.—LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Mar.
21, 2008), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/03-21-08balukina.pdf. 
452. See GE in Russian Joint Ventures, ZACKS INV. RESEARCH (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/45283/GE+in+Russian+Joint+Ventures; Skolkovo  
Attracts Foreign Companies, THE VOICE OF RUSSIA (Dec. 14, 2010, 8:23 PM), http:// 
english.ruvr.ru/2010/12/14/36849246.html; Olga Razumovskaya, Siemens Plans Pilot
Projects, THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Dec. 14, 2010), available at http://www.times.
spb.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=33272; Svetlana Katmykova, Russia May
Take Lead in Innovations by 2017, THE VOICE OF RUSSIA (Dec. 13, 2010, 5:47 PM),
http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/12/13/36758465.html;  Tom Washington, Skolkovo Cash Goes to
Russian Energy Giants, THE MOSCOW NEWS (Dec. 13, 2010), http://themoscownews.com/ 
business/20101213/188274658.html?referfrommn; Andrey Goltsblat, Skolkovo Innovation
 287
KOGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:56 AM     
 
 
     
 
    
  
  
   



























    
Russian Presidency in 2012 would present additional risks to foreign ICT
and other investments, it is not yet certain.453 
e. South Africa
While having only very recently become a member of the BRICS
nations,454 South Africa is “[t]he leader of information and communication
technology (ICT) development in Africa” and has become “the 20th
largest consumer of IT products and services in the world . . . [T]he
country’s ICT and electronics sector [is recognized] as an increasingly 
important contributor to South Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP).”455 
Center Update: Rules for Aspirations: Fueling Inspiration or Regulating It?, GBLP in 
the Press, GOLDSBLAT BLP (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.gblplaw.com/news/articles/
47092/; Rajorshi Roy, Skolkovo Initiative: Russia’s Drive Towards Modernization, IDSA
COMMENT, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDY AND ANALYSES (Nov. 26, 2010), http:// 
www.idsa.in/idsacomments/SkolkovoInitiativeRussiasDriveTowardsModernization_rroy
_261110; Derek Anderson, Nokia Agrees to Join Skolkovo Center, THE MOSCOW TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/nokia-
agrees-to-join-skolkovo-center/423593.html; Goldie Blumenstyk, In New Project, 
Russian Universities Tap American Expertise in Tech Transfer, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://chronicle.com/article/In-New-Project- 
Russian/124657/.
453. See Andrew E. Kramer, For Investors, Russia’s Putin Is Good for Business, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/business/ 
global/new-putin-presidency-seen-as-good-for-business-in-russia.html (“A consensus is 
emerging among bankers, economists and companies that evaluate market risk that the
return of Vladimir V. Putin as Russia’s president will be a net positive for foreign
investors—regardless of whether they support the politics of it. . . .  According to this
analysis, the reunification of power in the Russian president in both title and practice—
even one, like Mr. Putin, who has a track record of abrogating contracts—creates a more
predictable long-term outlook for companies like Exxon Mobil, which has just agreed to
a major oil exploration deal in the Russian Arctic.  This investment argument in favor of
more stable, less pluralistic politics in Russia seems also to reflect the reality that rapid
economic development has been achieved in a number of post-Communist countries that 
never transitioned to democracy, like China. . . .  Other analysts note that companies and
investors will now be able to price in political risks whose contours are not likely to 
change much, as Mr. Putin is poised to remain in power until 2024.” (emphasis added)).
See also 5 Reasons for Investors to Cheer Putin’s Return, Editorial, The Moscow Times
(Sept. 26, 2011) available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mobile/article/ 
444280.html (“If Putin has proved anything during his 11 years in power, it is that he is a
strong leader interested in bringing stability to Russia.  His means of ushering in stability
and maintaining it have bred corruption and raised worries about the state of democracy
and civil society.  But at the same time, the investment climate has markedly improved 
from the chaotic 1990s, with, among other things, the passage of key legislation and
regulations that allow investors to work within an understandable—if often violated—
legal framework, a demonstrably greater effort by the authorities to consider and act on 
investors’ concerns, and a steady increase in the standard of living that has led to 
growing consumer demand.” (emphasis added)).
454. See GLOBAL POST, supra note 116; SOUTHAFRICA.INFO, supra note 116. 
455. See ICT and Electronics in South Africa, Key Sectors, SOUTHAFRICA.INFO
(Oct. 2008), http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/sectors/icte-overview.htm. 
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“The South African Ministry of Trade and Industry (DTi) has identified
ICT and electronics among 11 priority sectors that have the highest
growth and investment potential in South Africa.”456 
It is therefore not surprising that the South African government, a 
leading member of the WIPO DAG, released its own national 
eGovernment ICT interoperability framework during 2007.  Like the 
interoperability frameworks previously discussed in this Article, the
South African framework broadly defines open standards “as standards
containing specifications that are “documented, freely implementable
and available to the public at large.”457 The MIOS is applicable to all
existing as well as legacy government systems used by South African
national, provincial, and local government departments and agencies, 
and covers all intra-government agency, government-to-citizen, government-
to-employee and government-to-third party interactions consisting of the 
exchange of data and information access.458  The South African government
also recommends that MIOS be implemented “in all public sector
procurements and major upgrades to . . . departmental legacy systems . . .
[even for] systems that fall outside the scope and mandate” of MIOS.459 
And, as in the case of some other national governments’ frameworks, 
South Africa has drawn a strong correlation between ICT interoperability
and “open standards” largely for economic competitiveness and “public 
interest” reasons.  While acknowledging the different “definitions of
open standards which emphasize different aspects of openness, including 
of the resulting specification, the openness of the drafting process, and
the ownership of rights in the standard,” the framework nevertheless sets
forth a list of mandatory criteria for a standard to be considered “open.” 
Among other things, for example, “the intellectual property rights 
required to implement the standard (e.g., essential patent claims) [must be] 
irrevocably available without any royalties attached” and there must be “no 
reservations regarding reuse of the standard.”460 Perhaps corporate
innovators and investors may derive some comfort from the South African
 456. State of Victoria, Emerging ICT Market Strategy: South Africa, DEP’T OF
INNOVATION, INDUS. & REG’L DEV., 6 (2007), available at http://www.mmv.vic.gov.au/
Assets/606/1/MMVSthAfricaStrategyNov2007.pdf. 
457. MINIMUM INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS (MIOS) FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS
IN GOVERNMENT (VERSION 4.1) (2007), at §§ 2.2–.3 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added), available 
at http://www.sita.co.za/standard/MIOSv4.12007.pdf. 
458. Id. at §§ 1.2.1–33.
459. Id. at § 1.2.4. 
460. Id. at § 2.3.1. 
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government’s willingness, for reasons of pragmatism, to adopt other than 
fully “open” standards as so defined. For example, it may “take into
account . . . the degree of openness . . . when selecting an appropriate
standard [that does] not necessarily conform to being open in all
respects,”461 as in the case where a fully open royalty-free standard is
unavailable or is unsupported by the market and an otherwise
compatible FRAND, royalty-based specification is. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Multinational businesses possessing unique scientific and technological 
know-how should be concerned with the issues raised and findings
revealed in this Article.  National and regional governments, in both
emerging and developing countries, are actively pursuing regulatory 
agendas, originally conceived but later dismissed by European regulators, to 
advance the “public interest” that are actually undermining economically 
valuable private patents and trade secrets.  In the process, these
governments have intentionally or unwittingly increased the already high 
level of legal and economic uncertainty and associated risks currently 
borne by companies operating in the pharmaceutical and biotech, medical 
devices, clean and renewable energy technologies, clean technology 
services, and ICT sectors, as well as their investors.  As a result, unless
such companies endeavor to mitigate these risks through available public 
and private means, investors may ultimately decide to modify their 
investment strategies such that capital funds previously committed and 
new capital funds necessary to enable small and medium-sized entrepreneurs
(SMEs) and multinational innovators to conduct basic R&D and undertake 
technology-critical commercialization efforts will be diminished or
prematurely withdrawn and diverted to less risky and innovative ventures.
A. Public Law Opportunities to Mitigate Such Risks 
1. International Trade Agreements and the WTO            
State-to-State Proceedings 
The international trade agreements that fall under the auspices of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) acknowledge that proposed or enacted 
regulatory changes in one country can and often do affect the investment, 
trade, and regulatory landscapes in another.  Such regulatory changes 
also aim to prevent one member country’s laws and regulations from 
creating non-tariff-related trade and investment barriers that impede the 
461. Id.
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flow of goods and services offered for sale and sold by the citizens of 
another. Implicit in this recognition is an unspoken appreciation for the 
economic and legal uncertainties and the associated market risks such 
measures may engender. 
Consequently, consistent with the mutual concessions made by each
WTO member state at the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, member 
state governments are obliged, as a matter of due process and transparency, 
to consider other WTO members’ economic interests and to notify them 
promptly before enacting proposed legislative and regulatory measures 
that could potentially affect the property and due process rights of 
citizens engaged in the international trade of goods and services.462 This
obligation applies as well to WTO Member State laws and regulations that
may possibly impair the exploitation by WTO member citizens of validly 
held intellectual property (patent and trade secret) rights and trade in 
high technology goods in which such IP rights are embedded.463  In  
addition, it also applies to WTO Member State laws and regulations that
may “condition[] the approval of [patent-related] foreign investments on
compliance with laws, policies or administrative regulations that favor 
domestic [technology-based] products” for the direct or indirect purpose
of achieving industrial and economic development policy goals.464 
462. See Art. 12.4 (relating to Administration) and Annex B (relating to Transparency 
Of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations) of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493.; Arts. 
2.9 (relating to Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations by
Central Government Bodies), 3.2 (relating to Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Technical Regulations by Local Government Bodies and Non-Governmental Bodies), and
10 (Information About Technical Regulations, Standards and Conformity Assessment 
Procedures) of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Apr. 15, 1994,
1868 U.N.T.S. 120. 
463. Art. 63.2 of the WTO Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Agreement (relating to Transparency) “requires Members to notify the laws and 
regulations made effective pertaining to the subject-matter of the Agreement (the
availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement and prevention of the abuse of intellectual
property rights),” which the WTO Secretariat, pursuant to TRIPS, Art. 2.4, then “transmits to
the International Bureau of WIPO [World Intellectual Property Organization].”
Notifications Under the TRIPS Agreement, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop 
_e/trips_e/intel7_e.htm (last visited July 25, 2010).  See also WTO Trade Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs) Agreement, TRADE POLICY DIRECTORATE (Aug. 2001), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file22992.pdf.
In particular, TRIMS Article 6 relates to Transparency. See Agreement on Trade Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs), Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186. 
464. For example, governments may not adopt measures to promote the “public 
interest” of securing technological development and tech transfer at the expense of foreign 
patent and trade secret rights holders. See TRIPS, Article 8.1.  Nor may governments
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Furthermore, the obligations to ensure “national treatment” and transparency
to prevent “like” product discrimination or the creation of “unnecessary
obstacles” to (disguised restrictions on) international trade465 also extend to
the regulatory promulgations of a number of central and sub-central
government entities seeking to procure high technology products and 
related services beyond certain thresholds.466 
Consequently, a government’s decision to issue a de jure or de facto
compulsory license against foreign-owned software or other ICT patents 
or to enact a mandatory ICT interoperability framework has the same 
effect on ICT patent rights as do WTO implications may have on a
compulsory license.  WTO liability may be triggered if such rules favor 
domestic nonproprietary software and communications technology
developers operating pursuant to a “software-as-a-service” business model 
at the expense of foreign proprietary software, or communications
technology developers operating pursuant to a royalty-based business 
model.  For example, substantive as well as procedural measures could 
potentially fall within WTO Agreement provisions intended to prevent
discrimination between different types of intellectual property rights 
(patents versus copyrights or patents versus trade secrets) or between
different types of ICTs.467 Or, both types of measures468 could conceivably
fall within WTO Agreement provisions intended to prevent otherwise 
nondiscriminatory government measures from creating unnecessary
obstacles to trade if it can be shown that they impede a foreign owner’s 
adopt measures to prevent “abuse” of IP rights to prevent anti-competitive practices and 
practices that prevent technology transfer that unduly restrict or abrogate the right 
holder’s enjoyment of IP rights in violation of the TRIPS Agreement. See TRIPS, Article 8.2.
465. See also TRIPS, Art. 41.1; TBT, Art. 2.2–2.3.
 466. See Agreement on Government Procurement art. VI.1, Apr. 15, 1994
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103; 
URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTING BILL,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R.
DOC. NO. 103–316 (1994). See also Arts. III.1(a) and (b), XIX and XXIII.2 of the
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra. 
467. See TRIPS, Art. 27.1, which provides that “. . . patents shall be available and 
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.” Id.
468. “Procedures concerning the acquisition or maintenance of intellectual property
rights . . . [shall be] . . . reasonable . . . [and like] . . . procedures concerning the enforcement
of intellectual property rights[,] shall be fair and equitable.  They shall not be 
unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted 
delays . . . [And, they] shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”  See TRIPS, Arts.
41.1–41.2, 62.1, and 62.4.
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exercise of its IP rights469 when other less trade restrictive alternatives
are available to fulfill a legitimate public policy objective.470 
Arguably, the inquiry and analysis that national and regional governments 
and policymakers should undertake in each market (within developed 
and developing countries) to ascertain the presence and degree of
regulatory and policy risk and its impact on foreign as well as domestic 
high technology, innovation, and investment should be the same.  The 
inquiry should entail a broad examination of the domestic and cross-
border purposes and effects of the particular measure(s) in question.  The 
following inquiries should be made: 
• Did economic or civil society interests derive a direct or
indirect benefit from the enactment, repeal, or maintenance of 
a given regulation(s) (e.g., compulsory licensing) or the adoption
of ostensibly private standards? 
• Did this occur as the result of particular constituencies’ “home 
court” advantage? 
• Did this occur at the expense of competing foreign interests?
• Did such measure(s) qualify as permissible trade-related
political safeguard measure(s)? 
469. See TRIPS, Art. 31, which sets conditions for the issuance of compulsory
licenses. 
470. A WTO dispute panel recently explained the requirements imposed by TBT, 
Art. 2.2, which are arguably analogous to those contained in TRIPS, Art. 41.1.  While
such decision is not binding, it may be viewed as persuasive for purposes of
interpreting TRIPS, Art. 41.1.  See United States-Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Report of the Panel (US–Tuna II) 
WT/DS381/R, WTO (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanels/ 
us-tunamexico(panel).pdf.  “The first sentence of Article 2.2 translates this general 
objective into a positive obligation by requiring Members to ensure that their technical 
regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of,
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.”  Id. at ¶ 7.385.  “[T]he second
sentence of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement establishes two requirements that 
technical regulations must comply with in order not to constitute unnecessary obstacles 
to international trade . . . Technical regulations must pursue a legitimate objective; and 
They must not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill that legitimate objective, 
taking into account the risks non-fulfilment would create.”  Id. at ¶ 7.387. “Similarly
under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, which also relies on the notion of ‘legitimate 
objective’ pursued by the measures, the burden is on the complainant . . . to establish the
existence of a violation of this provision, including that the measures are ‘more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective,’ and this necessarily involves a
determination of what such objective is and its legitimacy within the meaning of Article
2.2.” Id. at ¶ 7.392. 
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• Were less intrusive and trade restrictive alternatives available 
other than those selected?
The answers to these questions may ultimately help determine whether 
WTO rules have been violated in the process.
“It must be emphasized that the use of an expressed preference (as
opposed to a direct mandate) is a nuanced way for governments to say
that if you seek a government contract, you must satisfy our demands, 
which can amount to a de facto mandatory imposition. It is possible,” 
therefore, “that such a preference can also rise to the level of a potential
trade barrier if, contrary to WTO rules,” its adoption, implementation, or 
enforcement by governments: (1) deny “national treatment” to foreign 
high technology imports; (2) “directly or indirectly . . . ‘discriminates’
against ‘like’ competing foreign or domestic” high technology products; 
or (3) “effectively creates an unnecessary (e.g., overly costly [and
burdensome]) obstacle to international trade” that could have otherwise 
been avoided through the selection of alternative mechanisms—
“[mechanisms that are other than] the least trade-restrictive alternative[s] 
available to satisfy a legitimate national policy objective.”471 
Indeed, GATT/WTO case law reveals that government preferences 
or recommendations can potentially rise to the level of indirect
governmental mandates even if the government itself does not directly
impose the mandate, but rather, private standards bodies or consortia do. 
In cases where governments indirectly facilitate development, promotion, 
enactment, adoption, implementation or enforcement of government 
policy preferences or prescriptions by private standards bodies or
consortia, GATT/WTO case law holds that there may exist enough of an 
imprimatur of government involvement in a given case to hold the
government culpable under WTO law.472  Thus, the relevant inquiry in
each case should be whether foreign high technology competitors
employing a product-based business model dependent on patent protection 
have been directly or indirectly disadvantaged economically as the result
of a preference for a business model based on royalty-free or
proprietary-free services.473  In this regard, the findings contained in the
471. See Precis of ITSSD WIPO Side-Bar Event, supra note 277, at 13. 
472. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Discerning the Forest from the Trees: How Governments
Use Ostensibly Private and Voluntary Standards to Avoid WTO Culpability, 2 GLOBAL
TRADE AND CUSTOMS J., No. 9, 2007 at 319, available at http://www.itssd.org/ 
GTCJ_03-offprints%20KOGAN%20-%20Discerning%20the%20Forest%20from%20the
%20Trees.pdf. 
473. For a more detailed discussion of the WTO implications of emerging voluntary,
compulsory and/or industry standards directly and indirectly impairing the exercise of 
exclusive patent rights, see Kogan, The Complementarity of Patents and Standards, supra
note 235, at pp. 30-41. 
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Report of the Panel on Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry474 are quite instructive, as they acknowledge that government
action can involve a demand, request, or the imposition of a condition,
but need not carry a particular connotation with respect to the legal form 
in which such government action is taken.475  Consequently, when
evaluating “situations involving actions by private parties, it is necessary
to take into account that there is a broad variety of forms of government 
action that can be effective in influencing the conduct of private parties.”476 
2. International Investment Agreements and  
Investor-State Arbitration 
The international trade agreements administered by the WTO provide
for state-to-state procedures that focus on either the removal or
withdrawal of state measures that interfere with an investor’s exercise of
private property rights, including patents and trade secrets, or the bringing 
of such measures into compliance or conformity with the relevant WTO 
Agreement (e.g., TRIPS).477 In addition to such state-to-state procedures, 
474. See Report of the Panel on Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R (Feb. 11, 2000), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop 
_e/dispu_e/6100d.pdf. 
475. “We note that several GATT and WTO Panel Reports have found that actions
by private parties can constitute ‘requirements’ within the meaning of Article III:4.”  Id. 
¶ 10.102. “While these cases are instructive in that they confirm that both legally
enforceable undertakings and undertakings accepted by a firm to obtain an advantage 
granted by a government can constitute ‘requirements’ within the meaning of Article
III:4, we do not believe that they provide support for the proposition that either legal 
enforceability or the existence of a link between a private action and an advantage 
conferred by a government is a necessary condition in order for an action by a private 
party to constitute a ‘requirement.’  To qualify a private action as a ‘requirement’ within 
the meaning of Article III:4 means that in relation to that action a Member is bound by
an international obligation, namely to provide no less favourable treatment to imported 
products than to domestic products.”  Id. at ¶ 10.106 (emphasis added). 
476. Id. at ¶¶ 10.106–10.107. “A determination of whether private action amounts 
to a ‘requirement’ under [GATT] Article III:4 must therefore necessarily rest on a
finding that there is a nexus between that action and the action of a government such that 
the government must be held responsible for that action.  We do not believe that such a
nexus can exist only if a government makes undertakings of private parties legally
enforceable, as in the situation considered by the Panel on Canada—FIRA, or if a
government conditions the grant of an advantage on undertakings made by private 
parties, as in the situation considered by the Panel on EEC—Parts and Components.” Id.
at ¶ 10.107. 
477. See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment
Arbitration: the Case of Indirect Expropriation, supra note 81, at 417, referencing The
DSU, Article 3.7. For a text of the DSU, panel and Appellate Body reports, and information
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there exist a myriad of international investment agreements (IIAs) which
a foreign IP investor could invoke in an investor-state arbitration
proceeding. 
Foreign investors generally can prevail in an IIA arbitration if they 
can show that a compulsory license (or government procurement
interoperability rules requiring royalty-free ICTs to participate in 
eGovernment standards that are tantamount to a compulsory license) 
constitute(s) an indirect expropriation.478  Unfortunately, there is no
“mechanical formula” that can be employed to determine whether a
given state act(s) rise(s) to the level of an actionable indirect expropriation,
given the multitude of state measures that could potentially substantially 
curtail an investor’s rights in its investment.479 
According to one commentator who has adopted a single-step analysis, 
an indirect expropriation will be found to exist where an investor has 
suffered a deprivation of the use of its property right and such
deprivation was “the result of the government reneging on a previous 
contractual commitment or authorization.”480  Another commentator
embraces a two-step analysis to determine whether a state act(s)
constitute(s) an indirect expropriation. First he focuses on whether “the 
nature or magnitude of the interference to the investor’s property interests in
its investment caused by” that measure(s) “amount[s] to a ‘taking’”.481 
Second he looks to whether such “interference rises to the level of an 
expropriation by reference to the relevant treaty standard . . . [taking into 
account] ‘specific undertakings or representations’ the state made to the 
investor and the ‘legitimate reliance or expectations’ of the investor
which were subsequently disappointed by the state interference”.482  A third 
commentator has adopted a three-step analysis. He first “examines 
whether the level of deprivation constitutes a taking [and then]
whether [it also] . . . rises to the level of an indirect expropriation.  [He
on the WTO dispute process, see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e. 
htm. 
478. Id. at 378.
479. Id. at 378–79. 
480. Id. at 381–82, referencing Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory 
Expropriation in International Law, 20 ICSID REV. FOR. INV. L.J. 1, 9–11 (2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=703244&download=yes. 
“[Thus,a] state’s decision to revoke a previously granted right [will be deemed similar] 
in its effects [to] the indirect appropriation or acquisition of that previously granted
approval or authorization by the state.” See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the 
Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: the Case of Indirect Expropriation, supra
note 81, at p. 382. 
481. Christopher Gibson, supra note 81, at 382 (referencing Jan Paulsson & Zachary
Douglas, Indirect Expropriation in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 145, 145–46 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Kröll eds., 2004). 
482. Id.
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then examines] the character of . . . and the regulatory purpose behind 
. . . the government action.”483 
Unlike the remedies available in WTO proceedings, which are purely
prospective in nature, the remedies available in investor-state tribunals 
are purely compensatory in nature and would provide monetary damages 
“in the case of an indirect expropriation or other violation of the
international investment agreement.”484  There are significant differences
as well between the available enforcement mechanisms of the WTO and
those of an IIA.  WTO enforcement measures, which tend to be lengthy
and non-tailored to particular investors, include “diplomatic pressure to
withdraw the WTO-noncompliant measure or bring it into compliance, 
obtention of compensation (which is voluntary), or suspension of trade 
concessions as a form of retaliation.”485  By contrast, an award rendered 
under the ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes) Convention486 must be recognized as binding by each contracting 
state. Thus each must “enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by
that award within its territory as if it were a final judgment of a court in
that State.”487 ICSID investor-state awards cannot be appealed
administratively or otherwise challenged in court, “as is possible under 
the New York [UNCITRAL]488 Convention.”489  If successful, an investor 
will have the option of enforcing “an award in any country where the 
host state may hold funds” or it may be “required to avail itself of the
domestic courts of the host state against whom such enforcement is 
sought.”490 Were an investor to take this latter course, it may encounter the
 483. Christopher Gibson, supra note 81, at 382–83. 
484. Id. at 418. 
485. “These measures may bring the investor the relief it desires, but the process 
may be lengthy and is not guaranteed to achieve a tailored outcome for the particular 
investor, even if some form of enforcement takes place.” Id. at 419. 
486. “ICSID is an autonomous international institution established under the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States [t]he primary purpose of [which] is to provide facilities for conciliation and
arbitration of international investment disputes.”  See International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp. 
487. See ICSID Convention, Article 54(1), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
488. See U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards [New York Convention] art. V, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf. 
489. See Christopher Gibson, supra note 81, at 418–19. 
490. Id. at 419. 
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doctrine of sovereign immunity which “may be used to impede execution
of the award.”491 
Notwithstanding the apparent differences between WTO state-to-state
and investor-to-state proceedings, it must be remembered that, in the
end, the tribunal must maintain an “appropriate balance between the 
rights and responsibilities of investors and those of governments.”492 
This means that while a foreign IP “investor is entitled to have its
legitimate expectations with regard to the operation and return on its
[patent and trade secret] investment[s] respected by the host state . . . the
host state should [nevertheless] be able to pursue lawful regulatory goals 
[such as affordable eGovernment ICT interoperability] without risk of 
‘regulatory chill.’”493  This will entail an additional level of complexity
as the TRIPS compulsory licensing provisions are applied in an investor-
state arbitration to assess the legality of the regulatory provisions in 
question.
The possible reference to the WTO TRIPS Agreement demonstrates the second
level of complexity: the compulsory license provides a case in point to show the 
intricate interplay between two different treaty-based regimes. A compulsory 
license-based claim for indirect expropriation against a host state under an IIA 
may implicate several strands of public law that can be complimentary or
competing, integrated or overlapping.  International investment law, as channeled
through the investment treaty, confronts intellectual property law as established
through national law or the TRIPS Agreement. The compulsory license brings
this confluence of competing legal regimes into stark focus.  If a foreign
investor believes that a host state has improperly authorized a compulsory
license with respect to its patent-based investment, it may face not only a choice 
of forum in which to vindicate its rights, but also complex choice of law issues
in making out a claim of indirect expropriation. Because investment agreements 
such as BITs stand side-by-side with the WTO multilateral trading system, these
different regimes may afford different levels of protection and different 
remedies to the foreign investor in a dispute where the investor’s home state and
the host state are both members of the WTO, or where the IIA itself makes
reference to the TRIPS Agreement.494 
Indeed, other legal commentators have also considered how general public 
international law, such as WTO and human rights law can influence
international investment law.495 
491. “Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force 
in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from 
execution.” See ICSID Convention, Article 55; see Christopher Gibson, supra note 81, at 
419. 
492. Id. at 420. 
493. Id.
494. Id. at 421 (emphasis added). 
495. See Jurgen Bering, Tillmann Rudolf Braun, Ralph Alexander Lorz, Stephan
Schill, Christian Tams & Christian Jietje, General Public International Law and 
International Investment Law—A Research Sketch on Selected Issues 9–25 (The
International Law Association German Branch, Subcommittee on Investment Law 
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B. Private Law Opportunities to Mitigate Such Risks 
Beyond recourse to public international trade and investment law
remedies, the innovator and investor community affected by the trends 
in evidence may avail itself of other initiatives and subsequent activity
designed to support practical proactive measures.  These measures 
traditionally include structural vigilance, wide external diligence, and
carefully crafted communications with individuals and organizations, both
public and private, all of which are predicated upon astute monitoring
and analysis of relevant events in international and national fora discussing
these issues. 
Structural vigilance would entail among other efforts, the undertaking 
of an organizational review of existing security regarding intellectual
property (e.g., patents, technical know-how, information, data, etc. .
.); correcting, revising, or replacing any areas of vulnerability as may be 
permitted; scrutiny of all R&D, product testing, licensing and distribution 
regimes and commercialization relationships in light of legal enforceability
venues, and licensee and agent performance and compliance with
established standards.  Management assessment must be made of the 
advisability of strategic placement of company R&D and commercialization 
assets in distinct business locations to prevent any one or more business
units from acquiring the capability of reverse engineering of technology 
with or without the assistance of local third parties, as may be possible. 
External diligence would entail access to or development of information 
pathways through credible sources, or reportage or analysis to facilitate 
due diligence necessary to follow and measure the extent to which IP-
based rule of law is adopted and enforced within each jurisdiction in which
company business units operate or are to be deployed; construction of
a flexible decision matrix to support a regime of identity or nonidentity
to be associated with such efforts; and concentration and limitation of 
personnel therein to reduce possible leakage or other unwanted or 
unintended consequences. External considerations also include vigorous 
supply-chain enforced protocols for information exchange, conformity
assessment and compliance with quality, performance, and integrity of 
Working Group, Working Paper (2009)), available at http://www.50yearsofbits.com/
docs/091 2211342_ILA_Working_Group_IIL_PIL.pdf (demonstrating, in part, how the 
abstract principle of “fair and equitable treatment” contained in most bilateral investment
treaties has been addressed in the practices of arbitral tribunals and is influenced by
public international law, and recommending an alternative approach that draws parallels 
to public law standards used in both domestic law and other international law regimes ). 
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shipment standards, loss control, and verified real time reporting, among
others. 
Carefully crafted communications with individuals and organizations 
would preserve credibility and access, whether or not contracted for,
gratuitous, or circumstantial.  An external communications policy that
conveys clear guidelines to all vetted personnel acting as representatives 
governed by an information regime designed to assess and ensure the 
identity, accuracy, and protection of relevant information must be
established. Where required, secure communications may have to be 
utilized. Responses to external sources of information, including civil
society pressures groups and policy initiatives arising in government and
intergovernmental venues, must be anticipated and conform to
predetermined protocols, whether the respondent is corporate or retained. 
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